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DOI: 10.2870/12804This thesis is composed by four independent chapters. Their common denominator is
the process of human capital accumulation analyzed under di®erent perspectives and using
di®erent techniques. In the following I will shortly describe each chapter in more detail.
Chapter 1 addresses an important aspect of the e®ects of trade liberalization that has
gained much attention in recent years: raising skill premia. It is motivated by recent evidence
showing that trade liberalization in developing countries is often associated with a large
increase in wage inequality. I investigate the mechanism through which a trade related
increase in the demand for skilled labor a®ects human capital investment and the wealth
distribution of a developing country economy.
In particular I focus on a scenario where the liberalizing economy is in a poverty trap.
This is because developing economies are often plagued by credit market imperfections.
Imperfect ¯nancial markets raise the probability that individuals are constrained in their
human capital investment decisions and that the economy is an poverty trap. I use a standard
overlapping generation model to show how a trade related increase in the demand for skilled
labor can release a developing country from a poverty trap, leading to increased human
capital accumulation and technology progress. The skill biased technological shock bene¯ts
the whole economy and "trickles down" - through the interest rate - to unskilled workers a
la Aghion & Bolton (1997).
Chapter 2, which is joint work with Lidia Farre, analyzes the educational choices of
Argentinean teenagers during di®erent phases of the economic cycle. We use data for Ar-
gentinean households over the period 1995-2002 to examine households' response to negative
idiosyncratic income shocks in di®erent macroeconomic scenarios.
We study how teenagers' school progress responds to household head unemployment
during periods of high economic growth and compare it to the response during recession
years, when families are more likely to be ¯nancially constrained. After accounting for the
potential endogeneity of household head unemployment we ¯nd that school failure in response
to unemployment shocks increases during periods of economic instability. Further we ¯nd
that for ¯rst born boys this results from a greater involvement in labor market activities.
Our results add to the existing literature on the long term cost of macroeconomic crises.
In Chapter 3 I analyze a di®erent aspect of the Argentinean macroeconomic crisis and the
related social costs. Argentina experienced an important increase of informal employment
and wage dispersion in the last 20 years.
This chapter extend a search model with exogenous human capital accumulation to include
an informal sector. The model is parametrized such to ¯t Argentinean data in order to
investigate the e®ect of employment protection measures on informality, employment and
wage dispersion under two di®erent macroeconomic conditions. I ¯nd that for low educated
workers both severance pay and minimum wages increase informality. In the presence of
vii
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DOI: 10.2870/12804a wage °oor severance payments do not a®ect employment but only shift marginal workers
from the covered sector to the unregulated one. I ¯nd that a decrease in the return to human
capital skills increases the incentives to seek informal employment. Labor market protection
measures and declining human capital return are able to explain most of the increase in
informality and much of the increase in wage dispersion.
Last chapter is coauthored with Christian Dustmann and focuses on the very early phases
of human capital investment: pre school years. In this chapter we investigate test score gaps
and their evolution for white and ethnic minority children aged 3 and 5 in the UK. We also
analyse the e®ect of early school exposure on test score gaps, and di®erences in the e®ect of
entry age on early school performance. Ethnic test score gaps at age 3 - when most children
are not enrolled in Kindergarten yet - are large. Background characteristics (in particular
exposure to the English language) explain part, but not all of this di®erential. Between the
age of 3 and 5, the ethnic test score gap narrows. Exposure to preschool measured at age
5 - even if limited to only a few months - has a larger positive e®ects on test scores for
those minority groups who started from a more disadvantaged position. Further, keeping
exposure to pre-school constant, ethnic minority children loose less from entering pre-school
at a younger age than majority individuals; for some groups, there is an overall gain from
entering school early. Our ¯ndings point at a reduction in achievement gaps between minority
and majority children in the UK between age 3 and age 5, which is partly due to a larger
positive e®ect of pre-school on achievements of minorities.
viii
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poverty traps and development
ABSTRACT
Credit market imperfections raise the probability that individuals are constrained in their
investment decisions and that the economy is an poverty trap. An overlapping generation
model where agents choose whether to become educated when young is presented. Education is
expensive and needs to be ¯nanced by borrowing. Interest rate is derived endogenously. Trade
liberalization provides an exogenous increase in skilled workers productivity under the form
of a technology spillover. It is shown that a skill biased technology shock, while increasing
income inequality can trickle down to unskilled workers and spur an increase in human
capital investment and growth. The new equilibrium is characterized by a higher human
capital, higher growth rate and possible specialization in the high technology sector.
1




Recent evidence shows that trade liberalization in developing countries is often associated
with a large increase in wage inequality (Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007)). Is has been argued
that trade increases technology transfers from industrial to developing countries and that the
transfer technology is biased in favor of skilled labor.1 Purpose of this paper is to analyze how
such a technological transfer a®ects human capital investment and the wealth distribution
of a developing country economy characterized by credit constraints.
In the presence of borrowing constraints the distribution of income and wealth becomes
an important determinant of investments in human capital. Moreover, in credit constrained
economies an increase in the skill premia might exacerbate the economy's divide between
those who can invest in education and those who cannot, without increasing human capital
accumulation. A growing literature shows that if credit markets are not perfect and the
acquisition of education is costly, poverty traps can arise.2
This paper shows how a trade related increase in the demand for skilled labor can release
a developing country from a poverty trap, leading to increased human capital accumulation,
technology progress, and wealth equality in the long run. The basic intuition is that an
increase in labor productivity experienced only by the skilled workers can bene¯t the whole
economy and "trickle down" - through the interest rate - to unskilled workers a la Aghion
and Bolton (1997).
The idea of trade related technology spillovers or transfers goes back to the work of Gross-
man and Helpman (1991) and found some convincing supporting evidence in the empirical
work of Robbins (1995), Robbins (1996), or Wood (1997) especially for Latin American coun-
tries. Wood (1997) eloquently summarizes the empirical ¯ndings on trade liberalizations and
criticizes the conventional wisdom associated with Stolper- Samuelson result, which predicts
gradual eradication of wage disparity in the South.3
1Bayoumi, Coe and Helpman (1999), Coe, Helpman and Ho®maister (1997), Coe and Helpman (1995)
¯nd that the research and development (R&D) spillovers from the industrial countries to the developing
countries are substantial. Total factor productivity in developing countries was positively associated with
R&D expenditure abroad. More important here, however, the spillovers were linked to trade °ows between
the industrial and developing countries. The spillover from an industrial country to a developing country
was proportional to the share of the industrial country's imports in the developing country's gross domestic
product. Robbins (1995), Robbins (1996), Wood (1997) or Hanson and Harrison (1999) identify technology
transfers as the most likely reason for the increase in wage inequality.
2The literature on educational choice and endogenous credit constraints builds on the pioneering work by
Zeira (1991), Tsiddon (1992) and Galor and Zeira (1993).
3According to standard Heckscher - Ohlin theories North-South trade should be characterized by a clear
trade pattern: the industrial "North" exports high-quality goods to the developing "South" which exports
primary goods or lower-technology goods to the North. In this context trade liberalization in a developing
country should be associated with an increase in the relative demand for unskilled labor and a narrowing of
2
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DOI: 10.2870/12804The increase in skilled labor productivity is due to technology spillovers as already hy-
pothesized by Grossman and Helpman (1991). 4
While in the existing literature on human capital accumulation, interest rate is usually
taken as given, this paper assumes both an endogenous real interest rate and agents who are
heterogenous both ex ante and ex post.5 In particular considering credit constraints few have
considered the interactions between physical and human capital investments. In deciding
whether to become educated or not when young, agents are also deciding whether to become
borrower or lenders. Thus not only is the educational choice determined in equilibrium,
but the division of the population into borrowers and lenders is endogenous. I will then
describe the evolution of the economy following the trade "shock" to a new unconstrained
equilibrium.
The economy is characterized by credit constraints that undermine investment in human
capital. Credit market imperfections are pervasive in the case of education loans due, in part,
to the fact that as human capital does not act as collateral for loans, there is a moral hazard
problem in lending to ¯nance education. Evidence that credit constraints a®ect human
capital accumulation in developing countries abounds. For example Jacoby and Skou¯as
(1997) or Jacoby (1994) ¯nd strong links between ¯nancial market imperfections and human
capital accumulation in India and Peru respectively.6
The model features two period lived agents who value both consumption and bequest to
their children. Individuals di®er both in ability (or cost to learn) and inherited wealth. To
invest in education individuals use their inherited wealth as collateral in return for a loan to
pay for the initial cost to learn and a human capital investment. Potential moral hazard in
debt repayment limits borrowing.
Initially few agents are e±cient enough to invest in human capital and those who do,
invest little. With few skilled workers, technology is stagnating, the demand for capital is
low and thus the interest rate is low. An exogenous productivity shock increases human
capital investment of the skilled workers on the extensive margin allowing for an increase in
the interest rate bene¯tting the unskilled/lenders. Wealth grows permitting an increase in
the share of skilled workers. However, an increase in skilled human capital generates higher
technology progress and thus a higher wage inequality. In the new steady state agents will
not be limited by their wealth in the investment into human capital but only by ability.
wage di®erentials.
4This channel o®ers a very °exible way to model skillpremia increases and it can be reconciled with
recent theories analyzing issues of fragmentation (Feenstra and Hanson (1995) or technological catch-up in
the South as in Tre°er and Zhu (2005).)
5Notable exceptions considering endogenous interest rates are Fender and Wang (2003) and Galor and
Moav (2004).
6For a cross-country evidence see e.g. Checchi (2001) and Flug, Spilimbergo and Wachtenheim (1998).
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existing literature on trade and human capital accumulation.
Departing from a standard two by two Heckscher - Ohlin prediction past literature on
trade and human capital accumulation has reached di®erent conclusions on the e®ects of
trade on human capital accumulation. Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983) ¯nd that the accu-
mulation of human capital in capital skill-scarce countries falls when the rewards to edu-
cation are reduced by the availability of cheaper skill-intensive import goods. In contrast
Eicher (1999) present a model where trade in goods alone is su±cient to reduce di®erences
in rates of growth, technological change and factor endowment between leader and laggard
economies. In his model both the human capital and technological change are endogenous
and their respective costs of accumulation interact. Stokey (1996) presents a dynamic model
of growth where free trade has almost no impact on human capital accumulation even if full
integration does have a substantial impact on skill premia. Cartiglia (1997) shows that trade
leads to a convergence across countries in human capital endowments in a model where the
credit market is missing and the investment in education is determined by the wage of skilled
workers.
The mainstream of the literature on trade and income distribution has focused on the
way trade and technology determine factor prices and then the distribution of income.7
This literature relays on trade induced technical change to explain wage inequality con-
sidering intermediate inputs trade and the hypothesis of production fragmentation between
North and South (Feenstra and Hanson (1995), Tre°er and Zhu (2005), Jones (2000)).8
This model di®ers from this literature in that it considers the human capital accumulation
process and possible imperfections in the credit market. The interest is thus in the dynamic
process of development set in motion by the trade shock. The model also analyzes the
consequences of credit market imperfections and high wealth inequality on trade pattern.
Ranjan (2001) and Wynne (2005) also show that the distribution of income can have dy-
namic e®ects on trade. Credit market imperfections make wealth distributions endogenous,
a®ecting the accumulation of human capital in the ¯rst case, the production in the labor
intensive sector in the second case.
This paper di®ers from Ranjan (2001) in that it endogenizes the interest rate and the
resulting division of the population into borrowers and lenders is endogenous.9
7see Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) for a survey of this literature and related evidence.
8 Shifting production of middle skill intensive goods from the North to the South raises the skill intensity
of employment everywhere.
9Aghion and Bolton (1997) have endogenous choice between becoming a borrower or lender in a model
where agents di®er in initial wealth and physical investment loans are subject to credit constraints. They
consider primarily the trickle-down e®ect of physical capital accumulation when credit constraints underpin
persistent income inequalities.
4
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DOI: 10.2870/12804In this spirit the paper very closely relates to the literature focusing on the income distri-
bution dynamics along stages of economic development in closed economies with imperfect
credit markets.10 In particular among this group of papers the dynamic analysis relates to
Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt (2000) and Galor and Moav (2004). These papers focus on a
di®erent issue however: the relation between inequality and growth.
The plan of the paper is as follow. Next section introduces the model. Section 1.3
analyzes the model in a stationary environment. Section 1.4 considers trade liberalization




The economy produces a single non-tradable ¯nal good, denoted by Y , and two tradable
intermediate goods one high tech and one low tech, denoted by Xs and Xu. The ¯nal good
is used for consumption as well as an input into education. It is also chosen as the numeraire.






The intermediate good's ,Xs, production is a function of skilled human capital H and a set
of capital goods z(j) indexed by the variable j. To avoid complications arising from integer
constraints, the index j is modelled as a continuous variable. Technological progress is
represented by the invention of new types of capital goods (Romer (1990)). Capital varieties
are di®erentiated but not necessarily superior to one another. More capital varieties lead to











where z(j) represents the input of capital good j used in the high skill good, b is the number
of capital goods employed,and HP is skilled human capital used in production. Given the
number of capital goods used, the technology represented in (2) exhibits constant return
to scale. All the manufacturers rent capital goods, z(j) from the patent holder and hire
skilled labor HP to produce manufactured goods. All manufacturers are price takers and
earn zero pro¯ts. Supposing that every capital good is used in equal quantity z, as will be
10See e.g. Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993), Piketty (1997), Aghion and Bolton
(1997)
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t , where pro¯t
maximization in the capital goods market implies z(j) = z is the average quantity of capital
goods and Bt is an index of the state of technology. Capital goods last for one period, and
are produced with one unit of capital k.11 Production cost is thus 1 + rt = Rt where rt is
the real interest rate. Perfect competition implies marginal cost pricing, hence the amount








which is the same for all types of intermediaries used in sector s, i.e. z(j) = z;8j.
The technology for producing new patents, assumes that human capital and knowledge
are the only inputs that in°uence the research output:
Bt+1 ¡ Bt = Bt±Á(At=Bt)H
R
t (4)
where Bt+1 ¡ Bt are the newly invented products, HR
t are the skilled workers employed in
R&D, ± measures the productivity of labour in the research lab, and Á(At=Bt) is a function
representing technological spillovers. Research productivity varies with the stock of knowl-
edge capital Bt. Bt is the range of products known in the country and At is the frontier of
the most advanced goods available in developed countries. Borrowing from Grossman and
Helpman (1991) and Pissarides (1997) I assume that the level of technology in the North im-
proves through original expensive research and that a lower level of technology in the South
improves through cheaper imitation of the North's technology. To simplify the analysis, I
assume that the level of technology in the North is independent of the activities of ¯rms in
the South and improves at an exogenous growth rate gA. If trade does not allow knowledge
spillovers or reverse engineering or if there is no trade Á(:) = 1, the same is true if At = Bt.
Research is ¯nanced by a public entity that raises revenues through tax collection on skilled
labor ¿. 12When the government undertakes R & D, the blue-prints are put in the public
domain and can be used at no cost. Research is ¯nanced by tax revenues and the ¯scal
budget is always balanced. Skilled workers can be used either in production of the high skill
good or in the research sector Ht = HP
t + HR
t , consequently the budget constraint is then
¿wsHt = wsHR
t . Given the budget constraint and the skilled labor market constraint, the
number of skilled workers that contribute to R& D and to production is given by
H
R
t = ¿Ht (5)
H
P
t = (1 ¡ ¿)Ht (6)
11Total capital in the economy is thus Kt = Btz.
12This simpli¯es the research sector and follows Grossman and Helpman (1991).
6
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to identify the ine±cient use of machines by unskilled labor.
X
u = Bt¡1»Ut (7)
Given the above production structure for the two industries, perfect competition implies



















t ((1 ¡ ¿)Ht)
´¡1 (9)
Equation (8) shows that, on the production side, the relative wage is determined by relative
productivity. The latter is determined by technological change. An increase in the relative
supply of skilled workers lowers the relative wage, while and increase in the rate of techno-
logical change raises it. Depending on the strength of each factor, the e®ects of an increase
in technological change may well outweigh the e®ects of concurrent increases in the skilled
labor force.
1.2.2 Factor supply
This section outlines the incentives and the opportunities to invest in education, given the
relative returns to skilled and unskilled labor, the credit constraints and the wealth accu-
mulated by households. Agents live for two periods, but for the sake of simplicity consume
only when old. In each cohort agents di®er along two dimensions: because of the amount
of wealth inherited ai 2 [a;a] and their ability qi. Each in¯nite parent-child chain forms a
dynasty.
Parents care about their children and leave them a bequest. Parents have warm glow
preferences over bequest. Apart from being analytically tractable, the warm glow preference
for bequests formulation seems to have better microfoundations than the Ricardian formu-







where C is consumption while a is the bequest left to the o®spring.
There is no population growth, and each cohort size is normalized to 1. The labor
constraints in period t then becomes
1 = St + Ut (11)
Ht+1 = h(St;xt) (12)
7
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dents), while xt denotes the investment in human capital they intend to do. Ht+1 is the
stock of e±cient human capital in the economy given by those agents who decide to invest
in education and increase their productivity to Sth(xt) = Ht+1.
In each period t, young agents learn the amount of their inheritances a and their ability
q and decide if they want to invest in education or to work as unskilled workers. To ¯nance
human capital investment, students borrow setting as a collateral their inheritances. The
cost of education takes the following form ctq and is determined by two components: there
is a direct cost ct, due to either tuition or forgone wages during the time spent in education,
and of the students' ability cost q.
The direct cost of education is a constant fraction of technology progress ct = c(Bt). This
accounts for the ¯xed costs in the education process, such as physical structures which need
to be upgraded with the new technologies. The initial cost of investing in human capital
depends on the talent that an individual is born with. Talented children will incur in a lower
cost of education. The costs incurred in acquiring education, or the talent (the inverse of
ability), denoted q, are assumed to be uniformly distributed in the population between q and
q. Abilities are uncorrelated with inherited wealth and are not correlated over time, (i.e. are
i.i.d.).
After paying c(Bt;q) each individual can then increase his e±ciency h, investing an
amount x in education. However, even in the absence of real expenditure x, individuals who
paid tuition fees c acquire one e±ciency unit of labor - basic skills. The number of e±ciency
units of labour a student i of generation t in period t+1, ht+1, is a strictly concave function
of the individual's real expenditure on education in period t, xt.
ht+1 = h(xt) (13)
where h(0) = 1, limxt!0+ h0(xt) = ° < 1, and limxt!1 h0(xt) = 0
If agents get trained they will become skilled and earn wsh.
If the agent does not invest in education he works and saves, while if he invests in
education, he might need to borrow Lt to ¯nance this investment.
The unskilled agent is subject to the following budget constraint:
ct+1;u + at+1;u = Rt+1(at + wu;t) (14)
Where Rt = 1 + rt represents the interest factor. While the skilled agent is subject to the
following budget constraint:
ct+1;s + at+1;s = (1 ¡ ¿)ws;t+1ht+1 ¡ Rt+1(L ¡ at) (15)
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imperfections depends on the amount of collateral, inherited wealth at. Let us ¯rst consider
the decision if to pay school tuition fees or not (thus xt = 0 and ht+1 = 1). If credit markets
are perfect and agents do not default, then an individual decides to acquire skill or to remain
unskilled depending solely on his ability. For given Rt;ws;wu the decision to invest or not
will be based on a lifetime utility comparison Vs if skilled Vu if unskilled.
Vs = ·((1 ¡ ¿)ws;t+1 ¡ Rt+1(L + at)) (16)
Vu = ·(Rt+1(wu;t + at)) (17)
where · is a constant representing the utility function parameters. In equilibrium the
marginal individual is indi®erent between acquiring skill and remaining unskilled: V i
s = V i
u.
This implies a threshold level of ability, q¤ given by:
(1 ¡ ¿)ws;t+1 ¡ Rt+1(L(x;q
¤;Bt) ¡ at) = Rt+1(wu;t + at) (18)
such that all individuals with qi < q¤ do invest in human capital by going to school, while
the others remain unskilled. The threshold depends on the bequest received, the return to
education, and the imperfections in the credit market as explained in the following. In the
absence of credit constraints, only the return to education would matter. Credit constraints
introduce a wealth e®ect in the choice of educational decision. The higher the bequest of an
individual, the lower the talent required to invest in education for any given level of future
wages.
Unconstrained optimal real expenditure on education.
Let us now consider the investment decision of those students who decide to supplement the
tuition fees with a capital investment in education.
Given that the indirect utility function is a strictly increasing function of the individual's
second period wealth, the unconstrained optimal real expenditure on education in every
period t, xt, from the viewpoint of individual i of generation t, maximizes the second period
wealth:
xt = argmax[ws;t+1h(xt) ¡ Rt+1(L(x;q
¤;Bt) ¡ at)] (19)
Hence, as follows from the properties of h(xt), the optimal unconstrained real expenditure
on education in every period t, xt is unique and identical across members of generation t. If
Rt+1 > ws;t+1 then xt = 0, otherwise x
opt
t is given by
ws;t+1h
0(xt) = Rt+1 (20)
Moreover, since ws;t+1 = ws(kt+1) (where k = K=H) and Rt+1 = R(kt+1) it follows that
xt = x(kt+1).
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human capital. That is R(¹ k) = ws(¹ k).13
Assumption 1 In the following it is assumed that: k0 > ¹ k The constrained human
capital investment is between 0 and xopt.
1.2.3 Endogenous credit constraints.
Borrowing constraints are modeled following Banerjee and Newman (1993). The capital
market is limited by a moral hazard problem. Students can borrow L, to pay for the initial
educational cost (ability and technology varieties Btq) and for the human capital investment
x, but they must put up their inheritance a as a collateral. After ¯nishing the educational
process they can abscond, losing Rt+1at, but escaping the repayment obligation Rt+1L. If
absconders are apprehended, which they are with probability ¼, they will loose all their sec-
ond period income. With homogeneous preferences, borrowers would renege if the expected
utility of absconding is higher than the repaying option.
·((1 ¡ ¿)ws;t+1ht+1 ¡ Rt+1(L ¡ at)) ¸ ·((1 ¡ ¼)(1 ¡ ¿)ws;t+1ht+1) (21)
where · is a constant which depends only on the parameters of the utility function. Recog-
nizing this, lenders only make loans that satisfy L · at + ¼(1 ¡ ¿)ws;t+1=Rt+1, where ¼ is a
measure of credit market imperfections. The higher the probability that the absconders are
apprehended ¼ the higher the loan granted. Therefore a scarce enforcement of rules limits
the credit allowed in the market.
For an agent with inherited wealth a to invest in education, he must draw an ability q
that is less than at+¼(1¡¿)ws;t+1ht+1=Rt+1. This de¯nes another threshold of ability called
~ q(a), increasing in ¼ and a.
~ q(a) = (at + ¼(1 ¡ ¿)ws;t+1h=Rt+1 ¡ x) (22)
Individuals having q < q¤ but q > ~ q are credit constrained, they would like to invest in human
capital but cannot borrow adequately to do so. If ¼ = 0 absconders are never apprehended,
thus credit contracts are simply not possible, and bequests are the only possible way to
¯nance human capital investments. From (22) it is clear that the threshold level of collateral
is decreasing in the ability of individuals for the simple fact that high ability individuals have
a lower initial cost of education to ¯nance. Thus the educational investment of an agent with
13In a similar model Galor and Moav (2004) consider two phases of development of a credit constrained
economy: before reaching ¹ k, the economy's growth is determined by physical capital accumulation, while
when the economy has reached this threshold, the growth process is determined by human capital accumu-
lation. In the following it is assumed that the threshold ¹ k has already been reached.
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e(a) = min[at + ¼(1 ¡ ¿)ws;t+1ht+1=Rt+1;q
¤(a;wu)] (23)
individuals talented have a low initial educational cost, q < e(a) and invest in human capital;
others remain unskilled. A certain share of the population will always be constraint if q¤ > ~ q
Lemma 1.1 The investment in education e(a;p;wu) is increasing and also concave in the
bequest a, decreasing in the credit market imperfections ¼, decreasing in the interest rate R,
and lima!1 ea(a;p;wu) = 0.
For the lowest possible level of bequests a, let us de¯ne ^ q < e(a) as those individuals highly
talented who are never constrained.
Individual's ability is unrelated to that of his parent. Thus the amount that an individual
receives as a transfer serves as a su±cient statistic to summarize the entire history of the
dynasty. The bequest an individual gives is a function of that individual's bequest receipts
and net labor income (income after paying for education). The individual's net labor income
is in turn a function of his ability and transfer receipt, as well as of the wage structure.
Denoting the bequest function by b(a;q), the evolution of lineage wealth can be written as
at+1 = b(at;qt) (24)
Further, using the superscript u to denote the bequest of an unskilled parent and s to denote
the bequest of a skilled parent, b(a;q) can be written as
b
u(a) = (1 ¡ ¯)R(a + wu) if q > min[~ q(a);q
¤] (25)
b
s(a;q) = (1 ¡ ¯)((1 ¡ ¿)wsh ¡ R(L ¡ a)) if q · min[~ q(a);q
¤] (26)
The bequest of an unskilled parent does not depend on his level of ability. It is further
assumed that (1 ¡ ¯)Rt < 1.14 For a given set of wages and interest rates, eqs(25) and
(26) de¯ne a Markov process where the probability of inheriting a particular value at+1 is
conditioned on the value at.
Then as the distribution of q is bounded over the support [q; ¹ q], (1 ¡ ¯)Rt < 1, and h is
a decreasing return function, it can be shown that there exist a recurrent distribution of a
that will also be bounded.
14This a standard assumption to avoid exploding patterns.
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1.3.1 Autarchy
In autarchy, intermediate prices are determined by the maximization of (1). Substituting











In autarchy, the technology e®ect is not present. An increase in skilled labor generates an
oversupply of skilled good and, given homothetic demand, lower skill good's price. Thus in
an autarchic equilibrium, wage rates are simply determined by the relative supply of labor.
Let G(:) denote time t distribution of inheritances and H(:) the distribution of abilities q.















Z Z ¹ q
e(a;p;wu)




where Ht+1 represent the skilled workers in the economy; Ut the unskilled workers; Et the
costs of education and Kt+1 is the accumulated capital. These aggregates are time-varying
functions of the wages and the interest rate because they also depend on the distribution
of inherited wealth. Capital Kt+1 accumulation is given by the net savings of the whole
population in each period. As agents consume only in the second period of their life, savings
correspond to net income of the ¯rst period: income and wealth of the low skilled workers
net of the students' borrowing. A competitive equilibrium for an economy with inheritance
distribution Gt(:) is a tuple fws;wu;R;U;Sg such that:
² given the wages and the interest rate, an agent of type (a;q) selects its education level
to maximize utility;
² type (a;q) skilled workers choose how much to invest;
² markets clear.
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In the dual economy, poverty trap economy there is no mobility between the classes.
This arises if the initial stock of educated workers is su±ciently small. With few educated
workers, the wages of skilled workers will be su±ciently high that even the least able child of
an educated parent will both receive a su±cient transfer and ¯nd it pro¯table to get educated.
Similarly the wages of unskilled workers will be su±ciently low that no child of uneducated
parents will be able to a®ord an education. At this stage of development, technological
change is weak thus the labor supply e®ect dominates: the low supply of skilled workers
drives the skill premium high.
In an advanced economy equilibrium there is both upward and downward mobility across
the classes.
From (27) it is clear that in a closed economy the following relations between human
capital and wages hold:
lim
S!0
wu = 0 and lim
S!0
ws = 1 (28)
For values of S close enough to 0, or su±ciently small, the equilibrium with no mobility
constitutes a stable steady state. Credit market imperfections raise the probability that
individuals are constrained and the economy is an poverty trap. In the case credit constraints
bind at least for some individuals for ¼ < 1 then it must be that q¤ > ~ q(a). The probability
of agents being credit constrained for a particular a is H(q¤) ¡ H(~ q(a)). The higher the
agent's wealth the lower the probability of being credit constraint.
The lower ¼ (the higher the credit market imperfections) the lower is ~ q(a) (from (22),
@~ q=@¼ > 0) thus the more individuals are borrowing constrained. Therefore, each lineage
has lower wealth for a longer time. This establishes a direct relationship between the degree
of credit market imperfections ¼ and the economy wealth distribution.
Lemma 1.2 Let ¼i be the degree of credit market imperfections in country i. If country 2 has
otherwise the same characteristics as country 1 but better ¯nancial institutions ¼2 > ¼1 then
the steady state distribution of wealth in country 2 dominates the steady state distribution of
wealth in country 1 in the ¯rst order stochastic dominance sense: G¼1(a) ¸ G¼2(a).
The impact of a greater degree of credit market imperfections on the investments in
human capital is summarized by Lemma 1.1. The educational investment is decreasing in
the degree of credit market imperfection ¼.
15The steady state is de¯ned as a condition where wu;ws;r and U are constant and the distribution
of bequests a across individuals is unchanging from generation to generation. Note that even when the
economy is in a steady state, individual dynasties will experience movements within the income and wealth
distribution due to shocks to ability. The proof of the existence of these two equilibria is a straightforward
application of Hopenhayn and Prescott's (1992) analysis of existence, uniqueness and convergence properties
for monotonic stochastic processes and is given in the appendix.
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¯nancial institutions ¼2 > ¼1 then country 2 has greater skill endowment in the steady state.
Lemma 1.3 summarizes the link between an institutional variable like the degree of credit
market imperfections and the human capital skill endowment of the economy.
It is straightforward to show that if the distribution of talent in one economy dominates
that in another economy in a ¯rst order stochastic sense, then the former has a greater
investment in human capital and greater skill endowment in e±ciency units.
I next analyze the role of the interest rate. The market clearing interest rate re°ects the
simple supply and demand for credit by individuals. The larger supply of unskilled labor,
the lower the interest rate. The more binding the credit constraint, the lower the supply of
skilled labor, the lower the demand for funds and the interest rate.
1 + rt = (1 ¡ ´)Btz
¡´
t ((1 ¡ ¿)Ht)
´ (29)
Credit constrains generate distributional e®ects not only related to skillpremia. Those ex-
cluded from education because of credit constraints become lenders and lose not only because
they earn a low wage but also because of the lower interest rate. Those who can still borrow
to purchase education gain in two ways from credit constraints: the skilled wage is higher
(relative to unconstrained economies) and the interest rate falls.16 So the presence of credit
constraints not only has e±ciency costs by distorting educational choice, but also widens the
wealth gap between the skilled and the unskilled. In this model capital complements skilled
labor, thus the wage gap is increased by the higher capital-labor ratio resulting from this
oversupply of savings.17
Consider the steady state behavior of the autarchic economy. In steady state, Ht¡1 =
Ht = H. To obtain the rate of output growth, note that in steady state all inputs except









and hence determined by the level of human capital in the economy.
This result combined with equations (1.3) and (29) implies that
Proposition 1.4 If country 2 has otherwise the same characteristics as country 1 but better
¯nancial institutions ¼2 > ¼1 then
16According to Matsuyama (2004) credit market imperfections can indeed explain capital °ows from poor
to rich economies.
17See Fender and Wang (2003) for a similar model. They ¯nd that the e®ect of credit rationing on the real
rate of interest depends crucially on whether the rationing applies to loans to ¯nance investment in human
capital or physical capital. In this model, investments in capital are tied to human capital investments.
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ii) its interest rate is higher r2 > r1;
iii) its income inequality is higher.
Proposition 1.4 summarizes the e®ects of credit market imperfections on the autarky equi-
librium. Credit constraints limit some agents' opportunities to become educated despite its
desirability; as human capital drives technological progress, this translates in a lower growth
rate. Like in Fender and Wang (2003) of in Matsuyama (2004) credit constraints mean a
lower real interest rate. In this economy where the uneducated are savers, moral-hazard
induced credit constraints imply that education falls and some agents switch from borrowing
to lending. For this reason savings rise and, with capital-skilled labor complementarity, the
marginal product of capital and real interest rate fall. This result di®ers radically from the
investment loan models, such as Aghion and Bolton's (1997), in which credit constraints
limit investment, leading to a higher marginal product of capital and real interest rate.
The distributional implications of credit constraints are thus determined both by the low
human capital investment and the related skillpremia and by the low interest rate which
damages the unskilled lenders.
1.4 Trade and technology spillovers
The degree of credit market imperfections determines the amount of skilled labor in the
country, the productivity of the research sector and thus of technology progress. The lowest
the share of skilled labor the lowest the number of varieties of intermediate goods produced
at home and the higher the number of varieties At ¡ Bt that will be imported. However,
the bigger the di®erence between domestic and foreign research productivity, the more the
research sector will gain in productivity upon opening to trade. As the research, or imitating
sector, only employs skilled labor, opening to trade implies an increase in the wage premium
as long as changes in relative intermediate goods prices are not too important. This is not
to say that equalizing forces coming from Hecksher-Ohlin e®ects do not take place but that
they might be dominated by the increased demand for skills created by a technology transfer
induced by trade.18 Other than technology spillovers, critical to the small country analysis
is the perfectly elastic demand on the world market, which immediately implies that the
rates of technological change, growth and return to education are no longer constrained by
the autarky demand (prices).
18Wood (1997) argues that the entry of large low-income exporters such as China, India, Bangladesh,
Indonesia, and Pakistan in the 1980s and 1990s has reduced the relative price of less skill intensive exports
thereby driving the price of unskilled goods down.
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economy in a poverty trap, the economy passes through two phases of transition to a new
equilibrium:
phase 1 Skilled wage increases, human capital and interest rates increase. Incomes and
wealths grow in the ¯rst order stochastic sense. Inequality increases.
phase 2 Eventually all those who have a talent high enough (low cost of education) invest
in human capital, the others become lenders. Incomes and bequests grow in the second
order sense.
Following the exogenous increase in skilled wage, incentives to educate for agents with suf-
¯ciently low educational costs increase, at the same time a higher skilled wage implies the
possibility to take a higher loan, thus for increases in ws higher than the increase in interest
rate, students will invest more in education. The associated increase in capital demand raises
the interest rate. At the end of their lives skilled and unskilled workers bequeath more than
what they received. The increase in wealth encourages more agents in the following cohort to
engage in education and on a greater scale. This will raise the demand for capital and thus
the interest rate allowing more unskilled to accumulate their wealth. Moreover, increased
research activity increases the wage premium of the skill sector giving to workers a higher
incentive to invest in education. In the absence of international o®setting movements of
prices, the new equilibrium of the economy is found when eventually return to education is
equal to the interest rate (eq(20)). The returns to human and physical capital are equalized
and inequality is eventually reduced.
The economy will specialize in the high technology good if this equality in human and
physical capital return is reached after all the individuals have invested in human capital.
Equation (20) de¯nes an upper bound to the ratio skilled wages and interest rate. It
follows that the transitional dynamics governing the distribution of wealth converge to a
stationary Markov process. This process satis¯es Hopenhayn and Prescott's (1992) Mono-
tone Mixing Condition, so that the distribution of wealth and income converge to a unique
limiting distribution.
1.4.1 Numerical example
In the following section the model is simulated using the above speci¯cation. The economy
is analyzed in a perfect foresight environment, i.e. agents are not subject to any form of
risk idiosyncratic nor aggregate. They observe their ability before making any choice. The
cost of education is modelled following Eicher and Garcia-Penalosa (2001): ct(Bt;q) = ³Btq
where ³ = 0:6 gives a proportion of the growing technological progress translating into higher
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in human capital. However, due to credit market imperfections (¼ = 0:7, the probability to
be apprehended after absconding) the economy is in a poverty trap.19 The initial stock of
skilled labor is about 10% of the working population; this is consistent with Barro and Lee
(2000) data on labor endowment by educational levels; in Latin America in the mid Eighties
(before trade liberalization) less than 15% of the working force (older than 25) had a high
school degree and only about 7% had some tertiary education. Accordingly the initial ratio
between skilled and unskilled wages is about 3.4; this is consistent with de Ferranti, Perry,
Ferreira and Walton (2003) average wage gap between high and low skilled workers for the
Latin American countries at the beginning of the Nineties.20 The labor share parameter for
market production ´ used in the calibration is 0.5 this is consistent with the values found by
Elias (1992) for Latin American countries. The remaining parameters are , the ine±ciency
parameter of unskilled workers » = 0:8, the share of skilled workers employed in the research
sector ¿ = 0:33, the input share of high/low skilled goods in the production of the ¯nal good
® = 0:5; a change of these parameters does not a®ect the results. the initial steady state is
found in the following way:
² Create a grid of possible capital holdings associated with a schooling cost q. Each grid
point represent an agent, this agent can be skilled or not.
² For an initial guess on the capital holdings and skill distribution calculate K = Ki,
H = Hj, Lu;j with i = 0,j = 0 With these compute from the ¯rm optimization
condition r;ws;wu and then solve the household's optimum problem.
² Stack all possible agents, for capital level, and educational attainment. Use the decision
rules to determine the stationary distribution of agents over the educational levels and
the capital holdings.
² Compute the new levels of skilled H¤
j and unskilled labor force L¤
u;j.
² For a ¯xed "relaxation parameter" ¹ 2 (0;1), compute new estimates of H, Lu from
19 The value of ¼ does not correspond to any existing index; it might be useful to think about the rule of
law index constructed by the worldbank in the World Business Environment Survey (WBES). Available at:
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wbes/ The index ranges from 1 to 0. Larger values mean higher rule
of law. The average for developing countries is 0.5 compared to 0.8 for developed countries.
20they report a Latin American average wage gap between high and low educated workers of about 3.5.
Low educated are workers with 8 years of education, high educated workers have more than 14 years of
education.
17




Hj+1 = ¹Hj + (1 ¡ ¹)H
¤
j
Lu;j+1 = ¹Lu;j + (1 ¡ ¹)L
¤
u;j
² Iterate on this scheme to convergence.
² Compute the aggregate value of capital K¤
i found in the previous step.
² For a ¯xed "relaxation parameter" ¹ 2 (0;1), compute new estimates of K
Ki+1 = ¹Ki + (1 ¡ ¹)K
¤
i
² Iterate on this scheme to convergence giving each new iteration a new distribution of
abilities.
Once found the stationary equilibrium for a given level of prices the transition is computed
using the laws of motion of capital, the above scheme is repeated at each period. Given the
next period capital (derived from the optimal choice of this period) and a possible guess
on the human capital decision agents maximize their utility, prices are adjusted and the
maximization repeated until convergence over each period. The new steady state is found
when human and physical capital do not change anymore. Prices are kept at the initial
steady state level.
Figure (1) shows the transition of a constrained economy. Given an exogenous produc-
tivity shock on the ¯rst period wages, skilled agents who already made their investment
decision will at ¯rst only be able to pass on to their descendants a higher bequest without
immediately adjusting to the new prices. Thus the new increased capital will - in the ¯rst
period - let the interest rate drop while the skilled wages raise.
This clearly favors educational investments: on the one side higher skilled wages imply
higher incentives to invest in human capital and on the other side lower interest rates mean
lower borrowing constraints. The ¯rst generation of children will then increase investment
on the intensive margin (those who belonged to a "skilled family" but could not a®ord to
increase their skill- e±ciency investment) and on the extensive margin (those who due to
lower interest rates can a®ord a loan).
The demand of skilled labor will at ¯rst be sustained by the exogenous productivity
growth determined by the di®erential between foreign A and domestic B technology. When
the country eventually reached the growth rate of the North, skilled labor demand will clearly
be driven by domestic technology growth. Agents start investing in human capital, increasing
the demand for loans. The increased demand for capital raises the interest rate, making the
18
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opportunity cost of investing in education higher. In the ¯rst panel it is depicted also the
skillpremia the ¯rst increase in the skillpremia is followed by a drop due to human capital
adjustment, however it raises again when reaching the new equilibrium. The trade induced
productivity shock thus releases the economy from a poverty trap and sets the economy on
a high growth - high skill premia path.
1.5 Conclusions
Previous literature (Cartiglia (1997), or Ranjan (2001)) has shown that trade liberalization
can release a developing country from a poverty trap if trade liberalization induces a fall in
the skill premia. However, while the model of trade liberalization inducing both a fall in skill
premia and human capital convergence might be considered consistent with the experience
of East Asian economies, many other episodes of trade liberalization did not follow the same
path. In particular, trade liberalization has been concurrent with increases in skill premia in
many Latin American countries (Attanasio, Goldberg and Pavnik (2004), Robbins (1995),
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007), Robbins (1996), Wood (1997)).
Many channels have been theorized for this phenomena. Empirically the evidence sup-
ports some form of technological transfer, due to spillover, foreign direct investments or for
some countries outsourcing (notably Mexico). In the present paper an investigation of the
e®ect of trade related technology spillovers is carried out. The mechanism through which
productivity shocks spillover to the whole economy has not been analyzed before in the
context of human capital investments. While credit constraints are quite common with re-
gards to educational investments, few have considered the interactions between physical and
human capital investments due to these imperfections.
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and higher physical capital, and thus higher skilled wage, lower technological progress and
lower interest rate than an economy not su®ering from credit market imperfections. Agents
who are not talented enough or do not have enough capital to invest in education become
lenders to skilled agents. In the model presented the human capital stock determines both
the degree of income inequality and the rate of growth. Technologies are generated by skilled
workers, which implies that the relative demand for labor, and hence the skill premium, is
not monotonically decreasing in the stock of skills in the economy. A higher demand for
human capital, and a consequent increase in the interest rate allow the economy to escape
the poverty trap. This in turn will set the economy on a high productivity - high skill premia
path.
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1.6.1 Equilibrium existence and stability
For the proof of existence and stability of the two steady states - the dual economy and the
advanced economy - the following theorem by Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992) is needed:
Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992) Theorem 2: Suppose the transition function
P(a;B) is increasing, ~ a 2 (a;¹ a) and the following condition is satis¯ed: Monotone Mix-
ing Condition: There exist a point ~ a and an integer m such that P m(a;[~ a;¹ a]) > 0 and
P m(¹ a;[a;~ a]) > 0. Then there is a unique stationary distribution G for process P and for any
initial measure ¹, T n¹ =
R
P n(~ a;:)¹(d~ a) converges to G.
A) There is unique equilibrium when there is twoway mobility between classes.
Let P n(~ a;:) give the transition probabilities from wealth ~ a after n generations, noting that:
1. P is increasing. The monotonicity of P can be shown by examining eqs (25) and (26)
and noting that increasing at results in an increase of at+1 for every realization of qi.
2. The upper bound of the distribution of wealth is max(¹ a;a¤) and the lower bound of
the distribution of wealth is min(a;a¤¤) where a¤ is the largest inheritance received by
any individual at t = 0 and a¤¤ is the smallest inheritance received by any individual
at time t = 0. ¹ a and a are the upper and lower bounds of the recurrent distribution
3. the Monotone Mixing Condition applies when there is mobility between classes. Since
ability is i.i.d. among individuals, there is complete wealth mobility within a class
then Theorem 2 by Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992) can be applied to show that the distri-
bution of wealth converges to a unique distribution.
B) There is an in¯nite number of steady states when there is no mobility
(poverty trap).
let A be the set of all possible transfers from educated parents and B the set of all
possible transfers from uneducated parents. When there is no mobility between classes,
P N(a1;[b1;b2]) = 0 and P N(b1;[a1;a2]) = 0 for all b1;b2 2 B and a1;a2 2 A and N ¸ 1. As
shown in part (A), P N([a1;a2];[a2;a3]) > 0 for all a1;a2;a3 2 A and P N([b1;b2];[b2;b3]) > 0
for all b1;b2;b3 2 B. Thus, when there is no mobility between classes, the state space can be
divided into two ergodic sets, A and B. which in turn correspond to two invariant measures.
An invariant measure over the entire state space will be a convex combination of these two
invariant measures. Since there are in¯nite number of convex combinations, there are an
in¯nite number of invariant measures and thus of distributions of wealth. Since Ht+1 = Ht
in steady state, the °ow into skilled labor must equal the °ow out of skilled labor. This
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twoway mobility as in case A).
Proof of Lemma 1.1. Let ~ a denote the inheritance below which the marginal entrepreneur
is constrained on the extensive margin, so that e = ~ a+p¼=Rt¡1. Let ^ a denote the inheritance
level above which marginal entrepreneurs are unconstrained so that z = q. Then if
a 2 [0;~ a] : ea = 1;eaa = 0
a 2 [~ a;^ a] : ea =
wshx ¡ R
wshx
> 0;eaa < 0
a 2 [^ a;1] : ea = eaa = 0
Since ea(a;ws;wu) = 0 for all a > ^ a, it follows that lima!1 ea(a;ws;wu) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 1.2. Let T¼ and T¼0 be the Markov operators associated with the degrees
of market imperfections ¼ and ¼0, respectively. Similarly, denote the distributions associated
with the degrees of credit market imperfections ¼ and ¼0 by G¼(a) and G¼0(a). Using the
transition function de¯ned above
T¼G¼0(x) ¡ T¼0G¼0(x) =
Z
a
[P¼;(a;[a;x]) ¡ P¼0;(a;[a;x])]dG¼0(a) (A-1)
It is ¯rst shown that P¼;(a;[a;x]) ¸ P¼0;(a;[a;x]);8a Consider the level of ability q"(a) such
that bs(a;q"(a)) = x. Also since bs(a;q"(a)) is increasing in a, if a0 ¸ a, then q"(a0) ¸ q"(a).
Then the transition function can be written
P¼(a;[a;x]) = 1 ¡ F(e¼(a)) + F(e¼(a)) ¡ F(q"(a)) (A-2)
where the ¯rst term on the right hand side refers to unskilled workers and the second term
to skilled workers. P¼(a;[a;x]) can be de¯ned analogously. Consider the di®erent cases
Case I q"(a) < e¼0 = 0 and q"(a) < e¼ = 0, then P¼;(a;[a;x])¡P¼0;(a;[a;x]) = F(e¼0(a))¡
F(e¼(a)) ¸ 0
Case II q"(a) < e¼0 = 1 and q"(a) < e¼ = 1, then P¼;(a;[a;x]) ¡ P¼0;(a;[a;x]) = 0
Case III q"(a) < e¼0 = 1 and q"(a) < e¼ = 0, then P¼;(a;[a;x]) ¡ P¼0;(a;[a;x]) =
F(q"(a)) ¡ F(e¼0(a)) ¸ 0 because e¼(a) > q"(a) > e¼0(a)
Case IV q"(a) < e¼0 = 0 and q"(a) < e¼ = 0, then P¼;(a;[a;x]) ¡ P¼0;(a;[a;x]) =
F(q"(a)) ¡ F(e¼(a)) ¸ 0 because e¼0(a) > q"(a) > e¼(a)
Therefore P¼;(a;[a;x]) ¡ P¼0;(a;[a;x]) ¸ 0 8a Thus T¼G¼0(x) ¡ T¼0G¼0(x) ¸ 0 or G¼0(x) =
T¼G¼0(x) · T¼G¼0(x). Since the Markov operator T¼ is increasing and the transition func-
tion is increasing, then G¼0(x) · (T¼)nG¼0(x), where (T¼)n is the nth iterate of T¼. Then
25
Trentini, Claudia (2009), Essays on Human Capital Accumulation and Inequality 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/12804from the previous proof on stationary equilibria, for n ! 1(T¼)nG¼0(x) converges to G¼(x).
Therefore G¼(x) · G¼0(x).
Proof of Lemma 1.3. Given Lemmas 1.1 and 1.2 and the following theorem by Hadar
and Russel (1971) H¼0 ¸ H¼.
Theorem 1.6 (Hadar and Russel (1971)) Let Mg =
R
¹(a)G(da), where ¹a(a) ¸ 0, 8a;
¹a(a) > 0 for an interval. If G(a) ¯rst order stochastically dominates F(a) then Mg > Mf.
Theorem 1.7 (Hadar and Russel (1971)) Let Mg =
R
¹(a)G(da), where ¹aa(a) · 0,
¹aa(a) < 0 for some a. If G(a) second order stochastically dominates F(a) then Mg > Mf.
Proof of Proposition 1.4. Given Lemma 1.3, and equations (4), (28) (29) , and (30) the
result follows.
Proof of Proposition 1.5. The following analysis is in°uenced by Lloyd-Ellis and Bern-
hardt (2000).
Phase 1 Denote by ©t(y) the distribution of income. Let b q(y¤;a;wu;t;rt+1) be the value
of q such that income of skilled workers is ys(a;q;ws;t+1;rt+1) = y¤. Then the distribution
of income conditional on inherited wealth and the equilibrium obtaining at time t can be





1 ¡ H(e(a;wu;¼)) if wu;t · y < ys(a;r;ws;wu)






where ys(a;r;ws) = max[wu;ys(a; ~ q;r)] is the lower support on skilled workers income (where
the education investment is determined by credit constraints e = ~ q).
ys(a;r;ws) = ys(a;r;q) is the upper support. The unconditional distribution of incomes is
therefore ©(y) =
R
©(yja;ws;wu;t;r)Gt(da). Let ^ q be implicitly de¯ned by ys(a; ^ q;ws) = y.
Total di®erentiation reveals that ^ qa ¸ 0
Suppose that for some t, Gt(:) First Order Stochastically Dominates (FSD) Gt¡1(:). Then
the resulting change in the distribution of income for any y equals.
©t(y) ¡ ©t¡1(y) =
Z
©a(yja;ws;wu;r)[Gt¡1(a) ¡ Gt(a)]da (A-4)
But ©a(yja;ws;wu;r) · 0. Hence from Theorem 1.6 by Hadar and Russel (1971), ©t(a) FSD
©t¡1(a). Analogous results hold for the distribution of ¯nal wealth and, hence, bequests:
Gt+1(a) FSD Gt(a). Since G1(a) FSD G0(a), the ¯rst part of the proposition follows by
induction. Income inequality is increasing as technological progress is faster (equation (4))
and thus the skill premia increases.
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accumulate enough to invest in education. As the incentive to invest in education (the skill
premia) increases over time, and relative prices are exogenous in free trade, the economy
will tend to specialize in the high skill good. As credit constraints are no more binding, the
optimal investment in education is determined by the return to capital as in eq. (20). This
will be the new educational investment for everyone, thus inequality decreases.
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Factors a®ecting the schooling
performance of secondary school
pupils - the cost of high
unemployment and imperfect ¯nancial
markets
This is joint with Lidia Farre
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the implications of major ¯nancial markets crises for the human cap-
ital accumulation decisions of households. We use data for Argentinean households over the
period 1995-2002 to examine households' response to negative idiosyncratic income shocks
in di®erent macroeconomic scenarios. In particular we study how teenagers' school progress
responds to household head unemployment during periods of high economic growth and com-
pare it to the response during recession years, when families are more likely to be ¯nancially
constrained. After accounting for the potential endogeneity of household head unemployment
we ¯nd that school failure in response to unemployment shocks increases during periods of
economic instability. Further we ¯nd that for ¯rst born boys this results from a greater in-
volvement in labor market activities. Our results add to the existing literature on the long
term cost of macroeconomic crises.
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Under the assumption that households have access to a complete market in contingent claims,
marginal utilities of consumption and of human capital investments are not a®ected by purely
idiosyncratic shocks. Accordingly investment decisions, including those in human capital,
are determined solely by rates of return. However, in the presence of credit and insur-
ance market imperfections, labor market shocks and °uctuations can have a deep impact
in household consumption and time allocation behavior (Jacoby and Skou¯as (1997)). Self-
insurance strategies or informal arrangements to cope with unexpected shocks might include
the liquidation of physical assets or the reallocation of time of family-members towards
income-earning activities, and possibly a decrease in human capital investments. As a con-
sequence income shocks might increase the transmission of poverty across generations and
have long term consequences on inequality.
This paper examines the consequences of credit market imperfections for households'
human capital investment in Argentina during the economic crisis of the late 1990's and
early 2000's. We use data over the period 1995 - 2002 to cover both a recessionary and
a growth period. During periods of aggregate instability families are likely to experience
di±culties accessing credit; as a consequence, negative shocks to household income may lead
to a higher involvement in productive activities by household members. If young household
members are those who increase participation in home and market production they will
have to sacri¯ce part of their time at school and consequently reduce their investment in
human capital. By comparing the response of human capital investment decisions to negative
household income shocks in di®erent macroeconomic scenarios we can test for the presence
of credit market imperfections.
For developing countries there is growing empirical evidence that these concerns apply to
rural areas and a®ect child labor supply. Jacoby and Skou¯as (1997) and Jacoby (1994) ¯nd
that Indian agrarian households lacking access to formal ¯nancial markets are found to draw
upon the labor of their children when faced with an income shortfall. A wide literature also
examines the consequences of the macroeconomic crisis su®ered by Indonesia. Frankenberg,
Smith and Thomas (2003) ¯nd that household's labor supply increase during the crisis while
Thomas, Beegle, Frankenberg, Sikoki, Strauss and Teruel (2004) ¯nd evidence of a negative
e®ect of the macroeconomic shock on the attendance rate of younger children with older
siblings in the household. However, Indonesia had a very large rural sector in which to work
during the crisis.
Evidence of whether the same concerns are relevant for the relatively wealthier urban
areas typically characterized by a wide heterogeneity in the nature and e®ectiveness of formal
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examines the role of transitory shocks to household income in children's advancement through
school in Brazil. Her results show that children's time is used to bu®er rare transitory income
shocks to households in ways that are consistent with education models that incorporate
insurance or credit market imperfections. On the same data Duryea, Lam and Levinson
(2007) ¯nd that unemployment shocks signi¯cantly increase the probability that a child
enters the labor force, drops out of school and fails to advance. In particular teenager girls
are the most a®ected by the household shock. Looking to the Mexican peso crisis Parker
and Skou¯as (2006) ¯nd that while signi¯cant added-worker e®ects are in place for adult
females, for teenage males there is no signi¯cant evidence that labor force participation,
school attendance and the likelihood of advancing to the next school grade are in°uenced
by the event of unemployment of the household head. This is in contrast to Attanasio and
Sz¶ ekely (2004) ¯ndings that show that Mexican households tend to react to idiosyncratic
shocks reducing human capital expenditures. Finally, consistent with the hypothesis of
income e®ects driving the labor market incentives of children, Schady (2002) ¯nds positive
e®ects on schooling attainment of urban peruvian children aged 11 to 17 years old during
the macroeconomic crisis of 1988-1992.
Evidence based on urban data is more mixed than in rural areas partly because macroe-
conomic circumstances also in°uence the incentives of child labor. In particular as the labor
market conditions determine the likelihood that the household heads loose their job, they
also determine the average wage children can expect to receive entering the labor market,
thus a®ecting the opportunity cost of schooling.2 A change in the wage that a child can
earn has both income and substitution e®ects on children's time allocation decisions. Chil-
dren who work to meet a standard of consumption will work fewer hours when their wage
increases (income e®ect), while the substitution e®ect implies that children will work more
when wages increases.
This paper examines the labor market and educational behavior of teens both during
recession and high growth years in urban areas of Argentina. We focus on teenage children
both because recent e®orts to increase schooling attendance have been targeted at this group
and also because teenagers may be in a better position to contribute to household income
than younger children. Our analysis focuses mainly on the educational and work behavior
of boys as previous research suggests that they are more likely than girls to participate in
1Fafchamps and Wahba (2006) ¯nd that Nepalese children residing in or near urban centers attend school
more and work less in total but are more likely to be involved in wage work or in a small business. The
larger the urban center, the stronger the e®ect is.
2 Clearly also children' probability of ¯nding a job is a®ected by general conditions, depending on the
separation of the two labor markets or the substitutability of adult work with child work.
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comparison purposes, we replicate the same empirical analysis for girls.
In our empirical investigation the presence of negative idiosyncratic income shocks is
measured by unemployment spells a®ecting the household head. There may be the concern
that interruptions in the work career of the head are not exogenous to the educational and
labor market performance of teenagers in the household. Accordingly we need to ¯nd a valid
instrumental variable to estimate the causal e®ect of idiosyncratic shocks on teenagers be-
havior. In rural settings natural events, typically rainfalls, are used as a source of exogenous
variation for household head's unemployment spells. In urban settings it is more di±cult to
¯nd a valid instrument. In this paper we use a trade related measure, namely export prices
interacted with the structure of the di®erent production sectors in which the household head
works, as a source of exogenous variation for the unemployment probability. This is because
the e®ect of the crisis was very heterogeneous in its impact across groups de¯ned by di®erent
sectors and ¯rms size (Pessino and Andres (2003)).4 The instrument is shown to be highly
correlated with unemployment spells while not being a choice variable of the worker.
We ¯nd evidence that during periods of economic deceleration unemployment spells by
the household head have a negative e®ect on boys and girls' human capital investment. In
contrast, these spells do not a®ect schooling progress during growth periods. Our study of
labor market behavior suggests that at least for the oldest male sibling in the family schooling
failure results from their greater involvement in market activities. For girls, we do not ¯nd
evidence that the failure is produced by a similar mechanism. This result is consistent with
previous research where girls' time is more likely to be employed in home production. On
the whole, our results indicate that during periods of economic instability, when access to
credit is more di±cult, households use teens' time to insure themselves against negative labor
market shocks. Accordingly macroeconomic crisis and related ¯nancial market failures have
important costs in terms of human capital investment by teens.
The paper proceeds as follows: in the next section we outline the macroeconomic condi-
tions of Argentina during the period under study. Section 3 presents the data and empirical
strategy and section 4 discusses the results followed by some concluding remarks.
3Studies which do have access to information about children's time use (Levison, Moe and Knaul (2001),
Cigno and Rosati (2005), or Emerson and Souza (2008)), show that while for girls the traditional work -
school tradeo® is far from resolved, the relevant work activity to be considered in the analysis of girls' time
use is house chores work.
4For example, job creation occurred in construction and destruction in services and government sector. In
the short-run though services and medium and small ¯rms appeared to bene¯t(Pessino and Andres (2003)).
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2.2.1 The economy
After a decade of recurring debt crisis and stagnating growth, in 1991 Argentina imple-
mented a wide ranging set of reforms such as liberalizing the country to foreign capital and
trade, as well as reforming the labor market and ¯xing the exchange rate to the dollar.
Economic opening and regional integration increased both exports and imports. In general,
trade opening led to a higher surge in imports than in exports, that produced a structural
negative trade balances. The currency board was partly responsible for this disappointing
performance since it kept the price of exported goods arti¯cially high. As a matter of fact
exports recovered after the 2001 crisis, supported by the strong devaluation of the local cur-
rency. The impact of the increase in imports during the 1990s was negative as a result of the
industrial restructuring and a rise in labour productivity (Galiani and Hopenhayn (2003)).
The unemployment rose from nearly 6% at the end of the 1980s to around 15% at the end
of the 1990s and over 20% during the 2001-2002 crisis. 5
Table (A-1) shows some key macroeconomic indicators over the period 19952002. This
period is of particular interest as it includes 3 years of high growth 1996, 1997, 1998 after
which Argentina entered in a prolonged recession coupled with 3 years of de°ation.
2.2.2 The education system and child labor
Since 1884 Argentina established mandatory primary school: this involved 7 years of educa-
tion for children aged 6 to 12. Secondary school (nivel medio) followed from age 13 to 17.
Both primary and secondary schooling have traditionally been public and free.6 In 1993 the
mandatory years of schooling increased from 7 to 10. Last year of pre-school at age 5 and
the ¯rst two of high school (age 13 and 14) became obligatory.
Table (A-2) describes upgrading and repetition rates by grade and year. All the rates
reported- promotion, repetition, lagging behind and dropping out- show a dramatic change
passing from grade 7 (the old primary school - mandatory school) to grade 8 (old secondary
school). However, the reform seems to have had some e®ect as all the rates improve over
time, in spite of adverse economic conditions.
Argentinean legislation prohibits work to children younger than 14 years old (law on work
contract 1976) and strictly limits the hours of work and working conditions of the children
aged 14 to 17 years old. The Children's and Teenagers' Activities survey (Encuesta de
5Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003) explain in detail the macroeconomic context of the crisis. For a review
on the e®ects on workers/ households see McKenzie (2004) or Giovagnoli, Fiszbein and Adriz (2003).
6 According to o±cial statistics from the Argentinean Ministry of Education for the period 1996-2000,
only 20% of primary school pupils and roughly 27-28% of secondary school pupils attended private schools.
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child labor in Argentina found that in 2004, 6.5% of children aged 5 to 13 years old worked
at least an hour in the market or doing house work, while this ¯gure was about 20% for
the children aged 14 to 17 years old. These percentages are much higher than the ¯gures
found in our sample as they include hours of homework, and they include rural areas, where
helping in the parents' farm is a relatively common task.
According to the EANNA, the most common activity for boys aged 5 to 17 in urban
areas is to work in shops and workshops, while for girls the main occupation is housework
taking care of younger children, elderly and sick persons. This is why in our analysis, we
will consider primarily boys, as girls's opportunity cost of schooling is badly represented
by market wage. Both home and market work clearly a®ect the schooling performance of
children. This is evident from table (A-4) constructed with the information in our sample.7
2.3 Data and empirical strategy
Our main source of data is the Permanent Household Survey (Encuesta Permanente de
Hogares, EPH) from 1995 to 2002. This is a national socioeconomic survey collected by the
Argentinean Statistical Institute (INDEC) in the major urban areas of Argentina. In its
most recent wave the survey covers 29 urban centers, which represent 70% of urban national
population and 61% of the national population. 8 The EPH is the only survey that covers
the whole country for a long period of time.
The survey is conducted twice per year, in May and October. The survey, identical in
both waves, contains an individual questionnaire and a household questionnaire surveying
the family characteristics and standards of living. Since the academic year in Argentina runs
between March and November, the two waves contain information on schooling attendance
during the third and eight month of the academic year, respectively.
The survey is designed as a rotating panel. Each household is interviewed in four con-
secutive waves, after the forth round it is removed and replaced by a new household. The
design is such that in any given cross section of EPH, 25% of the households are in their
¯rst interview, 25% are in their second interview and so on. We construct two years panels
following each 25% of households from May to May.
Although the length of the panel at the household level is short, the data allows us to
follow teens attendance and progress in school over a year time, and at the same time track
the employment and earnings experiences of their family members. The sample is restricted
7The corresponding statistics from EANNA in 2004 are broadly comparable in magnitude taking in
account the fact that our data only considers market labor activities.
8Note that the rural population in Argentina represents less than 10% of total population.
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are enrolled, cohabit with their parents and whose household head is employed at the time
of the ¯rst interview (May). Household heads who are currently unemployed in the ¯rst
observation may have already experienced a shock and, therefore, be deviated from their
long run path. We restrict our analysis to household heads employed as salaried workers
excluding self employed or employers. This is to exclude children collaborating in the family's
enterprise as unpaid workers. This situation would invalidate our instrument.
To test for the presence of credit market imperfections we take as a theoretical framework
of reference the model in Jacoby and Skou¯as (1997). This model predicts that if households
can fully insure against risk, changes in their consumption and investment decisions depend
on changes in the collective resources but not on changes in the distribution of resources
among households. Thus testing for the presence of credit market imperfection simply re-
quires examining cross-section correlation between changes in their economic decision and
changes in their resources. In this paper we test for the presence of full insurance by exam-
ining the response of children's human capital investment and labor market participation to
idiosyncratic household's shocks, which we proxy by unemployment spells of the household
head over the academic year.
To measure changes in human capital investment decisions we focus on whether the child
has successfully completed the grade in which he/she was enrolled at the time of the ¯rst
interview (i.e. beginning of the academic year). We de¯ne upgrading individuals as those
who in the third observation (i.e. May of the year after the household was ¯rst interviewed)
declare to be enrolled in a higher grade respective to the previous year or have completed
the grade they were enrolled in. To complete our empirical analysis we also track these
individuals labor market behavior from the ¯rst to the third observation. For the household
head we reconstruct working histories using questions on the duration of the employment
or of the unemployment spell. We can therefore classify heads as always employed if in the
three observations they declare to be employed and their experience or tenure in the second
year is greater than in the ¯rst observation. All other cases, excluding voluntary changes in
occupation, are categorized as events creating a negative shock to the household's income.9
With two waves per year over 8 years, we have an average of 600-800 boys (girls) per year
and thus our ¯nal sample contains roughly 5,800 observations for each gender. We do not
include information in surveys before 1995 as the sample design is di®erent and households
are not easily tracked over a year time.
9 We follow the o±cial de¯nition of employment participation in which an individual is considered to be
in the workforce if he or she was employed for 1 hour or more of paid work in the week of reference; or if he
or she did work for 15 hours or more without a pay; or if he or she did not work in the reference week for
reasons due to leave, vacation, strike, or illness but maintained his or her employment status.
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shows the probabilities that the household head remains employed throughout the academic
year by educational level. We can identify three di®erent levels of education: only primary
or less than primary education, at most secondary and more than secondary school. The
probability of remaining employed increases in the educational level attained suggesting that
unemployment risk and volatility is unequally distributed and that low skilled heads are more
likely to experience unemployment spells. The time trend and timing of the crisis are also
clear from this table. Table (A-5) shows the labor market participation rate of children
younger than 15, - thus subject to the mandatory schooling rule - and older than 15, both
for household heads who are always employed throughout the period examined and those who
experience an unemployment spell. The table suggests that older children are much more
likely to participate in market activities and that children of household heads experiencing
unemployment spells have higher chances of entering the labor force. However mandatory
schooling seems successful in limiting labor market participation among the youngest when
the head becomes unemployed. These patterns characterize the labor market behavior of
boys as well as that of girls. Thus the ¯gures in this table indicates that the Argentinean
economic crisis in the late 1990's and early 2000's seems to have interrupted the improving
trend into reductions of child labor participation and school interruption. Next we explore
the contribution of ¯nancial market incompleteness in explaining these trends in children
and teens educational behavior.
Progress to a higher grade can be thought to be a function of the child's e®ort spent on
schoolwork. This e®ort, ec
it *, can not be observed; however it can be considered a latent
variable that in°uences the likelihood of upgrading. Accordingly we model the upgrading
probability using an indicator variable ¢Schild
it that takes value 1 if ec
it * exceeds an unobserv-
able threshold and therefore the child is promoted to the next grade, and 0 otherwise. We
test for credit market imperfections in a model of children's schooling progress where the em-
ployment status of the household head is included as an explanatory variable. The coe±cient
on this variable can be interpreted as an indicator for the presence of imperfect insurance
markets. To investigate whether the degree of ¯nancial market imperfections changes with
the macroeconomic conditions we interact the employment status variable with an indicator
that takes value one during recessionary years.
The economic literature has widely documented that the economic behavior of children
resembles that of their parents (see Mulligan (1997); Solon (1999)). Thus we need to control
for the presence of unobserved factors a®ecting both the schooling outcomes of children and
the employment status of their parents. We estimate a linear probability model for the
child's upgrading behavior, and adjust for the potential endogeneity of parental employment
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it is the indicator of progression in school for child i. Ehh
it is an indicator variable
taking value 1 if the head in child i0s household has not experienced an unemployment spell
during the academic year and 0 otherwise. The variable cr is a crisis indicator that takes
value 1 if the year, t, of the observation is 1995, and 1999 to 2002, and 0 otherwise.11 The
variable Ehh
it cr captures the interaction between the employment status of the household
head and the crisis indicator cr. The coe±cient on the indicator for the employment status
of the household head and that on the interaction with the crisis indicator, cr allow us to
test for full insurance. The instrument employed to identify the causal e®ect of both the
household head employment status and the additional e®ect during crisis years is carefully
discussed at the end of this section.
Education in Argentina is free thus the only cost of schooling is represented mainly by
foregone production or earnings. Accordingly we include in equation (1) the log wages of
children and teens in the year of reference, ¢lnWit . This variable captures the e®ect of
changes in the opportunity cost of secondary school. The variable is constructed as the mean
wage in the individual's cell, where cells are de¯ned on the basis of region, gender and an
indicator for whether he/she is older than the minimum school-leaving age (i.e. 15 years
old). Real mean wages at the cell level are computed from the entire sample of individuals
between 12 and 18 years old in the EPH survey in each semester and not just the subsample
of households in our panel.12
Note that the model in equation (1) is in di®erences thus it should not include any variable
that is constant over time. However, individuals or families may have di®erent preferences
for education. Accordingly the schooling model includes a set of preference shifters to allow
children's schooling progress to vary with the characteristics of the family Xi. The preference
shifters are represented by dummy variables to control for the level of parental education.
We also include a vector of child's characteristics, such as child's age and an indicator for
10While a biprobit estimation is more e±cient, a simple 2SLS imposes less restrictive assumptions on the
error structure while being consistent (Altonji, Elder and Taber (2002), Angrist (2001)).
11In 1995 the country su®ered from the Mexican tequila crisis, with unemployment reaching 15% for the
¯rst time in two decades.
12 The nominal wage for each individual in any given semester was de°ated by the simple average of
the value of the national consumer price index (CPI) prevailing in each month of the academic year. The
monthly CPI was obtained from the INDEC website.
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equation include a set of year, Yit, and regional dummies, Rit. Year dummies are used to
control for the role of common aggregate shocks and to absorb potential changes in the real
interest rate r(t) faced by households.
In the presence of unobserved factors shared by children and their parents, identifying
the causal e®ect of household head's unemployment in equation ( 1) requires the use of in-
strumental variables. Here we propose the use of an instrument that is likely to have a®ected
the demand for labor in Argentina during the period, but not the supply side. Thus not
being a choice variable for the worker. The instrument we propose is related to Argentinean
trade performance and how this di®erently a®ected the sectors of the economy. Argentina
liberalized its trade regime at the beginning of the 1990's. Total trade almost quadrupled
between 1990 and 1998. According to traditional trade theory, economic liberalization is
meant to increase trade, accelerate technological change, e±ciency gains and growth. It is
argued that a more e±cient allocation of resources due to trade liberalization will, in the
long run, lead to increased welfare and will have a positive impact on employment as well
as on poverty and inequality. However negative employment e®ects in speci¯c sectors are
expected during the transition period.
The proposed instrument is an index of export prices interacted with the sectoral share
of ¯rms with more than 25 employee as measured in 1993. The size threshold is particu-
larly relevant as according to the Argentinean labor market legislation, ¯rms with less of 25
employees are subject to less restrictive norms, often resulting in much more dynamic enter-
prises. On the other hand, for many sectors, size is an important indicator of competitiveness
and employment stability. This partly explains the di®erential impact of devaluation across
groups formed by sectors and ¯rms' size. For example during the period 1995 ¡ 2002 while
services and public administration lost jobs, small and medium services were particularly
active creating new jobs (Pessino and Andres (2003)). 13
There are several reasons to support the conjecture that the price of Argentinean ex-
ports is determined in the worldwide market, without much in°uence of its own economic
conditions. First, Argentina is a relatively small open country, thus it is not supposed to in-
°uence world market prices. Second, the bulk of Argentinean exports are agricultural goods,
petroleum and combustibles, which are traded on relatively free international commodities
markets. Last, but not least, Argentina adopted a currency board policy during the 1990's,
that prevented exchange rate manipulations to favor exports.
Our measure of export prices is obtained from the Argentinean Statistics O±ce that
provides export price indexes for major product industries. The indices are constructed in
13see Corbacho, Garcia-Escribano and Inchauste (2007) for an extensive analysis of the role of the public
sector during Argentinean's crisis.
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elaborated, the prices used to construct the index refer to unit values available from the
customs registry for any tari® item. Primary products constitute the leading Argentinean
export sectors, and can thus be decomposed in rather precise price indexes, as each product is
listed under a certain tari®. For more elaborated goods, like capital goods or durable goods,
customs registries cannot be used. This is because the various parts of these products, or
the di®erent models of the same product can be subject to di®erent tari®s. Thus for these
goods, the unit values reported in the customs registry can re°ect both changes in export
prices and the application of di®erent tari®s. To construct price indexes for these sectors,
prices of international market leaders are used. Thus for these kind of goods, only more
aggregated price indexes are available.14 For services, public sector/non traded sectors we
use the general export price level, meant to be valid for the whole economy's exports. The
interaction of export sectors and size groups allows us to de¯ne about 30 groups each year.
Note that the model in equation (1) is in di®erences, thus in estimation individual char-
acteristics constant over time drop from the error term. Accordingly our instrument will
be valid as long as it is uncorrelated with children and teens' unobserved characteristics
changing over time. While preferences for education and working habits might change with
the economic context, they also have a large persistent component that is inherited from
previous generations (Toledo (2008)) and will not immediately adjust to the new economy.
However, as a robustness check for our identi¯cation strategy, we estimate the schooling
model using as instrument lagged values of export prices in the sector where the household
head is employed. While export prices in the previous period are likely to be correlated
with the current employment level, they are certainly uncorrelated with contemporaneous
idiosyncratic shocks at the individual level.
The model in equation (1) allows us to analyze the e®ect of household head's unem-
ployment on children's schooling outcomes and test for the presence of credit market im-
perfections. To further investigate the mechanism behind this relationship we explore the
implications of household head's unemployment for children and teens' labor market behav-
ior. The labor supply of young household members can be used as an informal mechanism
to insure households against unexpected and negative idiosyncratic shocks such as unem-
ployment spells. However the time that children and teens spend on various activities such
as work and school is likely to be simultaneously determined. Thus it is reasonable to ex-
pect that an increase in the number of hours a child is employed will reduce time for other
activities and negatively a®ect their schooling outcomes.
To investigate the previous conjecture we regress the change in the child's labor market
14 These prices are already expressed in real terms referring to 1993 prices, we thus do not need to adjust
for in°ation.
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schooling model in equation (1). The model for the change in the child's labor market
behavior is:
¢Pit = ®P + °PE
hh
it + &1Pcr + °2PE
hh
it cr + ¯P¢lnWit + ±PXi + &1PRit + &2PYit + "
P
it (2)
where Pit is an indicator value that takes value 1 if the child works in period t and 0 otherwise.
Thus the dependent variable in the model can take the values -1, 0 or 1, and it is obtained
from comparing the child's labor market status in May of two consecutive years. We estimate
the model in equation (2) by two-stage least squares using the previous instrument to control
for the potential endogeneity of head's unemployment.
2.4 Results
In this section we examine the implications of credit market imperfections for human capital
investment decisions. In the presence of full insurance we expect discontinuities in the
work career of the household head not to have any e®ect on the schooling progress of other
household members. In contrast, if households do not fully share risk, interrupted work
careers by the head will negatively a®ect the human capital investment decisions of other
household members, if, for example, they have to increase their degree of labor market
involvement to insure the household against income drops. To test this conjecture we ¯rst
estimate the schooling model in equations (1) for all the years available in the sample.
However imperfections in ¯nancial markets are likely to vary depending on the aggregate
state of the economy, thus we re-estimate the schooling model by including the interaction
between the employment status of the household head and the crisis year indicator. 15 The
results separately for both boys and girls appear in table (1).
Column (1) in Table (1) reports the OLS estimates of the linear probability model for boys
while column (5) reports the results for girls. The coe±cient on the indicator for the absence
of discontinuities in the work career of the household head is not statistically signi¯cant
on the boys' likelihood of upgrading. For girls, the indicator of the employment status of
the household head is marginally signi¯cant at the 10% level. To investigate whether the
e®ect of parental employment status is di®erent conditional on the macroeconomic scenario
we include in the empirical model a crisis year indicator and an interaction between this
indicator and the employment status of the household head. The results for this alternative
speci¯cation for boys appear in column (2) of Table (1) and those for girls in column (6).
While the coe±cient on the crisis year indicator is always negative and highly signi¯cant its
15This indicator takes value 1 if the observation belongs to years 1995, and from 1999 to 2002, and 0
otherwise.
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for boys and girls).
As mentioned in the previous section the estimation results in columns (1)-(2) and (5)-
(6) do not re°ect the causal impact of household head unemployment in the presence of
unobserved factors associated both with parents' and children's schooling and labor market
performance. To account for the potential endogeneity of parental unemployment we esti-
mate the model in equation (1) by two-stage least squares using as exclusion restrictions the
instruments discussed in the previous section. Table (2) displays the ¯rst stage estimates
for the parental employment probability. The size of the t-statistic suggests that the instru-
ment is very informative in all the speci¯cations and take this result as evidence that the
export price index satis¯es the conditions required to identify the e®ect of head's job losses
on schooling progress.
In Table (1) columns (3) and (7) present the 2SLS estimates of the upgrading linear
probability model respectively for boys and girls. In both columns the adjusted coe±cient
on the indicator variable for the employment status of the household head is higher in mag-
nitude than the OLS estimate but it remains statistically insigni¯cant. We next investigate
whether the e®ect of employment discontinuities by the household head on human capital
accumulation decisions varies conditional on the macroeconomic scenario. The 2SLS esti-
mates for the speci¯cation that includes the interaction between the employment status of
the head and the crisis year indicator appear in column (4) for boys and (6) for girls. The
coe±cient on the employment status of the head, though positive, remains statistically in-
signi¯cant. However the coe±cient on the interaction is now positive and highly signi¯cant
for boys. The point estimate suggest that continuous work career by the household head
during recessionary periods increase the chances of school upgrading by about 60 percent-
age points relative to growth periods. Our results provide strong evidence that while the
employment status of the household head does not a®ect the upgrading probability during
growth periods, the absence of work career interruptions by the household head mitigates
the negative e®ects of recessionary periods for the households' human capital accumulation
decisions.
The results for girls reveal a similar story. The coe±cient on the employment status
of the head is statistically insigni¯cant; however that on the interaction is positive and
statistically signi¯cant at 10% level. The point estimate indicates that the probability of
schooling upgrading increases by about 33 percentage points if the head is continuously
employed during periods of aggregate economic instability relative to periods of economic
prosperity. The e®ect for girls is half of what we ¯nd for boys suggesting that the latter
are at a higher risk of schooling failure if the household head looses the job. This evidence
is consistent with the work by Emerson and Souza (2008), Cardoso and Verner (2007) and
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or Thomas et al. (2004) on Indonesian children, where boys present a higher response to
households' income shocks than girls due to the higher opportunity cost of staying at school.
That pattern does however contrasts to evidence found for other Latin American countries
(Duryea et al. (2007) for urban Brazilian, Parker and Skou¯as (2006) for Mexican children).
We further investigate the educational response to household head unemployment of the
oldest child in the household. The fact that earlier born children may have higher innate
abilities may mean that their return to education is greater than that of later born children
which might lead to the decision to withhold them from the labor market.16 During the
1998 crisis in Indonesia poorer households apparently sought to protect investments in the
schooling of older children at the expense of the education of younger children (Thomas et al.
(2004)). This would be consistent with the previous literature on birth order e®ects.
On the other hand, these same abilities may mean that they are able to command higher
wages as children on the labor market than their later born siblings and thus are more likely
to be sent to work as children. Also, older children can command higher wages than younger
children, this also could lead to earlier born children being sent to work rather than their
later born siblings. Thus, when examined in a emerging economy context, where child labor
is widespread, the e®ects of birth order may be distinctly di®erent than has been previously
assumed.
Previous work in developing countries has found that the oldest siblings are those more
involved in the household surviving strategies. For example Emerson and Souza (2008) ¯nd
that Brazilian male ¯rstborn children are less likely to attend school than their later born
siblings and that male last-born children are less likely to work as child laborers than their
earlier born siblings. For female children, ¯rst-borns are less likely to go to school than their
later born counterparts.17
The results for the oldest siblings are reported in Table (3) for both boys and girls.
Obviously the sample size has decreased but the results in this table reinforce those obtained
on the whole sample. That is, while the coe±cient on the indicator of the employment status
of the household head is statistically insigni¯cant, its interaction with the crisis year indicator
is positive. Thus continuous work careers by the head during periods of aggregate instability
has a positive e®ect on the upgrading probability of the oldest siblings. Notice that the
16A large body of empirical evidence ¯nds that ¯rst-born children have higher IQs and cognitive abilities
than their later-born siblings. See for example Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2008) or Behrman and
Taubman (1986). However, most of this evidence is based on developed nations' results.
17Edmonds (2006) analyzes the e®ect of rice's price liberalization in Vietnam on child labor. The author
¯nds that household composition attributes that are associated with higher levels of child labor are also
associated with larger declines in child labor when rice price increases. See also Edmonds (2004), Emerson
and Souza (2007)
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magnitude of the e®ect is substantially larger than that for the whole sample. This evidence
reinforces the view that oldest siblings are at higher risk of acting as insurance mechanism
during periods of ¯nancial di±culties.18
One confounding factor in the literature on birth order is usually the family size. Family
size has been found to have negative developmental e®ects likely due to the fact that family
resources are spread more thinly the larger the family. The size of the family may also be an
important factor in the labor force participation and school attendance of children. It may
be that larger families increase the likelihood of the household being impoverished and thus
large families are more likely to need the additional income a child who works in the labor
market can provide. Or it may be - most likely in agricultural environments - that families
increase the number of children they bear as a response to poverty so that the family's income
may be supplemented by sending some children to work or having them provide labor within
the household. Looking at short term shocks, these long run e®ects should be ruled out.
However, to avoid confounding e®ects in the robustness checks we present regressions which
include family size as an additional control.19
Some of the other estimated coe±cients in Table (1) and (3) also deserve some attention.
The estimates indicate that children with more educated parents have higher chances of being
successful at school and less likely to participate in market activities. This result indicates
that intergenerational mobility, at least in education, is low in Argentina. The coe±cient
on the variable capturing changes in wages is negatively correlated with the probability of
schooling progress for boys. This is evidence that male teens' educational choices respond to
the opportunity cost of staying at school. Accordingly an increase in the opportunity cost of
school, as measured by the wage rate, increases the chances that individuals drop out from
school to participate in market activities. In contrast the e®ect of the wage di®erential is
positive for girls. This could indicate di®erent incentives, i.e. income e®ects, for girls' time
allocation decisions.
The most important feature in table (1) is the implicit negative response of children's
school progress to household's idiosyncratic shocks during recessionary periods. This ¯nding
clearly lead us to reject the full market insurance hypothesis in periods of aggregate insta-
bility. We now investigate the potential mechanisms behind the observed academic failure.
The data allows us to explore whether it is due to a reduction in schooling e®ort motivated
by a higher degree of children's labor market involvement. To investigate this possibility we
estimate the model in equation (2).
18First born children are only minimally older and have an average age of 15.02 compared to the mean
14.58 years of the total sample.
19As child labor is mostly a phenomena related to familial poverty (Basu and Van. (1998)), we also included
in the controls familial per capita income decile. The results are not reported as they were not a®ected.
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labor market behavior of both boys and girls. The OLS estimates suggest an increase in the
labor market involvement of boys in response to job losses by the head. The IV estimates
reveal a signi¯cant impact of household head employment on boys labor for the whole period
but do not ¯nd a statistically signi¯cant di®erence during recessionary years. Note however
that the point estimate of the coe±cient of the head's employment status during the crisis
would be ¡:337 signi¯cant at the 1% level; this implies that children living in families where
the household head is continuously employed during the school year are about a third less
likely to enter the labor market during the crisis.
In contrast, for girls we do not ¯nd any signi¯cant e®ect on labor market activities.
For the sample of oldest siblings we ¯nd that, at least for boys, the higher schooling failure
during recessionary periods responds to an increase in labor market involvement to insure the
household in response to job losses by the household head. The point estimate suggests that
boys are 40 percentage points more likely to be working during recessionary periods relative
to growth periods if the household head becomes unemployed. This di®erential e®ect that
only appears for oldest male siblings is in line with the ¯ndings in other studies on birth order,
school attendance and child labor (Emerson and Souza (2008),Emerson and Souza (2007),
and Edmonds (2006), Edmonds (2004)) and con¯rms that in moments of general economic
distress, when insurance markets fail, households turn to self insuring strategies resorting to
children work and that oldest siblings are at higher risk of reducing their educational e®ort to
contribute to the household economy. A similar e®ect is not found for girls, suggesting that
they are more likely to be involved in home production to replace other household members
who go to work.
A striking result from table (4) is that wages do not seem to provide any incentive to
enter the labor market. It is rather the educational level of the parents the most signi¯-
cant variables associated with children labor market activities. Parental education can be
interpreted as a proxy for permanent income. Thus the previous result suggests that the
decision to let children participate in the labor market is more related to credit constraints
or ¯nancial di±culties than to the opportunity cost of schooling.
On the whole our empirical ¯ndings reveal important adverse e®ects on human capi-
tal accumulation by Argentinean youth due to the presence of credit market imperfections
during the economic crisis of the late 1990's and early 2000's. We ¯nd evidence that house-
hold heads' job losses were associated with higher levels of labor market involvement, in
particular for oldest male siblings, who then reduced their schooling performance. For girls
unemployment spells by the head also led to reductions in schooling e®ort and upgrading
probabilities, however, girls' time was most likely employed in home rather than market
production. Our results suggests potential mechanisms to understand the poor schooling
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2.4.1 Robustness checks
The instrument proposed will be valid as long as it is uncorrelated with children and teens'
unobserved characteristics changing over time. As a robustness check for our identi¯cation
strategy, we estimate the schooling model using as instrument lagged values of export prices
where the household head is employed interacted with the a measure of the average size of
the sector. The 2sls estimates for the relevant variables are shown in tables (6) and (7).
Coe±cients are slightly bigger and even more precisely estimated than in the base results.
In tables (8) and (9) we add additional controls: maternal educational level, family size,
ownership of the household's housing, number of room. As already mentioned, family size
could be an important factor to explain both educational success and child labor. However,
the results are not relevantly a®ected.
Many studies consider 2002 as the ¯rst year of economic recovery. In this case this would
a®ect the classi¯cation of crisis years we did. Tables (10) and (11) the 2SLS estimates of
the relevant variables discarding the observations belonging to 2002. Again results are not
signi¯cantly altered.
2.5 Conclusions
This paper examines the implications of credit market failures for human capital investment
decisions in Argentina during the period from 1995 to 2002. Our results suggest a remarkable
negative and statistically signi¯cant e®ect of household heads' work career interruptions on
the schooling progress of children during years of economic distress. We also ¯nd evidence
that during periods of economic instability, in response to household head unemployment
shocks, boys increase their involvement in labor market activities whereas girls seem to
increase participation in home production. We interpret these results as evidence that dur-
ing the Argentinean economic recession between 1999 and 2002, credit markets collapsed
signi¯cantly a®ecting households' insurance strategies and investment decisions.
Our ¯ndings indicate that macroeconomic crises can potentially have a persistent e®ect
on the well-being of subsequent generations. If children left behind as a result of parental
job losses do not catch up with their cohort counterparts, macroeconomic shocks will have
a persistent e®ect on the level of inequality of younger generations. Therefore policies de-
signed to protect and boost the schooling enrollment of children during periods of economic
turbulence would be desirable to prevent temporary shocks a®ecting the current working
population to have a permanent e®ect on subsequent generations.
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DOI: 10.2870/12804Table 1: Probability of school progression
BOYS GIRLS
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ehh
it 0.006 -0.013 0.129 -0.232 0.032 0.01 0.145 -0.063
[0.017] [0.027] [0.091] [0.164] [0.016]* [0.026] [0.085]* [0.127]
Ehh
it ¤ crisis 0.032 0.569 0.035 0.331
[0.035] [0.261]** [0.034] [0.172]*
crisis 0.000 -0.664 -0.155 -0.421
[0.000] [0.247]*** [0.037]*** [0.160]***
age child -0.318 0.008 -0.32 -0.324 -0.121 -0.121 -0.118 0.022
[0.054]*** [0.008] [0.058]*** [0.008] [0.050]** [0.050]** [0.039]*** [0.039]***
age child2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003
[0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002] [0.002] [0.001]* [0.001]*
age hh 0.008 -0.318 0.006 0.005 0.024 0.024 0.022 -0.124
[0.008] [0.054]*** [0.007] [0.065]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]***
age hh2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
school obbl. 0.048 0.048 0.047 0.05 -0.07 -0.069 -0.07 -0.066
[0.027]* [0.027]* [0.034] [0.037] [0.025]*** [0.025]*** [0.023]*** [0.022]***
hh gender 0.057 0.057 0.059 0.064 0.025 0.025 0.024 0.027
[0.017]*** [0.017]*** [0.014]*** [0.015]*** [0.015]* [0.015]* [0.010]** [0.011]**
hh no ed. -0.19 -0.19 -0.166 -0.166 -0.051 -0.05 -0.035 -0.028
[0.066]*** [0.066]*** [0.077]** [0.079]** [0.054] [0.054] [0.072] [0.077]
hh primary -0.109 -0.108 -0.104 -0.099 -0.082 -0.082 -0.075 -0.073
[0.015]*** [0.015]*** [0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.019]*** [0.020]***
hh second. -0.042 -0.042 -0.038 -0.04 -0.034 -0.034 -0.03 -0.027
[0.015]*** [0.015]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.015]** [0.015]*
work sp. 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004
[0.012] [0.012] [0.009] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.013] [0.014]
¢lnWt -0.036 -0.036 -0.037 -0.036 0.061 0.06 0.061 0.058
[0.023] [0.023] [0.021]* [0.021]* [0.023]*** [0.023]*** [0.028]** [0.027]**
region d. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
year d. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs. 5856 5856 5856 5856 5838 5838 5838 5838
R2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
notes: Standard errors in brackets. Signi¯cance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
In the ¯rst stage regression errors are clustered by household head's sector of employment.
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Exp. price 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002
[.000]*** [.000]*** [.000]*** [.000]***
(Exp. price)*crisis 0.002 0.002
[.001]*** [.001]***
F- stat 15.06 12.28 5.27 30.85 16.85 13.8
partial R 0.0154 0.0166 0.0215 0.0209 0.022 0.0273
notes: Standard errors in brackets. Signi¯cance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Errors are clustered by household head's sector of employment.
Table 3: Probability of school promotion oldest siblings
BOYS GIRLS
OLS IV OLS IV
Ehh
it 0.017 -0.013 0.135 -0.48 0.037 0.03 0.17 -0.149
[0.021] [0.032] [0.116] [0.211]** [0.021]* [0.033] [0.132] [0.204]
Ehh
it ¤ crisis 0.049 0.946 0.012 0.518
[0.042] [0.340]*** [0.042] [0.226]**
crisis -0.217 -1.028 0.000 -0.594
[0.047]*** [0.321]*** [0.000] [0.210]***
age child -0.328 0.01 -0.333 0.007 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.024
[0.061]*** [0.061]*** [0.060]*** [0.073]*** [0.058]** [0.058]** [0.008]*** [0.009]***
age child2 0.01 0.01 0.011 0.011 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
[0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]*
age hh 0.01 -0.328 0.008 -0.332 -0.121 -0.121 -0.119 -0.129
[0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.010] [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.047]** [0.048]***
age hh2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
school obbl. 0.06 0.061 0.059 0.068 -0.059 -0.059 -0.062 -0.059
[0.030]** [0.030]** [0.042] [0.044] [0.028]** [0.028]** [0.024]** [0.023]***
hh gender 0.055 0.056 0.057 0.067 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.02
[0.020]*** [0.020]*** [0.019]*** [0.019]*** [0.018] [0.018] [0.015] [0.018]
hh no educ. -0.165 -0.166 -0.139 -0.158 -0.042 -0.042 -0.034 -0.015
[0.073]** [0.074]** [0.075]* [0.088]* [0.065] [0.065] [0.077] [0.077]
hh primary -0.111 -0.111 -0.107 -0.097 -0.085 -0.085 -0.077 -0.077
[0.019]*** [0.019]*** [0.014]*** [0.016]*** [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.021]*** [0.022]***
hh second. -0.055 -0.055 -0.051 -0.054 -0.04 -0.04 -0.035 -0.03
[0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.014]*** [0.016]*** [0.018]** [0.018]** [0.015]** [0.016]*
work sp. 0.007 0.006 0.008 -0.001 0.004 0.004 0.005 -0.001
[0.015] [0.015] [0.012] [0.012] [0.014] [0.014] [0.015] [0.016]
¢lnWt -0.045 -0.045 -0.045 -0.038 0.112 0.111 0.113 0.104
[0.029] [0.029] [0.028] [0.028] [0.029]*** [0.029]*** [0.025]*** [0.025]***
region d. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
year d. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs. 4080 4080 4080 4080 4042 4042 4042 4042
R2 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
notes: Standard errors in brackets. Signi¯cance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
In the ¯rst stage regression errors are clustered by household head's sector of employment.
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BOYS GIRLS
OLS IV OLS IV
Ehh
it 0.003 0.029 -0.31 -0.264 -0.007 -0.018 0.065 0.068
[0.012] [0.018] [0.099]*** [0.166] [0.008] [0.015] [0.041] [0.096]
Ehh
it ¤ crisis -0.043 -0.073 0.018 -0.005
[0.023]* [0.149] [0.018] [0.129]
crisis 0.000 0.073 0.000 -0.006
[0.000] [0.138] [0.000] [0.115]
age child -0.086 -0.002 -0.08 -0.079 -0.034 -0.007 -0.033 -0.008
[0.041]** [0.041]** [0.033]** [0.004] [0.031] [0.031] [0.018]* [0.004]**
age child2 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]** [0.001]**
age hh -0.002 -0.085 0.003 0.003 -0.007 -0.035 -0.008 -0.033
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.033]** [0.004]* [0.004]* [0.004]** [0.017]*
age hh2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]* [0.000]* [0.000]* [0.000]*
school obbl. 0.014 0.014 0.017 0.017 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006
[0.017] [0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.013] [0.013] [0.010] [0.010]
hh gender -0.027 -0.028 -0.032 -0.033 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
[0.011]** [0.011]** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
hh no educ. 0.076 0.076 0.013 0.013 -0.007 -0.006 0.003 0.003
[0.038]** [0.038]** [0.046] [0.047] [0.036] [0.036] [0.039] [0.038]
hh primary 0.042 0.041 0.031 0.031 0.019 0.019 0.023 0.023
[0.009]*** [0.008]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.005]*** [0.006]***
hh second. 0.007 0.007 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.004
[0.007] [0.007] [0.013] [0.013] [0.006] [0.006] [0.003] [0.003]
work sp. -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
[0.007] [0.007] [0.010] [0.010] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
¢lnWt 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011]
region d. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
year d. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs. 5858 5856 5856 5856 5840 5840 5840 5840
R2 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02
notes: Standard errors in brackets. Signi¯cance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
In the ¯rst stage regression errors are clustered by household head's sector of employment.
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BOYS GIRLS
OLS IV OLS IV
Ehh
it -0.006 0.028 -0.343 -0.025 -0.007 -0.02 0.14 0.125
[0.015] [0.024] [0.097]*** [0.182] [0.011] [0.020] [0.071]** [0.153]
Ehh
it ¤ crisis -0.056 -0.489 0.021 0.026
[0.031]* [0.232]** [0.025] [0.189]
crisis 0.000 0.465 0.000 -0.022
[0.000] [0.221]** [0.000] [0.165]
age child -0.09 -0.003 -0.075 0.003 -0.008 -0.008 -0.01 -0.019
[0.045]** [0.005] [0.038]* [0.038]** [0.005]* [0.005]* [0.004]** [0.004]**
age child2 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.002]** [0.002]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
age hh -0.003 -0.09 0.003 -0.076 -0.021 -0.021 -0.019 -0.01
[0.005] [0.045]** [0.004] [0.005] [0.035] [0.035] [0.017] [0.018]
age hh2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]** [0.000]**
school obbl. 0.02 0.02 0.023 0.019 -0.014 -0.014 -0.016 -0.016
[0.019] [0.019] [0.016] [0.016] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
hh gender -0.036 -0.037 -0.04 -0.046 -0.015 -0.015 -0.016 -0.016
[0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.010]*** [0.013]*** [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
hh no educ. 0.099 0.1 0.023 0.033 -0.034 -0.033 -0.025 -0.024
[0.048]** [0.049]** [0.060] [0.075] [0.043] [0.043] [0.048] [0.045]
hh primary 0.044 0.043 0.032 0.027 0.024 0.024 0.032 0.032
[0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.012]** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]***
hh second. 0.009 0.009 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.006
[0.010] [0.010] [0.014] [0.015] [0.009] [0.009] [0.006] [0.005]
work sp. -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.001 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005
[0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.012] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
¢lnWt 0.011 0.01 0.012 0.008 -0.009 -0.01 -0.008 -0.008
[0.015] [0.015] [0.017] [0.017] [0.013] [0.013] [0.015] [0.013]
region d. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
year d. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs. 4082 4082 4082 4082 4044 4044 4044 4044
R2 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
notes: Standard errors in brackets. Signi¯cance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
In the ¯rst stage regression errors are clustered by household head's sector of employment.
Table 6: Probability of school progression lagged export price.
BOYS GIRLS
ALL SAMPLE OLDEST ALL SAMPLE OLDEST
Ehh
it 0.133 -0.223 0.121 -0.469 0.162 -0.027 0.204 -0.069
[0.089] [0.167] [0.107] [0.206]** [0.082]** [0.119] [0.131] [0.194]
Ehh
it ¤ crisis 0.564 0.921 0.301 0.445
[0.271]** [0.344]*** [0.165]* [0.217]**
obs 5856 5856 4080 4080 5838 5838 4042 4042
notes: 2SLS. Standard errors in brackets. Signi¯cance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
In the ¯rst stage regression errors are clustered by household head's sector of employment. The
controls are: child's and household head's age and gender, household head's education, work status of
the spouse.
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BOYS GIRLS
ALL SAMPLE OLDEST ALL SAMPLE OLDEST
Ehh
it -0.292 -0.234 -0.32 0.008 0.067 0.062 0.145 0.118
[0.098]*** [0.166] [0.094]*** [0.179] [0.043] [0.095] [0.073]** [0.149]
Ehh
it ¤ crisis -0.091 -0.511 0.009 0.044
[0.148] [0.231]** [0.129] [0.188]
obs 5858 5858 4082 4082 5840 5840 4044 4044
notes: 2SLS. Standard errors in brackets. Signi¯cance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
In the ¯rst stage regression errors are clustered by household head's sector of employment. The
controls are: child's and household head's age and gender, household head's education, work status of
the spouse.
Table 8: Probability of school progression additional controls
BOYS GIRLS
ALL SAMPLE OLDEST ALL SAMPLE OLDEST
Ehh
it 0.113 -0.242 0.111 -0.501 0.151 -0.048 0.165 -0.157
[0.101] [0.157] [0.117] [0.202]** [0.084]* [0.124] [0.133] [0.203]
Ehh
it ¤ crisis 0.56 0.944 0.319 0.528
[0.241]** [0.327]*** [0.173]* [0.225]**
obs 5856 5856 4080 4080 5838 5838 4042 4042
notes: 2SLS. Standard errors in brackets. Signi¯cance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
In the ¯rst stage regression errors are clustered by household head's sector of employment. The
controls are: child's and household head's age and gender, household head's and spouse's education,
work status of the spouse, family size, ownership of housing, number of rooms.
Table 9: Probability of working additional controls
BOYS GIRLS
ALL SAMPLE OLDEST ALL SAMPLE OLDEST
Ehh
it -0.301 -0.248 -0.333 -0.013 0.071 0.072 0.149 0.13
[0.100]*** [0.172] [0.099]*** [0.186] [0.042]* [0.094] [0.073]** [0.149]
Ehh
it ¤ crisis -0.084 -0.492 -0.002 0.032
[0.155] [0.230]** [0.125] [0.184]
obs 5858 5858 4082 4082 5840 5840 4044 4044
notes: 2SLS. Standard errors in brackets. Signi¯cance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
In the ¯rst stage regression errors are clustered by household head's sector of employment. The controls
are: child's and household head's age and gender, household head's and spouse's education, work status
of the spouse, family size, ownership of housing, number of rooms.
Table 10: Probability of school progression discarding the
observations of year 2002.
BOYS GIRLS
ALL SAMPLE OLDEST ALL SAMPLE OLDEST
Ehh
it 0.114 -0.22 0.116 -0.469 0.116 -0.064 0.154 -0.143
[0.080] [0.174] [0.100] [0.204]** [0.088]* [0.125] [0.129] [0.198]
Ehh
it ¤ crisis 0.557 0.958 0.311 0.534
[0.258]** [0.353]*** [0.165]* [0.246]**
obs 5369 5369 3741 3741 5337 5337 3681 3681
notes: 2SLS. Standard errors in brackets. Signi¯cance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
In the ¯rst stage regression errors are clustered by household head's sector of employment. The
controls are: child's and household head's age and gender, household head's education, work status
of the spouse.
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2002.
BOYS GIRLS
ALL SAMPLE OLDEST ALL SAMPLE OLDEST
Ehh
it -0.301 -0.261 -0.351 -0.038 0.07 0.072 0.148 0.132
[0.094]*** [0.158]* [0.107]*** [0.170] [0.045] [0.099] [0.080]* [0.157]
Ehh
it ¤ crisis -0.067 -0.511 -0.002 0.029
[0.132] [0.214]** [0.137] [0.202]
obs 5370 5370 3742 3742 5339 5339 3683 3683
notes: 2SLS. Standard errors in brackets. Signi¯cance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
In the ¯rst stage regression errors are clustered by household head's sector of employment. The
controls are: child's and household head's age and gender, household head's education, work status of
the spouse.
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Table A-1: Macroeconomic summary
Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Real GDP growth -2.8 5.5 8.1 3.9 -3.4 -0.8 -4.4 -10.9
Urban unempl, Oct. 16.6 17.3 13.7 12.4 13.8 14,7 18.3 17.8
Consumer Price Index 3.4 0.2 0.5 0.9 -1.2 -0.9 -1.1 25.9
Imports growth -9.8 17.5 26.9 8.4 -11.3 -0.2 -13.9 -50.1
Exports growth 22.5 7.6 12.2 10.6 -1.3 2.7 2.7 3.1
Export price index 108.8 115.9 111.9 100.3 89.1 98.0 94.7 91.0
Source: INDEC. All indicators except export price index are in percentage.
Export price index refers to 1993= 100.
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promotion rates by grade and year
mandatory schooling - EGB Polimodal
gr. 1 gr. 2 gr. 3 gr. 4 gr. 5 gr. 6 gr. 7 gr. 8 gr. 9 gr.10 gr.11 gr.12
1996 88.34 91.03 92.67 93.06 93.28 93.62 92.11 67.19 68.32 78.46 85.21 72.85
1997 88.57 91.77 93.04 93.69 93.83 93.38 99.27 76.79 68.08 81.84 86.43 73.40
1998 88.15 91.97 92.50 93.42 93.69 93.50 99.02 76.35 77.08 81.39 86.88 74.39
1999 87.59 91.76 92.61 93.19 93.33 92.88 96.52 78.97 76.35 80.86 88.52 74.16
2000 87.11 91.62 92.46 92.85 93.26 90.66 94.55 79.16 75.86 79.18 84.33 65.23
2001 86.88 91.71 92.50 93.07 93.60 92.79 93.17 80.30 80.13 80.51 85.07 77.11
2002 86.92 91.64 92.47 92.68 93.08 92.87 92.66 79.77 79.84 77.40 81.95 77.17
repetition rates by grade and year
mandatory schooling - EGB Polimodal
gr. 1 gr. 2 gr. 3 gr. 4 gr. 5 gr. 6 gr. 7 gr. 8 gr. 9 gr.10 gr.11 gr.12
1996 9.13 7.37 5.64 4.92 3.91 3.03 2.03 10.79 13.91 9.07 5.21 1.12
1997 9.00 6.76 5.64 4.55 3.77 2.97 2.64 11.63 12.11 9.51 4.86 1.06
1998 9.51 6.76 6.26 5.02 4.20 3.44 3.48 11.42 9.87 8.95 4.76 0.95
1999 9.93 7.06 6.10 5.23 4.61 3.78 4.41 10.69 9.51 8.09 3.95 0.99
2000 10.38 7.25 6.38 5.56 4.72 3.87 5.14 10.81 9.26 8.23 5.73 0.83
2001 9.94 7.05 6.15 5.20 4.30 3.60 5.07 9.70 8.01 7.24 5.31 0.78
2002 9.95 7.05 6.17 5.53 4.70 3.82 5.70 10.35 8.85 8.42 6.40 0.55
percentage of lagging behind children - older than the "on-time" age
mandatory schooling - EGB Polimodal
gr. 1 gr. 2 gr. 3 gr. 4 gr. 5 gr. 6 gr. 7 gr. 8 gr. 9 gr.10 gr.11 gr.12
1996 13.57 20.31 23.10 25.11 25.29 25.62 26.56 40.39 42.05 38.76 37.13 32.00
1997 13.6 20.3 23.1 25.1 25.3 25.6 26.6 40.4 42.1 38.8 37.1 32.0
1998 14.5 18.9 23.3 25.1 26.4 26.1 26.4 38.1 40.7 40.1 36.7 33.3
1999 15.1 19.2 21.1 23.9 24.7 25.7 26.2 36.0 36.9 40.2 37.4 32.5
2000 15.1 20.1 21.8 22.4 24.4 25.1 27.3 34.8 35.5 37.8 37.3 33.8
2001 15.09 20.17 23.07 23.79 23.59 25.03 27.85 35.14 35.16 37.59 36.66 34.00
2002 16.31 20.80 23.91 25.55 25.63 25.12 28.58 35.14 35.78 37.84 36.69 32.91
percentage of drop outs by grade and year
mandatory schooling - EGB Polimodal
gr. 1 gr. 2 gr. 3 gr. 4 gr. 5 gr. 6 gr. 7 gr. 8 gr. 9 gr.10 gr.11 gr.12
1996 2.53 1.60 1.69 2.02 2.81 3.34 5.86 22.03 17.77 12.46 9.57 26.03
1997 2.42 1.47 1.32 1.76 2.41 3.65 -1.91 11.58 19.81 8.65 8.72 25.53
1998 2.34 1.27 1.24 1.56 2.11 3.06 -2.51 12.23 13.05 9.66 8.36 24.66
1999 2.48 1.18 1.29 1.59 2.06 3.34 -0.94 10.34 14.13 11.06 7.53 24.85
2000 2.51 1.12 1.15 1.59 2.02 5.46 0.31 10.03 14.88 12.59 9.94 33.94
2001 3.18 1.25 1.35 1.73 2.11 3.61 1.76 10.00 11.86 12.24 9.62 22.11
2002 3.12 1.31 1.36 1.79 2.21 3.31 1.64 9.87 11.31 14.18 11.66 22.29
Source: Ministry of Education of Argentina
56
Trentini, Claudia (2009), Essays on Human Capital Accumulation and Inequality 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/12804Table A-3: Percentage of household heads not su®ering unemployment spells during
the year by level of education.
year primary school secondary school tertiary education
1995 86.25 87 94.49
1996 84.62 85.74 89.32
1997 86.42 86.44 91.59
1998 84 87.79 89.16
1999 80.36 85.67 87.5
2000 79.46 85.15 88.44
2001 73.85 82.33 88.01
2002 82.80 85.27 87
Source: EPH selected sample.
Table A-4: School promotion by labor market participation, BOYS. Years 1995-2002
younger than 15 years older than 15 years
year Non active Active Non active Active
1995 73.42 41.53 65.10 40.57
1996 77.87 66.66 68.40 50
1997 80.61 72 72.09 61.53
1998 84.76 74.41 79.73 74.66
1999 83.23 73.80 76.58 65.71
2000 81.85 56.25 73.77 65
2001 80.66 53.57 73.77 72.13
2002 79.44 64.70 75.56 59.52
Source: EPH selected sample.
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Percentage of labor force participation
year HH head always employed HH head not always employed
younger than 15 older than 15 younger than 15 older than 15
female male female male female male female male
1995 2.05 6.88 16.28 15.78 0 16.85 20 31.91
1996 2.59 6.35 10.59 22 4.27 6.73 13.69 17.14
1997 2.50 5.99 11.23 23.10 3.12 7.54 14 25.64
1998 3.17 5.68 11.11 20.88 2.70 4.21 13.46 14
1999 2.54 8.03 13.11 19.41 2.41 5.02 11.11 17.77
2000 2.39 3.66 9.15 15.22 4.13 8.10 10 30.43
2001 1.19 4.04 10.50 15.86 2.23 2.85 9.67 23.80
2002 1.22 3.29 7.27 16.50 1.31 5.71 14.28 13.95
Percentage of school progress
year HH head always employed HH head not always employed
younger than 15 older than 15 younger than 15 older than 15
female male female male female male female male
1995 77.27 70.53 60.28 62.53 72.81 73.03 62.5 55.31
1996 81.85 76.98 70.28 64.54 77.77 76.92 75.34 61.42
1997 84.63 80.65 76.96 70.21 81.25 75.47 72 64.10
1998 86.32 84.48 80.99 83.78 80.23 83.15 75 86
1999 83.81 82.74 82.89 77.02 87.09 84.82 79.36 64.44
2000 81.54 82 81.01 71.97 82.06 74.77 84 69.56
2001 83.10 79.57 78.59 75.64 80.59 80.71 70.96 65.07
2002 86.24 79.74 80.90 72.51 73.68 80 65.71 72.09
Source: EPH selected sample.
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Labor protection policies, informal
labor markets and wage dispersion
ABSTRACT
Argentina experienced an important increase of informal employment and wage dispersion
in the last 20 years.
This paper extend a search model with exogenous human capital accumulation to include
an informal sector. The model is parametrized such to ¯t Argentinean data in order to
investigate the e®ect of employment protection measures on informality, employment and
wage dispersion under two di®erent macroeconomic conditions. I ¯nd that for low educated
workers both severance pay and minimum wages increase informality. In the presence of
a wage °oor severance payments do not a®ect employment but only shift marginal workers
from the covered sector to the unregulated one. I ¯nd that a decrease in the return to human
capital skills increases the incentives to seek informal employment. Labor market protection
measures and declining human capital return are able to explain most of the increase in
informality and much of the increase in wage dispersion.
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During the last two decades Argentina has witnessed an increasing trend in wage inequality
both across and within educational groups coupled with a rise of informality measured by
the degree of unprotected or unregulated work. In this paper I formulate a search model
with an informal sector and show that these trends can be accounted for by the combined
e®ect of restrictive labor protection policies enacted by the government in the aftermath of
the crisis and a reduction in labor productivity.
Over the Nineties, the debate on labor market reform has been at the center of economic
policy debate in Argentina. In spite of the growing unemployment rate, attempts to reduce
dismissal costs have faced strong opposition and reform attempts were never successful.
Given the dramatic social consequences of the early 2000's crisis, with open unemployment
reaching over 21% in May 2002, an \emergency" measure taken in that year doubled com-
pensation for unfair dismissal. It was expected that this would moderate unemployment
growth. Real wages fell dramatically during the crisis (see McKenzie (2004)) and recovered
pre-crisis levels only in the recent years. To improve working conditions, minimum wages,
which had been held constant throughout the Nineties, were raised. While the recovery of
the economy has been accompanied by a decline in unemployment, informality and wage
dispersion are still above their before crisis levels.
I show that these labor market policies have been key determinants of the changes in
unemployment and in employment composition in Argentina once one accounts for the pres-
ence of a large unprotected or \informal" sector. Furthermore, the results suggest that most
of the rise in the residual wage dispersion can be accounted for by an increase in the share
of employment that takes place in the informal sectors of the economy. The key mechanism
at work is a self selection of workers into the informal sector brought about by a decrease in
expected wage growth.
I examine these issues in a general equilibrium search model with human capital accu-
mulation. Following Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), I assume that workers can accumulate
skills while working while unemployment spells are associated with depreciation of human
capital. In order to address both within and across group wage dispersion, the model allows
for ex-ante worker heterogeneity as in Amaral (2008). This feature enables me to address
the di®erential impact of labor protection provisions across educational/income groups.
Importantly, the analysis extends existing general equilibrium search models with a dual
labor market. The duality derives from the coexistence of formal and informal sectors which
are assumed to di®er in terms of search costs, wage distributions and labor market legislation
compliance. Search costs on the informal sector are assumed to be lower than on the formal
sector and are increasing in the human capital accumulated. This latter feature captures the
idea that workers without experience may ¯nd it easier to ¯nd a temporary or unprotected
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two sectors on the basis of their accumulated human capital and depending on the search
costs associated with the two sectors. 2 The dual sector aspect of the economy is key when
evaluating the impact of labor market regulation since minimum wage and employment
protection legislation apply only to the formal sectors of the economy.3
The model is parametrized such as to replicate key moments of the Argentinean labor
market both in the formal and informal sector and for two educational groups of workers -
college educated and non college educated workers - in the years from 1996 to 1998. I estimate
key parameters with an indirect inference approach. The results imply that increases in
severance pay in the presence of binding minimum wages do not reduce unemployment, not
even for formal workers. This is because minimum wages constitute a wage °oor which
introduces further rigidities in the economy. An increase of the minimum wage leads to a
signi¯cant increase in the incidence of unemployment for workers in the formal sector. At
the same time, higher minimum wages give rise to an increase of informality, and a small
decline in informal sector unemployment and in wage dispersion. This is consistent with the
empirical results of Maloney and Nunez-Mendez (2003) regarding the impact of minimum
wages on employment and formality in Latin America. These results are mainly driven by
non college educated workers. For college educated workers these two policies have little
impacts apart from an increase in the number of workers selecting into the informal sector.
The increase in unemployment and the cross-sectoral reallocation of the labor force also
give rise to a drop in human capital accumulation. Workers that lose their jobs disproportion-
ately reallocate to the informal sector. This implies an increase in within group inequality
as the wage of workers that reallocate to the informal sector (working below the minimum
wage) falls relative to the workers that manage to retain their jobs in the formal sector.
Accordingly, the increase of informality gives rise to a sharp increase in wage dispersion. I
1This is in accordance with empirical evidence which shows that in developing economies, workers em-
ployed in untaxed, unregulated, sectors tend to be younger, have less education, and earn less than their
counterparts in the formal sector. Middle aged and older worker are more likely to work in the formal sector
or to be self-employed, though many still end up as informal employees (WorldBank, 2008). Fig. (A-5)
con¯rms a similar age structure of informal workers in Argentina.
2A growing body of theoretical literature relates the rising proportion of unprotected employment to the
worker's decision to participate in the informal labor market. Albrecht, Navarro and Vroman (2006), Boeri
and Garibaldi (2006), model workers' self sorting into informal employment on the basis of their productivity.
Kolm and Larsen (2003) focus on the impact of education. Fugazza and Jaques (2002) instead highlight the
moral costs of operating on the informal sector. Alternatively, other types of models endogenize the ¯rm's
choice see for example Bosch (2007) or Kugler (1999).
3In a related paper, Dolado, Jansen and Jimeno (2005) present a model where labor legislation applies
only to target groups (e.g. young). They highlight how labor market regulation may spill-over to other parts
of the labor force.
61
Trentini, Claudia (2009), Essays on Human Capital Accumulation and Inequality 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/12804show that the labor market policies combined with the fall in human capital accumulation
allows one to explain all of the increase in informality and a large share of the increase in
wage dispersion observed in Argentina in the period considered.
The paper brings together the literature on labor market regulation and dual economy
aspects. Previous contributions to the literature have instead tended to examine the impact
of these two aspects of labor market regulation separately. Bosch (2007), Kugler (1999) and
Albrecht et al. (2006) show that higher ¯ring costs, while reducing job separation rates of
formal jobs, increase the employment share of the informal sector. Pages-Serra and Montene-
gro (1999) develop a model in which tenure-related job security biases employment against
young workers and in favor of older ones. None of these papers however, consider possible in-
teractions with minimum wages. 4 Empirical evidence for Latin American countries (see for
example Saavedra and Torero (2000), Mondino and Montoya (2000), Hopenhayn (2004) or
de Barros and Corseuil (2000)) supports the hypothesis that job security lowers employment
and job turnover rates for formal workers.5 Theoretical debates about the use of minimum
wages focus on the trade o® poverty reduction and redistribute income and the concern of
introducing new rigidities in the labor market reducing employment opportunities. While
empirical evidence in developed countries suggests that minimum wages have only negligi-
ble e®ects on employment and positive e®ects on poverty (see for example Brown (1999) or
Krueger (1994)), the evidence for Latin America overall suggests large negative employment
e®ects in countries where the minimum wage is binding (Freeman and Freeman (1991), Bell
(1997), Maloney and Nunez-Mendez (2003)).6 This empirical research cast doubts on the
claim that minimum wages are innocuous, even in countries with large informal sectors.
The paper also adds to the literature on residual wage dispersion. Recent theoretical
debate about residual wage dispersion has focused on developed countries and the relation
between technology growth and workers' skill loss upon job displacement (see for example
Violante (2002), Kambourov and Manovskii (2008), Guvenen and Kuruscu (2006), or Shi
(2002)). I highlight a new mechanism to match the increase of residual wage dispersion over
recessionary periods: falling human capital accumulation rates increase informality while
reducing reservation wages and consequently inducing a leftwards widening of the earnings
distribution. This new mechanism is key for understanding the changes in wage dispersion
in Argentina and other countries with signi¯cant informal sector employment.
4 Earlier models (see for example Bertola (1990), Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Bentolila and Saint-Paul
(1994), Risager and Sorensen. (1997), or Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993)) do not analyze compositional
e®ects and focus on the impact on employment: Firing costs would reduce unemployment rates in recessions
and lower turnover rates but reduce hirings during the recovery.
5 See Heckman and Pages-Serra (2003) for a review of literature.
6 See Devereux (2005) for a review of the empirical evidence on the impact of minimum wages in developing
countries.
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legal context of Argentina during the period under study. Section 3 presents the theoretical
model, Section 4 describes the parametrization and the data, while Section 5 presents the
results. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 The Argentinean context
During the 1990s, the Argentine economy experienced profound transformations, which af-
fected its labor market. Structural reforms were adopted as a result of the Washington
consensus (liberalization, privatization and market deregulation), new technologies emerged
and labour regulations underwent signi¯cant changes, within the framework of a ¯nancial
liberalization process that was to become one of the chief factors in the crisis which began
during the fourth quarter of 1998 (Stiglitz (2003)).7
In spite of the high GDP growth, Argentina has experienced sharp increases in unem-
ployment and degree of informality in the 1990s. Unemployment rose from a low of 6.5
percent in 1991 to a high of 21 percent during the economic crisis. While the recent recovery
of the economy has been accompanied by a decline in unemployment, the rate still hovers
between 8 to 10 percent, considerably higher than the rate at the beginning of the 1990s.
The quality of jobs, as measured by the degree of informal sector work has also declined.
Informal workers are de¯ned as a person who declares not to have retirement bene¯ts in
its main occupation. This de¯nition is mostly used in studies of informality in Argentina
(Gasparini (2002), Pratap and Quintin (2003)). While at the beginning of the 1990s the
share of salaried workers employed outside the regulated market was about 30 percent, the
¯gure was about 45 percent in 2003 and still above 40 percent at the end of 2006.
Figure (1) reports the unemployment rate and share of informal workers separately for
college educated and non college educated salaried workers aged 20-65.8 After 1995 both
unemployment and size of the informal sector rose considerably for both educational groups,
reaching a peak during the macroeconomic crisis 2000/2001. However, while unemployment
rates reduced substantially after the economic recession, the size of the informal sector shrank
only marginally.
The de¯nition of informality adopted in this paper includes not only non-protected wage
employment but also temporary, probatory contracts not subject to social security. As a
consequence labor reforms aimed at increasing labor market °exibility clearly in°uenced the
7Calvo et al. (2003) explain in detail the macroeconomic context of the crisis. For a review on the e®ects
on workers/ households see McKenzie (2004) or Giovagnoli et al. (2003).
8In 2002 the government introduced a form of subsidy /unemployment bene¯t for unemployed household
heads. The bene¯ciaries are recorded as workers in the EPH. Nevertheless in all the graphs presented
bene¯ciaries of the program Jefe de Hogar have been excluded.
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and their associated social security costs (1991, 1995, 2000), dismissals (1991, 1998), and
non-wage labour costs in general (1994). O±cially, the rationale behind these reforms was
that, by facilitating °exible contracts and dismissals and by cutting down non-wage labour
costs, they would stimulate employment creation and also help to reduce non-compliance
and precarious employment relations (Marshall (2004)). The 1991 law reinstated a ceiling to
lay-o® compensation, and introduced "promoted" temporary employment contracts, which
were exempted, partially or totally, from payment of social security contributions. In 1995,
the conditions under which employers could use "probatory" contracts were extended, while
the 1998 and the 2000 reforms tried to limit their use. In particular the 2000 labour code
reform made the trial period contract fully subject to social security contributions and other
mandatory bene¯ts, but maintained exemption from lay-o® compensation.10
Dismissal costs were constant throughout the 1990s until the 1998 reform which lowered
the cost of unfair dismissals for newly employed workers by reducing advance notice and
compensation. Nevertheless, the cost of dismissal due to economic reasons was increased
relatively, from one half the compensation for unfair dismissal to two thirds (Beccaria and
Galin (2002)).
Given the dramatic social consequences of the early 2000s crisis, with open unemploy-
ment reaching over 21% in May 2002, an "emergency" measure taken in that year doubled
compensation for unfair dismissal. It was expected that this would moderate unemployment
growth. Other decrees limited lay-o®s due to force majeure or to lack or decrease of work
(Beccaria and Galin (2002)). These emergency laws have been abolished only in 2007 after
the unemployment rate fell under 10% for the ¯rst time since the beginning of the 1990s
(Ministerio del Trabajo, Empleo y Seguridad Social).
Heckman and Pages-Serra (2000) construct a cardinal measure of ¯ring costs across Latin
America, the Caribbean, and OECD countries. This measure computes the expected cost,
at the time a full-time inde¯nite worker is hired, of future dismissal due to unfavorable
economic conditions.11 The index includes the cost of providing statutory advance notice
and severance pay and is computed for the years in the late 1990s, after the labor market
reforms undertaken by Latin American countries.12 The job security index is reported in
9Hopenhayn (2004) discusses the impact of temporary contracts on the Argentine labor market. He ¯nds
that these contracts induce an increase in hiring and a substitution away from long term employment toward
short-term unprotected employment.
10See Beccaria and Galin (2002) for further details on the Nineties' reforms.
11As such it does not capture the e®ects of the reforms mentioned above that have made temporary and
¯xed-term contracts widely available in Argentina.
12For Argentina, the index computed by the authors in 1999 is the same at the one they do calculate for
the 1990. This suggests that the 1990s reforms did not a®ect this measure of labor protection for tenured
workers.
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with the lowest job security index is the US, while the most protected is Bolivia. Argentina
as well as other Latin American countries have higher job protection indexes with respect
to OECD countries (with the exception of Spain); in particular the expected dismissal cost
in Argentina is roughly 3 monthly payments, or 24,8% of the yearly income.13
From August 1993 to June 2003 the nominal wage rate has been ¯xed at 200 pesos per
month, or 1 peso per hour. Given that until 2002 there was virtually no in°ation this meant
a constant real minimum wage throughout the Nineties (Grimshaw and Miozzo (2003)).
After 2003 the minimum wage has been constantly upwardly adjusted in an attempt to raise
workers conditions and limiting inequality. This was also partly necessary due to the raising
in°ationary process associated with the recovery started in 2002.
Figure (A-2) reports the evolution of consumer price index (IPC), nominal and real
minimum wage over the period 1996-2006. By the end of 2006 the real minimum wage more
than doubled its value. The average real minimum wage in the period 2003-2006 was roughly
46% higher than during the Nineties. Over the same period average real hourly wages of
both formal and informal workers declined by 21.5% (25.5% for informal workers, 11.45%
for formal workers). See table B-1.
In the sample considered, during the 1996-1998 period, less than 1% of formal workers
had an hourly wage of less than 1 peso. At the contrary, as many as 15% of informal workers
were receiving an hourly wage below the minimum wage. This corroborates Saget's (2001)
analysis that the minimum wage often does not represent a lower bound for wages in the
informal sector. In the following I will also assume that minimum wage does not apply to
the informal sector.
The reforms and the macroeconomic developments are considered the main determinants
both of the increase in informality and of wage dispersion both between and across edu-
cational groups the country experienced since the beginning of the 1990s (see for example
Galiani and Sanguinetti (2003) Acosta and Gasparini (2007), and Bustos (2007)).
Figures (A-3) and (A-4) analyze salaried wage dispersion in the country. Figure (A-3)
shows a decomposition of the log hourly real wage variances in between inequality, due to
changes in relative prices, and within inequality, or residual/unobserved inequality for the
area of Great Buenos Aires.14 Total wage variance and both within and between inequality
13Surprisingly, Argentina and Mexico exhibit lower job security than Chile, which has traditionally been
considered to have a more °exible labor market. This divergence arises because this index only measures one
component of labor market rigidities. While Argentina and Mexico have stronger unions than Chile, and
therefore are likely to have higher wage rigidity, Chile has higher individual job security provisions (Heckman
and Pages-Serra (2000)).
14I estimate standard log wage equations where the dependent variable is log real hourly wage and the
independent variables include 6 educational dummies, age, age squared, a gender dummy, dummies for two
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only a minimal part of the wage dispersion and do not capture moments of economic distress:
the recession in occasion of the Mexican tequila crisis in 1995 or the latest macroeconomic
crisis, which are on the contrary fully mirrored in the residual inequality. After the 2000-
2001 crisis while between inequality keeps relatively constant, within inequality maintain its
growing path.
The same rising path in residuals' dispersion is evident from Figure (A-4). This ¯gure
shows the standard deviation of the residuals for each educational group used in the model:
workers with more than secondary schooling and with at most secondary schooling.15 The
growing path is worrying as it does not show a decreasing trend since the economy's recovery.
Finally, ¯gure (A-5) shows the percentage of informality for salaried workers over age
in the period 1996-1998 in Argentina. This picture suggests that temporary, informal jobs
are a point of entry for young workers without experience. The percentage of informality
decreases for middle aged workers and then increases again for older workers, supposedly not
skilled enough to ¯nd a formal job or become independent.
3.3 Model
This paper extend a Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) type of search model with exogenous
human capital accumulation to include a) ex-ante worker's heterogeneity b) an informal
sector c) for formally employed workers severance pay and minimum wages.
There is a continuum of workers with geometrically distributed life spans, indexed on
the unit interval with births equaling deaths. Each period an individual faces a probability
® 2 (0;1) of dying and not remaining in the labor force for next period.
There are two types of individuals indexed by i = c;nc: college educated and not college
educated. Individuals do not choose their type. The measure of each type is time invariant
and their sum is equal to ¹c + ¹nc = 1.
For both types of workers the economic environment is de¯ned as follows. At any point
in time employed and unemployed workers have a skill level h 2 H. There is a ¯nite number
of skill levels with transition probabilities from skill level h to h0 denoted by ¼u(h;h0) and
¼e(h;h0) for an unemployed and an employed worker, respectively. That is, an unemployed
worker with skill level h faces a probability ¼u(h;h0) that his skill level is h0 next period,
big regions, GBA and the rest of the country, and for the industry sector, secondary and tertiary (Katz and
Autor (1999)).
15For each group I regress log hourly real wages on dummies for each level of education and related
completion. This means for the non college group: no education, primary incomplete, primary, secondary
incomplete, secondary complete. While for the skilled group: specialization degree, and university degree
both complete or incomplete.
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skill level h sees his skill level change to h0 at the beginning of next period, contingent on
not dying and not being laid o®. In the event of a layo®, the transition probability is given
by ¼l(h;h0). After this initial period of a layo®, the stochastic skill level of the unemployed
worker is again governed by the transition probability ¼u(h;h0). All newborn workers begin
with the lowest skill level. The laws of motion governing skill accumulation for the college
and not college educated populations are di®erent.16 In particular, college educated workers
accumulate skills faster.
When unemployed workers can decide in which sector to search employment: the regular
sector and the informal sector s = inf;f. On both markets searching is a time consuming
activity with disutility c(et(h)) increasing in the e®ort et. Search costs in the informal sector
are lower than on the formal market, i.e. c inf(et(h)) < c f(et(h)), 8h. In the formal sector
the cost of searching is constant across human capital levels, while in the informal sector
search costs increase with the level of human capital accumulated c inf0(et(h)) > 0. This
creates a relative advantage in searching on the informal sector for unexperienced workers.
An unemployed agent observes his new skill level at the beginning of a period before
taking any decision: choosing on which sector to search, choosing a search intensity or
accepting a new wage o®er. In particular unemployed agents observe expected values of
searching on the di®erent sectors, for each level of human capital. The choice of searching and
working in one sector is based on the maximisation of the relative expected unemployment
utilities.
On both labor markets, search may or may not generate a wage o®er in the next period.
With probability p(et(h)), which is assumed to be increasing in the search e®ort et(h), an
unemployed worker receives one wage o®er from the distribution Finf;f(w) = Prob(wt+1 ·
w). With probability 1 ¡ p(et(h)), the worker receives no o®er in period t + 1.
An informal worker draws his wage o®er from the distribution Finf(W); accepting a wage
o®er wt+1 means that the worker will earn that wage (per unit of skill) for each period he is
alive, and has not being laid o®. Informal employment is a full time activity and precludes
on the job search for a formal-sector job. Accordingly, transitions from one sector to the
other are possible only during unemployment spells.
A formal worker draws his wage o®er from the distribution Ff(W); accepting a wage o®er
wt+1 means that he will earn that wage in period t+1, and thereafter will receive a Markov
16In light of the ongoing debate on whether human capital accumulation is more job (or ¯rm or occupation)
speci¯c, or more general (experience), this model's skill accumulation process encompasses both job tenure
and experience. The available evidence on this topic is mixed. Altonji and Williams (2005) ¯nd small tenure
e®ects, while Topel (1991) and Buchinsky, Fougere, Kramarz and Tchernis (2002) ¯nd large tenure and
experience e®ects. Dustmann and Meghir (2005) distinguish between skilled and unskilled workers ¯nding
important returns to ¯rm tenure for unskilled, positive returns to ¯rm and experience for skilled.
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has not been laid o®.
Reservation wages on the formal market cannot be lower than the minimum wage wf;t+1 ¸
MW.
Earnings of an individual with skill level h, matched with wage w are earnings = wh.
The probability of being laid o® at the beginning of the period, ¸inf;f 2 (1;0), is higher in
the informal market ¸inf > ¸f.17
Each formal worker who is laid o® has to pay a tax K.18
The objective of each worker is to maximize the expected value Et
P1
i=0 ¯i(1 ¡ ®)ici+1
where Et is the expectation operator conditioned at information at time t, ¯ is the subjective
discount factor, and (1¡®) is the probability of surviving between two consecutive periods;
ci+1 is consumption. The linear utility assumption means that the private bonds market
can be ignored. This is to allow a clear focus of the model on the incentives present on the
labor market. More importantly, under the assumption of risk neutrality, each worker can
be treated as self-employed and liable for any lay-o® tax (Ljungqvist (2002)).
The individuals' earnings are assumed to be equal to the surplus generated by the match.
The purpose of this assumption is to avoid issues regarding surplus sharing that are funda-
mentally linked to the nature of the ¯rm and are not the main focus of this analysis.
The model maintains Ljungqvist and Sargent's (1998) assumptions about the individual's
transition probabilities:
Assumption 1. Laws of motion for employed: ¼e(h;h0) = 0 for all h0 < h. Skill level
evolution is weakly increasing for employed individuals. This implies that when an individual
reaches the maximum skill level, hmax, she will remain there while employed.
Assumption 2. Laws of motion for unemployed: ¼u(h;h0) = 0 for all h0 > h. Skill evo-
lution is weakly decreasing for unemployed individuals. This implies that once an individual
reaches the minimum skill level, hmin, she will remain there while unemployed.
Assumption 3. Laws of motion for job losers: ¼l(h;h0) = 0 for all h0 > h. Job losers
face skill losses.
Assumptions 2 and 3 imply that when a separation occurs individuals do not loose all
17The model does not distinguish between voluntary job quits and involuntary job losses (see e.g.
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) or Amaral (2008)). The distinction is potentially very important as in most
countries voluntary job to job °ows are characterized by wage increases while involuntary job to job °ows
are usually associated with wage losses (see Jolivet, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2005)). The EPH allows to
identify job quitters, asking the reason for a job interruption, however, almost no worker reports voluntary
job interruptions, being most of the layo®s related to employers' conditions.
18It is irrelevant for the analysis of employment whether this tax constitutes a deadweight loss or whether
the tax proceeds are handed back lump sum to all workers. Lump-sum transfers would not a®ect workers'
decision rules for reservation wages and search intensities.
68
Trentini, Claudia (2009), Essays on Human Capital Accumulation and Inequality 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/12804their accumulated skills, but they loose them over time the longer they are unemployed. In
this sense, as explained above, the model's skill accumulation encompasses both job speci¯c
skills as well as more general skills.
3.3.1 Equilibrium
Let V u
i;s(h) denote the discounted expected utility of an unemployed agent of type i (college















where ci;s(e) is the cost of searching. Given the search costs, the expected income and their
skill level, unemployed workers choose on which sector to search. Ui(h0) is the maximum of
the expected unemployment utility on the two sectors.
Ui(h0) = max[V u
i;f(h0);V u
i;inf(h0)] (2)
Vi;f(h;w) denotes the discounted expected utility of an individual of type i, in the formal
sector f, with skill h, that has a wage o®er w > 0, and is given by:
Vi;f(h;w) = max
n














Vi;inf(h;w) is the Bellman equation of informal workers:
Vi;inf(h;w) = max
n












A worker who receives a wage o®er can accept it or reject it. In case of rejection the
individual is unemployed this period, and the value of that is Ui(h), if he was formally
employed he pays K. If he is an informal workers and accept the wage o®er, he will receive
wh until he is not laid o®. In case he is a formal worker, this period he receives wh and from
next period onwards he will receive a Markov process G(w0jw).
Associated with the equations (1), (2), (3), and (4) are the functions (ei;s(h), wi;s(h),
and Is(h)), giving the optimal search intensity, the reservation wage, and the search sector
for an individual of type i, in sector s, with skill h.
69
Trentini, Claudia (2009), Essays on Human Capital Accumulation and Inequality 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/12804Ui(h) is the maximum value for each skill level h of V u
i;f(h);V u
i;inf(h). The di®erences in
the two curves (over di®erent levels of h) are driven by the wage distributions, the search
costs, the di®erent coverage of labor market policies and the separation rates. In this respect
it is assumed the following:
Assumption 4. Search costs in the formal market are higher than on the informal
market for each level of skill c infi(e(h)) > c fi(e(h)) 8h
Assumption 5. Search costs in the informal market are increasing in the level of skill
c inf0(e(h)) > 0
Assumptions 4 and 5 imply that high skilled workers face relatively lower search costs
on the formal market. This captures the fact that workers at the beginning of their career,
or who, because of long unemployment spells have lost their human capital, have a higher
chance to ¯nd employment in the informal market.
Given the individuals' optimal policies the steady state distribution of individuals can
be derived. Let ¹ ft(i;h;w) denote the period t measure of individuals of type i, with skill
level h, a strictly positive wage o®er w, employed in the formal sector. Let ¹ inft(i;h;w)
denote the measure of individuals of type i, with skill level h, a positive wage o®er w, but
employed in the informal sector. ¹t(i;h;0) denotes those individuals with wage o®er w = 0.















For this equation to hold over time, the measure of individuals entering the labor force has
to equal the measure leaving it, given by ®. Letting ¹s;t+1(i;h0;w0) denote next period's
measure of sector s workers:
¹s;t+1(i;h
0;w
























where Â(w0¸wi(h)) is an indicator function that equals one when wage is above the reservation
wage, otherwise it zero. Is0=s is an indicator function for the chosen sector of search for
unemployed workers.
The three lines of the above equation de¯ne the three possible individuals' origins regard-
ing their previous period's state. The ¯rst line refers to those individuals that were employed
the previous period at wage w0 and evolved to skill level h0. Only a fraction (1¡¸s) of these
actually gets the same wage o®er. The second line refers to those individuals that had wage
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s. Only a fraction fs;i(w0) will have an o®er of w0. Finally, the third line captures all those
that had a strictly positive wage o®er the previous period, but rejected it and evolved to
skill level h0. Again, only a fraction fs;i(w0) will have an o®er of w0.
Some individuals lose their job, while others simply do not get a job o®er after rejecting
one or after having lost their job. These are the people that have a wage o®er w = 0. The
evolution of the measure of these individuals is given by:
¹t+1(i;h





























The ¯rst term of the equation above is the measure of people entering the labor force the
¯rst time. The ¯rst line inside the bracket includes all individuals that were employed in
the previous period, but lost their job and evolved to skill level h0. The second line refers to
those individuals that had a wage o®er w = 0 the previous period and evolved to skill level
h0. Note that the probabilities to enter unemployment depend from the search e®ort and the
reservation wage and are thus di®erent for the two sectors. Finally, the last line captures
all those that had a wage o®er w > 0 the previous period but rejected it and evolved to
skill level h0. A steady-state equilibrium is de¯ned by the optimal individuals' policies and
associated invariant probability measures such that:
1. wi;s(h) are the optimal policies for (3) and (4), for each type i, each skill level h, and
each sector s;
2. given wi;s(h), ¹s;t+1(i;h0;w), and ¹t+1(i;h0;0) solve (5),(6), and (7)
3.4 Parametrization
In this section I will illustrate the parameters used in the model, next section will describe
their data counterpart. The model period is set to a month.
I partition the set of parameters into two groups. The ¯rst group is composed of
®;¯;¸s;K;MW.
The probability of exiting the workforce ® is set such that the expected working life is
41 years (0.002).
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observed in Argentina in that period (6%).19 The value of the job loss rate for informal
workers ¸i;inf is set equal to the average monthly unemployment in°ow rate (¸c;inf = 0:02614,
¸nc;inf = 0:04313).20 These values imply that the average expected employment duration in
the informal sector is just above 3 years for college educated- and less than 2 years for non
college educated workers.
The choice of ¸f is based on the fact that separation rates are unobservable for workers
covered by job security provisions, since the separation rate is, itself, a®ected by job security.
The value is chosen smaller than that foreseen for temporary contracts but bigger than the
one implied by the monthly unemployment in°ow (over 10 years for formal workers). I set
¸f = 0:0204 for both educational groups; this value implies an expected minimal contract
duration of 4 years.
K is set equal to 24% of the earnings wh as estimated (for formal workers only) by
Heckman and Pages-Serra (2000). Minimum wages for the whole period were set to 1 peso,
thus MW = 1.21












These cannot be mapped one to one to the data, thus they are estimated by minimizing a
measure of the distance between the model and the empirical moments. Let m(µi;s) denote
the mapping from µi;s to the model moments, and let md
i;s denote the corresponding empirical
estimates. The estimator ^ µi;s is the solution to:









where W is a diagonal matrix with the sample standard deviations of md
i;s along the diagonal.
The ¯rst two parameters, ¹w
i;s;¾w
i;s determine the mean and the standard deviation of
the wage distributions fi;s(w) from which workers draw their wage o®er. In the model
economy, the support of these distributions is discretized and rescaled so that they integrate
to one. Wage o®ers are drawn from a distribution discretized and evenly spaced between 0.01
(wmin) and 13 (wmax). This was done so that the maximum hourly earnings in the model are
hmaxwmax = 26, which is the maximum hourly earnings observed in the data. The parameters
are set such that the ¯rst two moments of the resulting log earnings (ln(whi;s)) distribution
match the mean and standard deviation of the data. This implies the computation of 8
moments: mean and standard deviation for two workers' types and 2 sectors.
19Source Mercosur.
20The in°ow rate is the monthly in°ow to unemployment divided by the informal employed labor force at
a point in time.
21Source: Ministerio del Trabajo, Empleo y Seguritad Social http://www.trabajo.gob.ar
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i determine the transition probabilities across skills hi of unemployed and newly
displaced workers respectively. Note that these parameters do not change across sectors.
Skill evolution, in these cases is weakly decreasing.
The set of skills Hi contains 21 points evenly spaced between 1 (hmin) and 2(hmax). I
follow the theoretical construct of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) in which a newly displaced
worker (an unemployed) experiences a reduction in his human capital modelled as a draw
from a truncated left half of a normal distribution with speci¯ed variance pl (pu). In other
words the probabilities of moving from skill level h to skill level h0 · h, ¼iu(h;h0), and
¼il(h;h0), are distributed according to the left side of a normal distribution with mean h
that is discretized and rescaled to the support fhmin;:::;hg. These distributions are indexed
by their variance: pu
i and pl
i. An increase of these variances decreases the expected skill
level.22 The lowest skill level reached through depreciation is also an absorbing state until
the unemployed worker gains employment. To estimate these parameters I compute from
the model invariant distribution of earnings the average loss of earnings for a worker who
has been unemployed for a year (pu) and who has been just been laid o® (pl). The same
moments are matched to the di®erence in earnings registered by workers observed before
and after an unemployment spell, where the di®erence between these two moments (pl and
pu) is given only by the length of the spell.
The disutility from searching and the function mapping search intensities into probabil-
ities of obtaining a wage o®er are assumed to be
ci;f(e) = ci;fe




where e 2 [0;1] is the search e®ort. The search cost ci determines agents' search e®orts,
thus the model's job turnover rate and unemployment rate. It also determines the relative
advantage in searching on one labor market with respect to the other.
ci;f(e) is estimated matching the aggregate (both of formal and informal workers) un-
employment rate for workers of type i, while ci;inf(e) is matched to the share of informal
workers for each educational group i.
ni;s determines the job ¯nding rate, given the search e®ort used. For a search e®ort and
a coe±cient both < 1, the smaller ni;s, the higher the probability of ¯nding a job. Note that
in the model the search e®ort and consequently the job ¯nding rate is di®erent for each level
of skill h, as a consequence more skilled workers have a higher search intensity and a higher
22An increase of these variances is termed turbulence by Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), and considered to
be behind the US increase in wage dispersion. I do not ¯nd in Argentinean data any evidence of an increase
of turbulence between the periods before and after the crisis.
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¯nding probabilities on the two markets; it is matched using the unemployment rates on
each labor market s for each worker type i.
pe
i determines the probabilities of skill growth while employed. The probability of moving
from skill level h to skill level h0 ¸ h, ¼ie(h;h0), is distributed according to the right side of a
normal distribution with mean h that is discretized and rescaled to the support fh;:::hmaxg.
This distribution is indexed by its variance pe
i and is estimated by matching the growth rate
of informal wages after the ¯rst 2 years of work. This is for two main reasons: I do only
have panels of 2 years, and the short duration of informal contracts does not allow to match
longer time spans. From the data no big di®erences are found in the growth rate of wages
in the formal or informal market over such a short period of time.
Unlike the previous pairs of moments, the last one cannot be computed directly from the
invariant distribution of earnings. In order to generate it, a panel of 10,000 individuals (for
each group) is constructed from the model's invariant distribution. I simulate their ¯rst 2
years of work life using the laws of motion described in the previous section and compute
the last moment.
In the next section I describe the data moments used.
3.4.1 Data
To match Argentinean inequality characteristics I will make use of data from the Encuesta
Permanente de Hogares (EPH) collected by the Instituto Nacional de Estad¶ ³stica y Censos
(INDEC). The survey is a six-month rotating panel in which 25% of the household rotate
every semester so that each of them can be followed for four periods. It is an urban survey
carried out in cities over 100.000 in habitants which represent 71% of the urban areas of
the country and approximately 62% of the whole population of the country. The survey
gives detailed information about employment, incomes and demographic characteristics of
the household. From 1974 until 2003 the EPH was done twice a year (May waves and
October waves) in the most important conglomerates in the country, which were progressively
incorporated to the survey. From the year 2003 some modi¯cations were introduced in
the questionnaires and the frequency in which the survey is collected is now every three
months.23 I will use EPH and EPH Continua (as it is called after 2003) between 1996 and
2006. The variables of interest are hourly earnings for salaried workers and the sector of
work. Hourly wages for the principal occupation are provided by the survey for most regions
and most years. Self employed, managers or employers, and workers without salary are not
23Gasparini (2006) considers these methodogical changes as not having a major in°uence on the quality
of the data.
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caused by heterogeneity the model economy is not designed to capture.
There are two alternative views of the concept of informality. The ¯rst one refers to
marginal jobs of low productivity and to subsistence economic units with low or null ac-
cumulation capacity. The alternative view emphasizes the non-regulated character of the
employment relationship. Here I follow current empirical literature (Pratap and Quintin
(2003), Gasparini (2002)), and adopt the second notion of informality. Speci¯cally, an infor-
mal worker is de¯ned as a person who declares not to have retirement bene¯ts in its main
job.25 The right panel of ¯gure (1) shows the constant increase of informal workers over
the period 1995-2006. The average share of informal workers during the reference period is
16.85% and 36.13% for college and non college educated workers respectively. This share
increased constantly afterwards, had a jump in occasion of the crisis and then kept on rising
in spite of labor market reforms to limit the use of temporary, unprotected contracts.
The incomes were de°ated by the consumer price index of the relevant month of survey
collection (May or October) until 2003 and by an average of the index for the trimester of
reference for the information from the latest continuous surveys (Encuesta Continua). The
sample is divided into two distinct populations, those with more than secondary degree and
those with at most a complete secondary degree. As a measure of relative wage earnings I
take the college di®erential, the di®erence in average log hourly wages between the individuals
with some college and those without. Between 1996 and 1998, the college di®erential averaged
0.5896 , while between 2003 and 2006 it averaged 0.5672 . The main changes occurred on the
Argentinean labor market are summarized in table B-1: severance costs increased of about
25-50%, minimum wages of 46%. Wage growth due to the accumulation of skills decreased
consistently both for college educated and non college educated workers. At the same time
the share of informal workers and wage dispersion - measured as standard deviation of log
hourly earnings - increased suggesting that labor protection policies and the reduced skills
accumulation probability could have in°uenced these outcomes.
24At the peak of the crisis (2002) the government introduced a new unemployment assistance programme
targeted to low skilled unemployed head of households, called Jefe de Hogar. The programme is very inclusive,
not distinguishing between former formal or informal workers. The bene¯ciaries were requested to provide
limited amount of work while engaging in training activities and job search. Those workers/bene¯ciaries are
excluded from the following analysis.
25The perception of other social bene¯ts derived from the labor relationship is highly correlated with the
receipt of pension: 98% of the people who declare to have a pension right, states that (s)he receives an
annual bonus, takes holidays, has work insurance coverage and a right to claim severance payments if ¯red
(GBA, 1998).(Gasparini (2002))
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The ¯rst two pairs of parameters are matched to the average log hourly earnings of formal
md
c;f(1)=1.5875 and md




With respect to the dispersion of earnings within groups, I use the standard deviation
of log hourly earnings. Because the model economy does not distinguish between more and
less educated people within each group, I regress the log hourly earnings on the di®erent
degrees and relative completion and then compute the standard deviation of the residuals of
this regression.26 Between 1996-1998 the average standard deviation for formal workers was
md
c;f(3)=0.5820 for those with more than secondary degree and md
nc;f(3)=0.5412 for those
with at most a secondary degree; for informal workers the average standard deviation of
these residuals were md
c;inf(4)=0.6810 and md
nc;inf(4)=0.6228, respectively.
The transition probabilities of skills while unemployed (determined by parameter pu) are
matched calculating the earnings loss of unemployed workers after a year. I link agents over
4 consecutive surveys and calculate the di®erence in wages of those who are employed in
the ¯rst observation and in the last one while being recorded unemployed in the 2 central
ones. The resulting data moments are md
c(5)=-0.4846 for college- and md
nc(5)=-0.1911 for
non college educated workers. These data moments re°ect the skill loss after one year of
unemployment.
The next parameter pl determines the amount of earnings loss immediately after a job
separation. I construct 2 years panels for each salaried worker in the survey. For those
workers who report strictly positive earnings in the survey following a job separation, as
well as in the survey before, I compute the di®erence in log hourly wage earnings before
the career interruption and after: md
c(6)=-0.0363 and md
nc(6)=-0.0163. In the context of the
model, this is an indicator of the skill change workers face immediately after loosing their
job.
The next parameters ci;s and ni;s are particularly important as they determine the model's
reservation wage, the unemployment rate, the job turnover rate, and the share of informal
workers. I ¯rst concentrate on the search cost ci;s.
Search costs determine both the search e®orts and the choice between the two sectors,
consequently search costs on formal markets ci;f are matched with the aggregate unemploy-
ment rates: md
c(7)=0.0656 and md
nc(7)=0.1095. Search costs for informal workers ci;inf are




26This means for the unskilled group: no education, primary incomplete, primary, secondary incomplete,
secondary complete. While for the skilled group: specialization degree, and university degree both complete
or incomplete.
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ployment rates in the two sectors and for the two workers' type: formal md
c;f(9)=0.0386 and
md
nc;f(9)=0.0692, and informal md
c;inf(10)=0.1790 and md
nc;inf(10)=0.1729.
pe determines the wage growth due to skills accumulation over time. As informal workers
can be observed only on very limited time spans, to de¯ne wage growth I link workers over
4 periods and de¯ne the average growth rate over two years.
The last pair of moments are md
c(11)=1.1578 and md
nc(11)=1.1415.
Table (B-2) lists all the parameter values with standard errors and the corresponding
simulated and data moments. The model can reproduce pretty closely the data moments
for both the formal and the informal sector, as well as the resulting mean log wages and
standard deviations of the aggregate markets for both the college educated and the non
college educated workers. Figure (B-1) shows the resulting initial wage distributions of
earnings; in the left panel for college educated in the right panel for non college educated
workers. Data distributions are a bit more concentrated in the mean earnings for college
educated, while the contrary is true for non-college educated workers.
The new hourly earnings growth rates are estimated from the data and showed in table
(B-1); formal college (non college) educated workers experienced a decrease in hourly earnings
growth of about 40% (33%).
Severance pay increased of 50%. However, the measure of severance costs used includes
two costs: the advance notice and the compensatory amount. Heckman and Pages-Serra
(2000) do not specify the weights associated to each component of the total job security
cost. I assume compensatory payments constitute more than 50% accordingly the increase
in job security cost would be in the order of 25% - 50% (in this last case the share of
compensatory payments would be 100%)
3.5 Results
Tables B-3 to B-6 present separately for college educated and non college educated workers
the results for the two policy measures analyzed. Results for non college educated workers
are presented ¯rst as the labor market protection measures are exactly meant to a®ect low
income/low educated workers' livings.
Tables B-3 and B-5 present the e®ect of severance pay and minimum wages under the
initial human capital growth rate, while B-4 and B-6 analyze the same policies under a
reduced human capital growth regime. For all tables the ¯rst column reports the baseline
speci¯cation, i.e severance payment costs equal to 24% of earnings and minimum wages
equal to 1 peso per hour. Columns 2 to 4 present in turn: an increase of only ¯ring cost to
0.32 (considering that severance payment makes about the half of the total ¯ring cost), an
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Each column analyzes the e®ect on hourly wages mean and standard deviation (row 1 and
2) of the whole group (college educated or not), and then in detail for formal and informal
workers, the share of informal workers in the economy, and unemployment ¯rst for formal
and informal workers and then totally.
An increase in severance pay increases the share of informal workers and slightly increases
unemployment. Theoretical debate on dismissal costs has long neglected the fact that labor
protection measures often are not applied to the whole working population. Only recent
evidence about the growing share of informal markets has raised the attention to the possible
compositional e®ects of these measures.
Severance payment are meant to reduce frictional unemployment by reducing reservation
wages (Ljungqvist (2002)), this is because they raise the cost of ending matches. However
in the presence of minimum wages this does not happen but rather an increase in severance
pay shifts the human capital threshold between formal and informal workers, making formal
employment less attractive to the previously marginal workers. The reason is that although
jobs last longer when the severance pay is higher, the expected formal sector wage decreases.
This is in accordance with what Albrecht et al. (2006) and Bosch (2007) also ¯nd.
The reduction of formal sector wages relies on the hypothesis that employers shift onto
the worker the cost of job security provisions. In the model employees bear the full cost of
job security measures. Evidence put forward by Mondino and Montoya (2000) for Argentina
con¯rm that a considerable share of labor costs are passed onto workers: during the period
1975-1996 wages of non-covered workers were 8% higher than the gross wages of covered
workers.
An increase in minimum wages has a wide impact on formal workers' unemployment,
informality and earnings. The negative e®ect on formal workers' employment is only partly
counterbalanced by the reduction of uncovered workers' unemployment. This is in accordance
with what the conventional neoclassical position on minimum wages predicts: imposing a
minimum wage above the equilibrium level increases unemployment among low-wage, low
human capital workers, who are laid o® by employers who comply. However, the informal
sector does not show the downward wage °exibility that traditional models of labor market
dualism predict. At the contrary, consistent with Maloney and Nunez-Mendez's (2003)
¯ndings, mean earnings in the informal sector slightly increase. This is because marginal
workers moving from the covered to the uncovered sector do not lower their reservation wage
by becoming informal workers; at the contrary they increase the average human capital of
the informal sector.27
27This is slightly di®erent from the "lighthouse" e®ect found by Maloney and Nunez-Mendez (2003) in
Latin America or Devereux (2005) in Uganda. The lighthouse e®ect refers to the common practise found in
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informality and formal unemployment raise on the other hand earnings both in the covered
and the uncovered sector raise.28 As a matter of fact the empirical evidence on the relation
between minimum wages and poverty is controversial (see for example Lustig and McLeod
(1996), Saget (2001), Maloney and Nunez-Mendez (2003)).29
The combined e®ect of job security provision and minimum wages on unemployment and
informality is more severe than the one foreseen for the single measures. This is because
minimum wages introduce farther reaching rigidities in the labor market precluding formal
wage adjustments to shocks and increasing unemployment both for formal and informal
workers.
Thus while the introduction of minimum wages is often meant to lift workers' standard of
livings, the outcome - in countries where the minimum wage is binding - is an increase in non
compliance, wider inequality between formal and informal workers and higher unemployment.
The e®ect is bigger for non college educated workers which earn a salary closer to the
minimum wage.30
Comparing the ¯rst column of tables B-3 and B-4 for non college educated and B-5 and
B-6 for college educated workers it is possible to understand the e®ect of a reduced human
capital accumulation growth. Both average formal and informal earnings decrease, however
the expected formal wage falls relatively more; as a consequence workers select into the
informal sector, where it is easier to ¯nd a job and there are no additional costs.
This result is important as it highlights the change in workers' incentives during a period
of labor productivity slowdown. It has been argued (Bosch (2007)) that in recessions in-
formality increases because of di®erential job ¯nding rates across sectors: the formal sector
would experience a severe contraction in hirings while the informal sector would provide a
relative time constant source of jobs. However, also workers' incentives might play a role:
faced with a lower probability to experience earnings growth, longer job tenure looses its
attractiveness.
As a matter of fact this could be the key to understand the often contradictory evidence
on the business cycle properties of informality.
Another important ¯nding is that given a lower human capital accumulation probability
informal wage dispersion increases, and this is particularly true for college educated workers.
This is because on the one hand human capital dispersion increases and on the other hand
informal workers can adjust their reservation wage to the negative shock. Formal workers
some countries to refer to the minimum wage as a fair/minimal retribution also in the informal market.
28Fields and Kanbur (2007) highlight the importance of family income sharing in evaluating the impact
of minimum wage on poverty.
29See Devereux (2005) for a comprehensive review of the literature on this topic.
30See for example Freeman and Freeman (1991) or Bell (1997) for corresponding empirical evidence.
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resulting surge of informal work determines an increase of residual wage dispersion for each
educational group.
Lower human capital accumulation is thus another possible mechanism to explain residual
wage dispersion which easily matches evidence on leftwards widening of earnings distributions
during economic recessions.
This channel is very di®erent from the technology driven mechanism proposed for devel-
oped countries where residual wage dispersion is due to skill loss upon job separation and the
related impossibility of transferring acquired skills across jobs (Violante (2002), Kambourov
and Manovskii (2008), Guvenen and Kuruscu (2006), Shi (2002)).
The combined e®ect of labor market policies and reduced wage growth is shown in the last
column of tables B-4 and B-6. Labor market policies and falling human capital accumulation
are able to fully explain the increase in informality and the falling skill premia, but only partly
- 35% for non college educated workers and about 50% for college educated workers - of the
observed increase in residual inequality.
3.6 Conclusions
In this paper I construct a search model to analyze the e®ects of labor protection measures on
inequality and informality under two di®erent macroeconomic scenarios. In light of empirical
evidence for Latin American countries, in the model, workers self select into unregulated
contracts on the basis of their accumulated human capital skills.
The model is parametrized such as to replicate key labor market moments in Argentina
in the period 1996-1998, before labor protection measures were raised. In the presence of
binding minimum wages an increase of severance payments does not have any sizeable e®ect
on employment but rather shifts marginal workers from the covered sector to the uncovered
one.
Minimum wages have large e®ects on informality, unemployment and wages. Thus while
the introduction of minimum wages is often meant to lift workers' standard of livings, the
outcome - in countries where the minimum wage is binding - is an increase in non compliance,
wider inequality between formal and informal workers and higher unemployment.
A reduction in human capital accumulation rate increases wage dispersion and further
raises informality. This highlights the change in workers' incentives during a period of labor
productivity slowdown and constitute an interesting perspective to investigate the business
cycle properties both of informal work and residual wage dispersion.
The combination of the labor protection measures and the fall in human capital accumu-
lation rate are able to explain all of the informality increase and 30 to 50% of the increase
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share of employed workers
informal workers
Figure A-1: Unemployment rates and share of informal workers for individuals with
some college education "c" and without "nc", only salaried workers, aged 20-65.
Table A-1: Job Security Index selected countries, Late 1990s
Country Job security index Annual wage ranking
(monthly wages) (percent)
United States 0.000 0.000 1
Germany 1.140 9.498 6
United Kingdom 1.457 12.144 10
Brazil 1.785 14.871 13
Argentina 2.977 24.808 24
Mexico 3.126 26.005 25
Spain 3.156 26.300 28
Bolivia 4.756 39.637 36
Source: Heckman and Pages-Serra (2000)
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Figure A-3: Decomposition of log hourly wage variances for salaried workers, aged
20-65.
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Figure A-4: Residuals standard deviation for salaried workers, aged 20-65, with
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Figure A-5: Percentage of salaried workers in the informal sector by age. Years
1996-1998.
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Table B-1: Main changes in the Argentinean labor market
1996-1998 2003-2006 % change
severance pay K 0:24 ¤ wh 0.30-0.36 25-50
minimum wage MW 1 1.46 46
wage growth c pe 2:48e ¡ 4 1:5e ¡ 5 -40.32
wage growth nc pe 2:10e ¡ 4 1.4e-4 -33.26
observed log earnings wh c 1.4999 1.2307 -17.95
observed log earnings wh nc 0.9103 0.6636 -27.11
skill premia 0.5896 0.5671 -3.80
std residuals c 0.6181 0.6491 5.01
std residuals nc 0.6054 0.6555 8.20
Unemployment rate c 0.0656 0.0680 3.70
Unemployment rate nc 0.1095 0.0988 -9.81
share of informal workers c 0.1685 0.2438 44.64
share of informal workers nc 0.3614 0.4629 28.09






















Figure B-1: Log wages distribution data and model: college educated, noncollege
educated.
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DOI: 10.2870/12804Table B-2: Parametrization: benchmark
Parameter Value std. err. Model moment Moment matched
¯ 0.9952 Annual interest rate = 0.06
® 0.002 Expected worklife = 41 years
¸f;s 0.0204 Expected contract duration 4 years
¸inf;c 0.0261 Monthly unempl. in°ow rate c informal
¸inf;nc 0.0431 Monthly unempl. in°ow rate nc informal
¹w
f;c 2.3990 (0.0012) mf;c(1)=1.5878 md
f;c(1)=1.5875
¹w
f;nc 0.1167 (0.0184) mf;nc(1)=1.0917 md
f;nc(1)=1.0875
¹w
inf;c 0.2043 (0.0026) minf;c(2)= 1.0582 md
inf;c(2)=1.0578
¹w
inf;nc 0.2083 (0.0036) minf;nc(2)=0.5959 md
inf;nc(2)=0.5965
¾w
f;c 4.2849 (0.0057) mf;c(3)=0.5791 md
f;c(3)=0.5820
¾w
f;nc 2.9623 (0.0319) mf;nc(3)=0.5265 md
f;nc(3)=0.5413
¾w
inf;c 9.0842 (0.0076) minf;c(4)=0.6795 md
inf;c(4)=0.6810
¾w
inf;nc 3.021 (0.0053) minf;nc(4)=0.6201 md
inf;nc(4)=0.6228
pu
c 0.0127 (8.1202e-5) mc(5)=-0.4838 md
c(5)=-0.4846
pu
nc 1.695e-3 (1.4637e-5) mnc(5)=-0.1915 md
nc(5)=-0.1911
pl
c 0.0039 (9.2393e-5) mc(6)=-0.0349 md
c(6)=-0.0363
pl
nc 1.2459e-3 (5.8058e-5) mnc(6)=-0.0196 md
nc(6)=-0.0163
df;c 116.73 (0.9947) mf;c(7)=0.0567 md
f;c(7)=0.0656
df;nc 64.93 (0.173) mf;nc(7)=0.1086 md
f;nc(7)=0.1095
dinf;c 80.859 (0.0118) minf;c(8)=0.1695 md
inf;c(8)=0.1685
dinf;nc 24.209 (0.0675) minf;nc(8)=0.3604 md
inf;nc(8)=0.3613
ne
f;c 0.9486 (0.1391) mf;c(9)=0.0254 md
f;c(9)=0.0386
ne
f;nc 0.8844 (0.0096) mf;nc(9)=0.0712 md
f;nc(9)=0.0692
ne
inf;c 0.9290 (0.0205) minf;c(10)=0.1848 md
inf;c(10)=0.1790
ne
inf;nc 0.8729 (3.7436e-7) minf;nc(10)=0.1725 md
inf;nc(10)=0.1729
pe
c 2.4792e-4 (2.8951e-7) mc(11)=1.1588 md
c(11)=1.1578
pe
nc 2.0978e-4 (9.1225e-7) mnc(11)=1.1386 md
nc(11)=1.1415
mean earnings c ¹c = 1:498 ¹d
c = 1:4999
mean earnings nc ¹nc = 0:9142 ¹d
nc = 0:9130
std deviation c ¾c = 0:6195 ¾d
c = 0:6181
std deviation nc ¾nc = 0:6103 ¾d
nc = 0:6058
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DOI: 10.2870/12804Table B-3: E®ect of severance payment K and minimum wage MW under high
human capital growth pe, non college educated workers.
K = 0:24;MW = 1 K = 0:32;MW = 1 MW = 1:46;K = 0:24 MW = 1:46;K = 0:32
¹nc 0.9130 0.9112 0.9798 0.9768
¾nc 0.6103 0.6103 0.6023 0.6027
¹f 1.0917 1.0916 1.2251 1.2251
¾f 0.5265 0.5264 0.439 0.4389
¹inf 0.5959 0.597 0.6 0.601
¾inf 0.6201 0.6189 0.6234 0.6221
share 0.3603 0.3647 0.3924 0.3978
U f 0.0712 0.0719 0.0814 0.0822
U i 0.1725 0.1733 0.1676 0.1684
U tot 0.1086 0.1098 0.1155 0.1168
Table B-4: E®ect of severance payment K and minimum wage MW under low
human capital growth pe, non college educated workers.
K = 0:24;MW = 1 K = 0:32;MW = 1 MW = 1:46;K = 0:24 MW = 1:46;K = 0:32
¹nc 0.8295 0.8361 0.8981 0.8813
¾nc 0.6222 0.6244 0.6221 0.6250
¹f 1.0756 1.0776 1.2087 1.2067
¾f 0.5238 0.5244 0.4354 0.435
¹inf 0.539 0.5427 0.5408 0.5394
¾inf 0.6087 0.6103 0.6127 0.6103
share 0.4361 0.4515 0.465 0.4876
U f 0.0568 0.0568 0.0655 0.063
U i 0.2147 0.2131 0.2097 0.2257
U tot 0.1278 0.1292 0.134 0.1449
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DOI: 10.2870/12804Table B-5: E®ect of severance payment K and minimum wage MW under high
human capital growth pe, college educated workers.
K = 0:24;MW = 1 K = 0:32;MW = 1 MW = 1:46;K = 0:24 MW = 1:46;K = 0:32
¹c 1.498 1.497 1.5468 1.546
¾c 0.61953 0.6201 0.5914 0.5922
¹f 1.5878 1.5872 1.6512 1.6515
¾f 0.5791 0.5796 0.5138 0.5138
¹inf 1.0582 1.058 1.058 1.0575
¾inf 0.6795 0.6796 0.6794 0.6795
share 0.1695 0.1704 0.176 0.1777
U f 0.0254 0.0255 0.0269 0.027
U i 0.1848 0.1844 0.1842 0.1841
U tot 0.0567 0.0568 0.0588 0.0592
Table B-6: E®ect of severance payment K and minimum wage MW under low
human capital growth pe, college educated workers.
K = 0:24;MW = 1 K = 0:32;MW = 1 MW = 1:46;K = 0:24 MW = 1:46;K = 0:32
¹c 1.3664 1.3657 1.4084 1.4075
¾c 0.6628 0.6635 0.6383 0.6392
¹f 1.5171 1.518 1.5856 1.5864
¾f 0.5729 0.573 0.5052 0.5053
¹inf 0.9432 0.943 0.943 0.9429
¾inf 0.7129 0.7126 0.7129 0.7126
share 0.2626 0.2648 0.2757 0.2779
U f 0.0276 0.0277 0.0294 0.0296
U i 0.2279 0.229 0.2279 0.229
U tot 0.0896 0.0906 0.0937 0.0947
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School Entrance Age, Exposure to
Pre-School, and the Evolution of
Ethnic Test Score Gaps
This is joint with Christian Dustmann
ABSTRACT
In this paper we investigate test score gaps and their evolution for white and ethnic minority
children aged 3 and 5 in the UK. We also analyse the e®ect of early school exposure on test
score gaps, and di®erences in the e®ect of entry age on early school performance. Ethnic
test score gaps at age 3 - when most children are not enrolled in Kindergarten yet - are
large. Background characteristics (in particular exposure to the English language) explain
part, but not all of this di®erential. Between the age of 3 and 5, the ethnic test score gap
narrows. Exposure to preschool measured at age 5 - even if limited to only a few months -
has a larger positive e®ects on test scores for those minority groups who started from a more
disadvantaged position. Further, keeping exposure to pre-school constant, ethnic minority
children loose less from entering pre-school at a younger age than majority individuals; for
some groups, there is an overall gain from entering school early. Our ¯ndings point at a
reduction in achievement gaps between minority and majority children in the UK between
age 3 and age 5, which is partly due to a larger positive e®ect of pre-school on achievements
of minorities.
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Educational attainment, early test scores, and school environment are important predictors
of future labour market outcomes such as earnings, or occupational choices (see e.g. Neal and
Johnson (1996),Neal (2006), Shonko® and Phillips (2000), and Currie and Duncan (1999)
for the U.S. and Robertson and Symons (1990) for the U.K.). Recent work by Heckman and
co-authors argues that the development of cognitive skills may be in°uenced even earlier,
and in the pre-school period (see e.g. Cunha and Heckman (2007), Carneiro, Heckman
and Masterov (2005), Heckman (2008)). The importance of pre-school experiences for early
school test results has also been emphasised by Elder and Lubotsky (2008). They argue that
the positive e®ect of later school entry age on test scores and other outcomes, as found in
many countries (see e.g. Bedard and Dhuey (2006), Puhani and Weber (2008), Fredriksson
and Oeckert (2005), McEwan and Shapiro (2008)), is related to di®erences in pre-school
learning. Elder and Lubotsky (2008) provide some convincing evidence for this hypothesis,
by showing that the age advantage is higher for children from higher income families, who
are more likely exposed to a higher quality pre-school environment.
Pre- and early school formation of cognitive skills may also be a key factor in explain-
ing di®erences in achievements across di®erent population groups. Recent research for the
U.S., investigating the sources of Black/white or Hispanic/white racial gaps, assigns impor-
tance to parenting practises and early home and schooling experiences (see e.g. Fryer and
Levitt (2004), Todd and Wolpin (2006), Hanushek and Rivkin (2006)). The evidence put
forward in this literature implies that ethnic test gaps for children at preschool age can be
predictive of wide and persistent socio-economic disparities along the lines of racial or ethnic
characteristics.
The importance of pre-school experiences vs. exposure to early schooling seems par-
ticularly important for children from minority background. If, as suggested by Elder and
Lubotsky (2008), age at school entry a®ects early test results through accumulation of skills
prior to school entry, then a later school start may be particularly disadvantageous for pop-
ulation groups where pre-school skill accumulation is low.1 In this paper, we analyse the
evolution of early test early test score gaps between majority and minority children in Britain,
and how this is a®ected by variation in exposure to pre-school household and parental char-
acteristics, and variation in the age at which pre-school is started. Our analysis focuses on
test outcomes at age 3, age 5, and after the ¯rst year of pre-school.
We ¯rst investigate the test gap between children of majority and minority descent at
ages 3 and 5, and whether it disappears conditional on parental background information.
1Consistent with Elder and Lubotsky's hypothesis, Cascio and Schanzenbach (2007) ¯nd negative age at
entry e®ects on longer term outcomes for disadvantaged children.
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and Whites is hardly detectable for children aged eight to 12 months, but widens for children
of all races after the age of 2. In an earlier paper (Fryer and Levitt (2004)), research by
the same authors suggests that the black-white gap disappears at Kindergarten age when
conditioning on a small number of covariates, but that blacks loose ground during the ¯rst
two years of schooling experience.
We demonstrate large attainment gaps between whites, and all ethnic minority children
at the age of 3. There are also large di®erences in parental learning oriented activities across
groups. Although attainment gaps decrease signi¯cantly when conditioning on a large set of
background information, they remain sizeable and signi¯cant. We ¯nd that before starting
pre-school programs, children are mostly a®ected by the family environment, in particular by
their parents' human capital and parental learning oriented activities. Language spoken at
home explains for some groups about half of the attainment gap. Given the limited exposure
children of most minority groups have to English at this age, they seem to be negatively
a®ected by all covariates which capture this lack of exposure, like grand parents' care, and
neighbourhood ethnic concentration. Likewise, test result gaps at age 5 do not disappear
after controlling for a large set of background characteristics. However, when comparing test
gaps between ages 3 and 5 it seems that these have not widened for most minority groups.
We then investigate whether earlier exposure to the ¯rst year of formal schooling is
more advantageous for children with an ethnic minority background. Our analysis utilises
- similar to papers by Elder and Lubotsky (2008), Crawford, Dearden and Meghir (2007),
Puhani and Weber (2008), Fertig and Kluve (2005), Cascio and Lewis (2006), Black et al.
(2008) and Bedard and Dhuey (2006) - variation in school entry age created by a single
cut-o® date. We analyse the e®ect of early school exposure on tests which are speci¯c to
our survey population, and which address a set of cognitive abilities at age 5. Other than
tests usually investigated in the before-mentioned literature - which address abilities after
the same exposure to school input - this test is age-adjusted and taken at di®erent stages
of pre-school exposure. It identi¯es the combined e®ect of age at school entry and exposure
to early school. We use di®erent cut-o® regulations across local areas, as well as variation
in birth dates, to create exogenous variation in exposure to pre-school. Our ¯ndings point
at pre-school exposure between the age of 3 and 5 having a large and positive e®ect on
test scores for both white and minority children. Further, the schooling experience - even if
limited to only a few months - is found to have a larger e®ects on test scores, exactly for those
groups who started from the most disadvantaged and segregated position. This is a result in
contrast with ¯ndings in the US literature, which point to schools' poor quality to explain
Black's disappointing performance in math and reading tests.2 It is in line with ¯ndings
2See for instance Fryer and Levitt (2004), Hanushek and Rivkin (2006), Krueger and Whitmore (2002).
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school curriculum - the test gap between whites and minorities in the UK decreases.
We then use variation in school entry age, created through the same cut-o® rules, to
investigate the e®ect of age at school entry on measures of personal, social and emotional
development after the ¯rst year of primary school. Unlike previous research, our focus is on
ethnic minority groups. We ¯nd that children who are older at school entry have higher test
scores. However, this e®ect is lower for children from ethnic minority groups; in fact, it turns
negative in sign for some minority groups. One interpretation - and in line with Elder and
Lubotsky (2008) - is that parental input for some minority children is of lower quality than
for majority children. Those groups that gain most from early school entry are at the same
time those groups that have lower exposure to the majority language, and lower parental
learning oriented activities. In accordance with this hypothesis, we ¯nd that children from
a background where English is not spoken gain less from entering school later than children
from a background where English is spoken.
We base our analysis on data from the Millennium Cohort Study (MCS), which over-
samples ethnic minority groups in Britain. The MCS Study o®ers large-scale information
about children, and the families who are bringing them up. The sample includes a "year
long" cohort of around 19,000 babies born over the 12 months starting in September 2000.
The ¯rst survey recorded the circumstances of pregnancy and birth, as well as those of the
all-important early months of life, and the social and economic background of the family into
which the children have been born. The second survey took place with the children at around
3 years of age and collected information on parenting practices, health and neighborhood
characteristics, older siblings' school performances. The third survey visited the families
when the children reached age 5 and had started primary school. The data provides, similar
to the data used by Fryer and Levitt (2004), detailed information about parental and school
background. In addition, it contains boost samples of the largest minority groups.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the next section presents the data and the
main variables used in the analysis. Section 3 presents and analyses the test gaps at age
3 and age 5. Section 4 investigates the causal e®ect of schooling on test scores. Section 5
concludes.
4.2 Background, Data and Estimation Strategy
4.2.1 Ethnic Minorities in England
Other than in the U.S., ethnic minorities in Great Britain are relatively recent populations,
with larger immigrations starting only after the Second World War, when the U.K. recruited
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subjects from these countries. Most of the UK minorities live in England. In 2001 only 2%
of the population in Scotland were from a non-White ethnic minority background. The
proportion is similar for Wales. In contrast, according to the 2001 Census ethnic minority
groups account for 9.1% of the total English population, up from 6.2% in 1991. Today, the
children of ethnic minorities constitute 21.9 % of the overall primary school population in
England, and this trend is sharply increasing.3
The ¯ve main ethnic minority groups in the UK are Black Caribbean, Black African,
Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi. These are also the groups that we will distinguish in
our analysis below. Individuals who belong to these groups arrived nearly exclusively in the
period after the Second World War, but their arrivals have been at di®erent stages, and were
triggered by di®erent events. While the majority of immigrants from the Caribbean arrived
in the period between 1955 and 1964, the main time of arrival of Black African, Indian and
Pakistani ¯rst generation groups was between 1965 and 1974 (Peach, 1996). Bangladeshi
arrivals peaked in the period 1980-1984.
A detailed description of the labour market experiences of ethnic minority groups of
¯rst and higher generation throughout the 1980s and 1990s can be found in Dustmann and
Theodoropoulos (2006). These authors document that ethnic minority immigrants in Britain
are generally well educated, with most groups having achieved higher levels of education than
their white native born counterparts. This trend continues for ethnic minorities born in the
U.K. Here - again - most groups seem to have at least the same education level than their
white native born comparison groups, but perform worse in the labour market, after taking
account of their concentration in the London area.
4.2.2 The Millennium Cohort Study
The Millennium Cohort Study (MCS) was selected from a random sample of electoral wards,
disproportionately strati¯ed to ensure adequate representation of all four UK countries,
deprived areas and areas with high concentrations of Black and Asian families. Currently,
three waves of the MCS are available. The survey for the ¯rst sweep took place between
June 2001 and January 2003, gathering information from the parents of 18,819 babies born
in the UK over a 12-month period and living in selected UK wards at age 9 months. In
England (to which we restrict our analysis, as nearly all ethnic minorities live in England),
3In maintained primary schools the percentage of pupils (of compulsory age and above) who were classi¯ed
as being of a minority ethnic origin has increased from 20.6 per cent in 2006 to 21.9 per cent in 2007. A
similar trend is apparent in secondary schools, where the percentage of pupils classi¯ed as minority ethnic
groups increased from 16.8% in 2006 to 17.7% 2007 (Statistics of England: Schools and Pupils in England -
2007, DfES).
97
Trentini, Claudia (2009), Essays on Human Capital Accumulation and Inequality 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/12804the sample for the ¯rst sweep included 11,695 babies born between 1 September, 2000 and
31 August, 2001, and who form an academic year cohort.
The second sweep of the survey re-interviewed parents when their children were 3 years
old, while the third survey took place in 2006 when the children were 5 years old and started
primary school. The survey covers a large array of household characteristics, ranging from
socioeconomic indicators, health of household members, and neighbourhood characteristics,
to parenting practices and parent-child interactions. It also includes cognitive, physical
and non-cognitive children assessments.4 At age 5 school identi¯ers allow to match MCS
children to teachers' evaluations (the Foundation Stage Pro¯le) of their cognitive, social and
emotional development. The Foundation Stage Pro¯le (FSP) assessment is collected by the
Department for Children, Schools and Families in state schools in England. Of the 9,839
children in the third wave of MCS, 8,630 children could be matched.
Geographical identi¯ers allow us to link MCS data to 2001 National Census statistics for
precisely de¯ned areas ranging from the electoral wards (which can include as many as 30.000
residents) to Output Areas (covering an average of 300 inhabitants) or neighbourhood.5 Our
sample for England comprises about 10,000 observations both at age 3 and 5; the number of
observations for the main ethnic groups we consider are 391 (373 at age 5) for Indians, 718
(676) for Pakistani, 278 (285) for Bangladeshi, 179 (170) for Black Caribbean, and 283 (303)
for Black Africans. Our main category of comparison is "white British" while the category
"Others" includes white others, black others, mixed, Chinese and not speci¯ed ethnic group.
4.2.3 Compulsory Schooling in Britain and Reception Class
In the UK, all children between the ages of 5 and 16 receive compulsory full time education.
The ¯rst stage (primary school) begins with the term following the child's 5th birthday. The
length of primary education is normally 7 years and until age 11 when the child moves into
Secondary education.6
Before primary school, children enrol in reception class. The minimum age for starting
reception class is set by the local education authorities (LEAs), of which there are approx-
imately 150 in England. LEA's determine the admissions policy for all community and
voluntary controlled schools in their area.7 There is therefore some geographical variation
4For a detailed description of survey design, recruitment process and ¯eldwork see Dex and Joshi (2005).
5See the UK National Statistics webpage for a broader overview of the geographic hierarchy
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/geography/soa.asp
6For a complete overview of the English education system see Gillard D (2007) Education in England: a
brief history" or visit the Department for children, schools and families website: http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/
7A community school is a state school run by the local authority, which employs the teachers, owns the
land and buildings, and sets the admissions criteria. A voluntary-controlled school is a state school is a state
school in which the local authority employs the teachers and sets the admissions criteria, but the school and
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LEAs are rapidly converging towards a single point of entry, which is in September of the
academic year when the child turns ¯ve.8 Almost three quarters of the children in our sample
is subject to this single point entry policy.
Reception class lasts for 9 months. Where reception class starts in September, children
must be four years old by September 1st. Thus, the youngest in class are those children who
turn 4 by August 31, and the oldest in class are those children who turn 4 at September 1st.
Although reception class is not compulsory, participation rates are only slightly lower than
Year 1 enrolment rates to primary school. In 2008, more than 91% of all 4 years olds were
enrolled in reception class in England,9 a percentage very similar to the one found in our
sample: 89,55%. The aim of reception class is to prepare children for a more formal education
when they reach the age of ¯ve and enter primary school. The types of skills taught include
rudimentary writing skills and the use of capital letters, and rudimentary counting. In our
analysis below, we will examine the e®ect reception class has on test outcomes within, and
after one year of exposure.
4.2.4 Measures of cognitive outcomes
We brie°y describe the main tests we are using in our analysis. We give more details in
Appendix A.
MCS Test Measures: The MCS performs two cognitive tests for children who are aged
3 and 5. The cognitive assessment tests are British Ability Scale (BAS) tests: The Naming
Vocabulary test and the Bracken School Readiness test at age 3, and the Naming vocabulary
test, the Picture Similarities and the Pattern Construction tests at age 5.
The BAS Naming Vocabulary test is a verbal scale for children aged 2 years 6 months
to 7 years 11 months. It assesses the spoken vocabulary of young children. The test items
consist of a booklet of coloured pictures of objects that the child is shown and asked to name.
The scale measures expressive language ability, and successful performance depends on the
child's previous development of a vocabulary of nouns.
The Bracken School Readiness Scale measures the comprehension of several functionally
relevant educational concepts related to colours, shapes, letters, numbers, comparisons and
sizes. The readiness concepts assessed in this test are related to early childhood education
the buildings are normally owned by a charity - often a religious organization - which also appoints some
members of the governing body.
8Admission policies are explained more in detail in appendix B, where we also report the compliance rate
by group.
9For statistics about early education in England see the Department for Children, School and Families
(DCSF) statistical release: Provision for Children under ¯ve years of age in England; January 2008
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The Picture Similarities scale is designed to be non-verbal in that the task requires
minimal oral instructions (and can be demonstrated by gesture) and does not require any
oral response from the child. The BAS Pattern Construction test measures spatial ability
and is considered as strongly related to overall cognitive ability.
The BAS scales are intended to obtain a test score by adjusting items appropriately for
the child's level of developmental ability. As items that are moderately di±cult for the child
provide the most information about his/her ability, children of di®erent ages (in month)
and of di®erent abilities therefore start and stop at di®erent points on each scale. These
starting and stopping points and the di±culty of the items are °exible rather than ¯xed,
in response to a child's performance. The tests ask a series of items which di®er by child's
age, so as to keep the degree of di±culty constant across di®erent age ranges. Further, in
response to the child's performance, levels of di±culty within each age scale are adjusted,
with tests becoming more di±cult for well- performing children. As children take di®erent
sets of items, their raw scores on a scale cannot be compared directly. The raw scores are
converted into an ability score, which re°ects both the raw score and the di±culty of the
items being administered. Ability scores are converted into T-scores based on the values
in the standardisation sample for the applicable age band. T-scores range from 20 to 80
and have a mean of 50. A child with a T-score of 50 is therefore placed at the mean value
for their age. Higher scores on either scale denote an increase in cognitive ability and,
conversely, lower scores indicate a reduced level of ability. Standardisation to the respective
age range is achieved through reference to a large UK populations sample used in developing
the assessment.10 As a result, the BAS provides an age adjusted measure of ability that
allows comparison of achievements of children across di®erent age ranges.11
The Foundation Stage Pro¯le: The Foundation Stage Pro¯le (FSP) assessment records
the child's achievement as reported by their teacher at the end of the ¯rst year of reception
class for children in state schools in England. The FSP has been introduced together with
a series of learning goals in 2000 and replaces statutory baseline assessment on entry to
primary school.
Throughout reception class, each child's development is assessed in relation to the step-
ping stones and early learning goals that form part of the Curriculum guidance for the
pre-school years. These assessments are made on the basis of the practitioner's accumulat-
ing observations and knowledge of the whole child. By the end of the reception class year,
10The standardization sample represents all children who are being educated in mainstream schools or in
special units attached to such schools (see Elliott (1996) and Elliott, Smith and McCulloch (1997); BAS II
Technical manual).
11See Hill (2005) for a detailed description and history of the development of the BAS and its strength
relative to other measures of ability.
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The Foundation stage sets out six areas of learning covering children's physical, intel-
lectual, emotional and social development. The FSP captures the six learning goals as a
set of 13 assessment scales, each of which has nine points (with 9 being the highest): three
measures of personal, social and emotional development; four measures of communication,
language and literacy skills; three components of mathematical development; one of their
knowledge and understanding of the world; one of their physical development; and one of
their creative development. The total score for the FSP comprises the sum of these 13 com-
ponents, with a maximum value of 117. Within each assessment scale points are presented
in approximate order of di±culty, according to evidence from trials. The points are assigned
on the basis of the teacher's assessment of the child's typical attainment.12
We normalize both the BAS - and the FSP assessments to have mean 0 and standard
deviation 1 across the whole sample.
4.3 Ethnic Test Score Gaps and Background Charac-
teristics
4.3.1 Socio-economic background
In table 1 we display information for a large set of background variables. The ¯rst panel
reports variables measured when the child is three, and the second when the child is ¯ve
years old (obtained from wave 2 and 3 of the MCS). We report means (in bold) and standard
deviations (in parentheses), where each column refers to a di®erent ethnic group.
The ¯rst two rows report information on English usage in the household ("English used
only partly" and "English never used"). The residual category is "English used always".
The ¯gures show a remarkable di®erence across groups. Unsurprisingly, among the whites,
English is "always used at home" in nearly 99 percent of households. However, English
is never spoken at home in a large fraction of Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and African
households. English is always used in only 4 percent of Pakistani households, 3 percent
of Bangladeshi households, and about 8 percent of Indian households. On the other hand,
English is spoken in about 95 percent of Caribbean households - which is due to English
being the main language in the Caribbean. Overall, these numbers suggest that children of
ethnic minority background are (with the exception of the Caribbean's) not much exposed
12To complete the FSP teachers need to record children' achievements on a booklet through-
out the reception class year. For details on the FSP see the Foundation Stage Pro¯le
Handbook issued by the Department for Education and Skills in 2003 and available online
(http://www.qca.org.uk/libraryAssets/media/Foundation stage pro¯le handbook COMPLETE.pdf)
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There is large variation in single parenthood. While 16 percent of white children have a
single parent, this number is far lower for minorities from the Indian sub-continent, but much
higher for Caribbean's and Africans: more than 1 in 2 children from the Caribbean group
grow up in a household with a single parent, and nearly 40 % of African children. There
are likewise large di®erences in the labour market attachment of mothers. While about 70
percent of white mothers worked before giving birth, only 16 and 13 percent of Pakistani
and Bangladeshi mothers did. The numbers for the other minority groups are higher, but
still lower than for whites. Three years after giving birth, mothers from all ethnic groups
have a lower participation rate than during pregnancy. However while Indian and Black
Caribbean mothers are similar to white mothers, Pakistani and Bangladeshi mothers are
the least active. This may partly be explained by di®erences in fertility - Pakistani and
Bangladeshi households have on average almost 3 children, compared with 2 for the other
groups. Further, they have chosen di®erent childcare arrangements - their children spend
the lowest number of months in early educational institutions (see the percentage of children
in formal childcare at age 3 or the average number of months spent in childcare at age 5).13
Di®erences for the partner's behaviour are less pronounced, with all ethnic groups, with
the exception of the Indian one, showing a roughly 10% lower labour force participation.
Compared to whites, the age at which mothers and their partners left full time education
is quite high for all groups. Black African and Indian mothers have -according to this
measure- higher levels of education than white mothers. Mothers from Bangladesh and
Pakistan have about 1 year less education than whites. Except for the Bangladeshis, the
partners of mothers for all groups seem to have higher levels of education than whites. These
numbers are similar to those reported in Dustmann and Theodoropoulos (2006), based on
the British Labour Force Survey.
Despite high levels of education, all ethnic groups (except for the Indians) have higher
probabilities for income and/or job seeking allowance. Particularly dramatic - about 40% -
is the fraction of Black African and Black Caribbean families receiving income support or
job seeking allowances. This poverty pattern is con¯rmed by the neighbourhood's OECD
poverty indicator (de¯ned as average neighbourhood income inferior to 60% of the average
British income).14 Almost three-quarter of Bangladeshi and Pakistani children and more
13Early education institutions are nursery school or nursery class, playgroup or pre-school. When English
children turn 3 they are entitled to 12,5 hours of childcare per week free. Thus if it were only an economic
concern, we would expect to see a higher share of Asian children in early education (average age in the MCS2
is about 3 years and 2 months).
14The statistics is provided by MCS. With neighbourhood here is meant the Lower Super Output
Area (LSOA). Lower Super Output Areas are a geographic hierarchy with an average of 1500 residents.
The size is consistent across the whole UK. For further details see O±ce of National Statistics webpage
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The ethnic concentration variable re°ects the percentage of individuals of the same race
in the neighbourhood as provided by the Census statistics.15 For comparison the next row
reports the percentage of the di®erent ethnic groups in the overall population as reported
by the 2001 Census. While all ethnic groups tend to segregate, segregation is particularly
pronounced for Bangladeshis, Pakistanis and Indians.16
4.3.2 Parental Learning Oriented Activities
The MCS includes a battery of questions about the activities parents undertake with their
children. Some of these items can be directly linked to cognitive achievements, as they are
related to learning-speci¯c skills. Mothers are asked how often they read to their child, and
how often someone in the household helps them learn the alphabet, count, learn songs, draw
or, at age 5, learn math, writing and reading.
In Table A-1 in Appendix A we report whether the mother undertakes any of these ac-
tivities more than 6 times per week, both at age 3, and at age 5. The table entries show
large di®erences across ethnic groups. In Table 2 we report di®erences in an overall mea-
sure of LOAs at age 3 and at age 5 between whites and each of the groups we consider,
unconditional (columns 1 and 3) and conditional (columns 2 and 4) on family background.
This measure of LOAs is the ¯rst principal component of the indicator variables reported
in Table A1, normalized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1.17 The entries show that
di®erences in learning oriented activities at age 3 reduce when we condition on a set of key
background variables, but remain large and signi¯cant for some ethnic groups, like Pak-
istanis, Bangladeshis and Black Africans.18 For instance, even conditional on background
characteristics, the overall score of learning oriented activities is 40% of a standard deviation
lower for Bangladeshi mothers, as compared to white mothers. Consistent with current liter-
ature (see e.g. Duncan and Brooks-Gunn (1997), Carneiro and Heckman (2003), Todd and
Wolpin (2006), Mayer (1997), Elder and Lubotsky (2008)) on early parents' investments, the
LOAs measure is highly correlated with the income status of the household, mother's educa-
tion, family composition and gender. English as a language used at home and immigration
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/geography/glossary/s.asp.
15Again we de¯ne neighbourhood as Lower Super Output Area. This area is less than half the neighbour-
hoods as de¯ned in American Census data (about 4000 residents) (Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (2008)).
16This is consistent with US evidence that ethnic group's share of the population is positively associated
with higher indexes of segregation (Cutler et al. (2008)).
17Using a simple average of the di®erent learning oriented activities indicators leads to very similar results.
18The controls included are: English use at home, mother education level, poverty index, an indicator
for arrival time to England less than 10 years ago, number of siblings, marital status of the mother, child's
gender.
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The LOA gaps are smaller in size and less associated with covariates at age 5. One
explanation - which we will explore below - is that children spend some of their time in
school at age 5: 99.16% of the children enrolled attend reception class full time.19
The numbers we report show clear pattern across ethnic groups. While Indian mothers
seem to be most similar to white mothers if it comes to learning oriented activities, most
other minority groups seem to invest less into learning activities of their children at age 3,
even conditional on a large set of variables. Pakistani and Bangladeshi mothers seem to
have the lowest rates of learning related activities. This is despite their low labour force
participation rate. On the other hand, these groups have also the highest fertility rates and
the largest households.
4.3.3 Raw test scores
We now turn to test score di®erences between groups at ages 3 and 5, based on the MCS
test measures we describe above. Tables 3 and 4 report the mean raw test gaps between our
six di®erent ethnic groups, and whites for the MCS and the FSP assessments respectively.
The tests have been normalized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. At age three,
there is a clear di®erence between whites, and minority groups. In the naming vocabulary
test (which assesses the spoken vocabulary of young children), ethnic minority children, in
particular of Pakistani and Bangladeshi background, score clearly lower than white children:
for these two groups, the gap is 1.3 and 1.5 standard deviations. This is well above the
reading test gaps of Blacks and Hispanics at Kindergarten entry in the US (both around
40% of a standard deviation - see Fryer and Levitt (2004)).20 The gap is also large for the
other groups. One reason could be that English is not the ¯rst language spoken at home in
most of these households - see Table 1. However, the gap is also large (0.5 of a standard
deviation) for the Black Caribbean, where English is spoken at home. There is also a stark
disadvantage in the Bracken test, which measures cognitive abilities at age three. Again,
Pakistani and Bangladeshi children have the most pronounced disadvantages.
The di®erences in the vocabulary test carry through to age 5, and are particularly pro-
nounced for the Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations. Although not comparable, the gap
in the cognitive tests seems to be smaller at age 5 for all groups we consider. For non-verbal
19In wave 3 of MCS 98.5% of the children are enrolled in reception class. Those not enrolled are either
attending private schools or do have medical conditions hampering school attendance. The BAS Naming
Vocabulary assessment is similar, in terms of assessment design and
20The BAS Naming Vocabulary assessment is similar, in terms of assessment design and abilities tested to
the reading tests used in the American Early Childhood Longitudinal Program and reported e.g. by Fryer
and Levitt (2004) for children at kindergarten entry (average age 67 months, 5 years and a half).
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show a gap of roughly 50% of a standard deviation.21
Another set of test outcomes are the FSP tests, obtained at the end of reception class. As
we describe above, these tests distinguish between both cognitive and non-cognitive abilities.
The ¯rst set of questions refers to personal, social and emotional development; the second set
to communication skills, language and literacy; the third set to mathematical development.
The last set is about knowledge and understanding of the world, physical development and
creative development. In Table 4 we show the raw gaps in the FSP attainments only for
the children which start school in September and who all have been exposed to one year of
reception class.
The gaps in the FSP assessments show surprisingly little variation across all the di®erent
scales. Pakistani and Bangladeshi children show the largest gaps not only in cognitive, but
also in socio-emotional, and in physical assessments. The total FSP scale comprises the sum
of the FSP single 13 components and is reported in the last column of Table 4. On the FSP
total measure Pakistani and Bangladeshi children perform roughly 0.7 of standard deviation
worse than whites.
4.3.4 Test Score Gaps and Family Background
Some of the large test score gaps between whites and minority individuals that we illus-
trate above may be explained by the di®erences in family background - for instance a very
large fraction of Caribbean mothers are lone mothers, and high fractions of Pakistani and
Bangladeshi mothers are receiving welfare bene¯ts. Recent work by Fryer and Levitt (2004)
suggests that tests score gaps between whites and blacks in the US, measured at age 5, are
essentially eliminated after controlling for a small number of background characteristics.
Table 5 reports results for the "Vocabulary" and "School Readiness (Bracken)" tests
at age 3, for three di®erent speci¯cations, conditional on an increasing set of family back-
ground characteristics.22 Estimation is done using weighted least squares, and clustering
over sampling units, to take account of strati¯ed sampling.
Speci¯cations (1) display the raw di®erentials and are identical to results in Table 3.
Speci¯cations (2) control for English use in the household, where "English always used" is
21Although the tests are not directly comparable, we would like to note that the gap in math tests - thus
a non verbal ability test - for Blacks and Hispanics in the US is about 64% and 70% of a standard deviation
respectively (see Fryer and Levitt 2004).
22We run simple regressions of the following type: test scorei =
P
g ®gG+°Xi+²i , where i indexes indi-
viduals and g corresponds to the ethnic group to which an individual belongs (where whites are the reference
group). The variable testscore measures standardised results of the di®erent tests (at age 3 "Vocabulary"
and "Bracken", and at age 5 "Vocabulary", "Picture Similarities", "Pattern Construction",and the di®erent
scales in "FSP"). The vector X captures a wide range of possible control variables, and ²i is an error term.
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Vocabulary test quite dramatically - by roughly a third, and by one-half for the Indian group.
An exception is the Caribbean group, where English is spoken in most households. Thus,
exposure to the English language at home appears to be a main determinant in the weak
performance of ethnic minority kids in vocabulary tests.
Is language also important for the school readiness test, which tests the children's basic
concept development? The results in column 2 in the second panel indicate that language
spoken at home does a®ect also these test score gaps, but to a much lesser extent.
Speci¯cations (3) add a wide number of background variables.23 Controlling for these
variables reduces the test gaps by about 20-30% of a standard deviation while the R2 in-
creases substantially. However, for all groups (except for the Indians) test score gaps remain
signi¯cant, and are large in magnitude. For instance, conditional on the full set of covariates,
test score gaps between Whites, and Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, are still 40 and 60 percent
of a standard deviation for the school readiness test; they are about 30 percent for Africans
and Black Caribbean. The covariates (we report the full set of estimates in Table A-2 in
Appendix A) generally enter with the expected sign. Firstborn children, those with higher
birth weights, those who breastfed longer, those with older mothers at the time of birth and
girls score better. Learning Oriented Activities are all statistically signi¯cant; in particular
mother's reading seems to have a large impact on both the Naming Vocabulary and the
Bracken test scores.
Table 6 shows the (conditional) test gaps at age 5; the full regression results for all
subscales are reported in Table A-3 in Appendix A. The ¯rst three panels refer to the MCS
tests, and the last panel to the FSP tests. For the FSP we report only the total FSP score.
Again, the ¯rst column of each panel reports the raw di®erences as reported in Table 3. The
set of covariates included in the regressions at this age changes slightly from the one used in
the previous section (e.g. the labour market participation of the parents is updated).
Results for the Vocabulary test gap at age 5 are similar to the ones at age 3. However,
for most groups (except Africans and Caribbean) the gap has slightly decreased. Again,
language spoken at home has a strong impact on the Vocabulary test score gap.
The Picture similarities and Pattern Construction tests are not measuring any language
related ability. For both tests, conditioning on language used at home hardly seems to
a®ect the test score gap. Parental human capital and human capital investments are the
only set of covariates able to raise the R2 signi¯cantly, while reducing the gap. Comparing
23These are: poverty status, receipt of job seeking allowances, parental years of schooling, learning oriented
activities, childcare arrangements, child-, family- and neighbourhood characteristics (including child gender,
birth weight, birth order, age of mother at birth, mother's time of arrival in the UK, breast feeding behaviour,
family composition, neighbourhood- OECD poverty indicator and ethnic concentration).
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small di®erences in point estimates.
Compared to test results for the Bracken test at age three (although not directly compa-
rable), test result gaps for the non-vocabulary tests are smaller, and they disappear entirely
for the Indian subgroup. In Table A-3 in Appendix A we report results for the additional
variables included. The results are similar to the ones at age three. However, parental
oriented activities are hardly correlated to test scores.
Overall, these results are di®erent than those found in some recent US literature (Fryer
and Levitt 2004). Even in the most comprehensive speci¯cation we are not able to eliminate
early test gaps at age 3 - except for the Indian subgroup. For all other ethnic groups, the
conditional gaps in speci¯cation (3) are between one third and one half of the raw gaps
shown in column (1). There is some evidence that the gap is slightly decreasing between
ages 3 and 5. One reason for this may be reception class, to which all children in our sample
have had some exposure by age 5. In the next section we investigate this in more detail.
4.4 Ethnic Test Score Gaps, Age at School Entry and
School Exposure
4.4.1 Estimation
Our cognitive test data captures two important moments in the life of children: when they
turn 3 (at a stage where they have been in°uenced by little more than the family), and
when they turn 5 (at a stage where they have been exposed to some months of reception
class). In addition, the FSP test provides information for children after 9 months of exposure
to reception class. These tests allow us - in combination with random birth dates and the
cut-o® policies of earliest entry - to investigate the e®ect of school entry age on test scores.
Our particular focus is to investigate whether children from minority background gain more
from early exposure to school, and by entering reception class early, as compared to children
from majority background.
As we discuss above, the di®erent LEA's in Britain have di®erent cut-o® regarding the
possible entry to pre-school. However, more than 70% of the children in our sample went to
pre-school in local education authorities where the cut-o® date was 1st September. If a child
turns 4 before the 1st of September in a particular year, it is allowed to enter pre-school in
that year. If - on the other hand - a child turns 4 after September 1st, the earliest possible
time to enter pre-school is September in the next year. As we describe above, our sample
consists of children born between September 2000 and August 2001. Thus, if all children
entered pre-school at the earliest possible date, children born in September 2000 are 5 years
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In the left panel of ¯gure 1 we display the expected age at entry based on this cut-o® rule
(solid line) and the observed age at entry (black dotted line) for all children born in LEA's
with a September cut-o® date. The ¯gure shows strong compliance, suggesting that most
parents sent their children to school at the earliest possible date; the di®erence between the
two lines is larger for those children who would have been younger at school entry, pointing
at parents delaying children's school entry when children are allowed to enter very young.
A second test that is taken after exposure to reception class, and before entering primary
school, is the MCS age 5 test which we describe above. The test is taken at di®erent exposures
of children to reception class. While designed to be taken right after children turned 5 years
old (thus generating an exposure to reception class between 1 and 9 months), this did not
always happen in practise. Children born between September 2000 and February 2001 were
interviewed between February and May of 2006; thus, these children had an exposure to
reception class of between 6 and 7 months. Children born between March 2001 and August
2001 were interviewed between April and August 2006, with the aim of having the interview
as closely as possible to their ¯fth birthday. These children had an exposure to pre-school
of between 7 and 9 months. Below, we will use this variation to compare test results across
children with a di®erent exposure to reception class.
In the right panel of ¯gure 1, we display the exposure to pre-school for children born
in di®erent months and when they took the MCS age 5 test. Again the solid line is the
maximum possible exposure at the test date (computed as date of interview - earliest possible
enrolment date), and the dotted line is the observed exposure. For illustrative purposes,
we have restricted the sample to children born in those LEA's where the cut-o® date is
September; in our empirical analysis, we will use the full sample. The ¯gure shows that - as
before - entry is delayed for those children that would have been the youngest in the class
(those born in August or shortly before).
To estimate the e®ect of age at school entry (AGEE) and exposure to reception class
(EXP) on age adjusted test outcomes from the MCS (T MCS
i ) and FSP results after reception
class (T FSP
i ), consider the following models:
T
MCS
i = ®0 + ®1EXP + X
0
i° + "i (1)
T
FSP
i = ¯0 + ¯1AGEE + X
0
i± + ºi (2)
where i is an index for individuals, and "i,ºi are error terms. As age at test AGET is the
sum of AGEE and EXP (AGET = AGEE+EXP), the ¯rst estimation equation identi¯es
the combined e®ect of age at school entry and exposure to reception class on exam results
(given that the MCS test results are age at test adjusted); the second equation gives the
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OLS estimates of equations (1) and (2) will results in biased estimates if parents' deci-
sions to enrol children later than the cut-o® date is correlated with test outcomes. We will
therefore estimate equations (1) and (2) by 2SLS using the earliest possible school entry age
as instrument for EXP and AGEE.
This instrument is similar to the one used in similar work by Dearden et al.(2008),
Puhani and Weber (2008) and Elder and Lubotsky (2008). It relies on exogenous variation in
month of birth and across policy admission areas (de¯ned by all the LEAs applying a certain
policy).25 As EXP is equal to the di®erence in the interview date and the age at school entry,
we need to rely on the assumption that the interview date is uncorrelated with unobserved
factors that may a®ect test results, conditional on observed characteristics in the vector X.
There is no reason to believe that the interview date is correlated with unobservables which
a®ect test results. As discussed above, the interview date was set to be as close as possible
to the child's 5th birthday while considering the requirement to interview the family during
reception class. As a consequence children born in September 2000-February 2001, were all
interviewed in January - May 2006, while those born March - August 2001 were interviewed
in April - July 2006.26 To investigate this further, we verify associations between a number
of family background characteristics - household poverty index, mother's education level,
mother marital status - and month of interview. There is no correlation between this set of
observable characteristics and month of interview.27
For the expected school starting age to be a valid instrument, two conditions need to be
satis¯ed. First, it must be random which children are born in di®erent months of the year.
This could be violated if, for example, wealthier parents deliberately decide to have children
in the autumn rather than in the summer. In this case the date of birth will be correlated
with background characteristics. Bound and Jaeger (2000) review a large body of evidence
of correlations between season of birth and parental wealth in the US. We verify associations
of the above mentioned family background variables and season of birth without ¯nding any
signi¯cant correlation. We nevertheless report results for all speci¯cations including quarter
of birth dummies.
Second, parents must not sort into LEAs based on school entrance cut-o®s, and LEAs
24Suppose the full model is TMCS
i = a0 + a1EXP + a2AGEE + X0
ig + ei, then ®1 = a1 ¡ a2 . If, as
found in some of the earlier literature, children who enter school at an older age perform better, then ®1 is
an underestimate of the e®ect of exposure to reception class on test results.
25LEAs which leave schools freedom to decide their own admission policies are excluded by the present
analysis. The number of children involved are 273, see appendix B.
26For further details on the MCS 3 ¯eldwork timetable see the Millennium Cohort Study First Three
Studies: a Guide to the Dataset Ed by Kirstine Hansen Institute of Education, University of London.
27We regress the relevant family's characteristic on month of interview dummies.
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children in the state. This is less of a concern, as most LEAs are progressively converging
toward one single admission policy. We also report results excluding children who moved in
the last 5 years: results do not change substantially.28 In addition, we condition on LEA
indicators variables, which control for both regional variation in child ability and in schools
quality. Our ¯ndings are robust to the inclusion of LEAs ¯xed e®ects which forces the
identi¯cation to come from within-LEA variation in birthdates.
Finally, in some speci¯cations we condition on the vector X, which includes a set of
background variables (like poverty indices, parental education and marital status, number
of siblings, child's gender, and birth weight). Notice that inclusion of these variables should
not a®ect our IV estimates if the instruments are valid. We include these variables to
improve estimation precision and to adjust for random di®erences between individuals in the
distribution of pre-school characteristics.
As in all 2SLS models, estimates of ¯1 identify local average treatment e®ects (LATE)
among children whose actual number of months spent at school is a®ected by their predicted
entrance age.
4.4.2 Results
Exposure to Reception Class
We ¯rst investigate the e®ect of the length of exposure to reception class on the MCS test
score results. In Table 7 we report results for the Vocabulary and Pattern Construction tests
taken at age 5, where the ¯rst two set of columns present OLS estimates, and the last two set
of columns present IV estimates. We estimate equation (1), where we allow the coe±cient
on exposure to reception class to vary between the di®erent ethnic groups. Speci¯cations 1
condition on gender, birth weight, and LEA dummies, while speci¯cations 2 condition on a
large set of family background characteristics.
For the Naming Vocabulary test, the OLS estimates imply that for white children one
month more of schooling is associated with an improvement in the test score of about 0.6%
of a standard deviation, while the coe±cient is 3.6%, and 4%, for Pakistani, and Bangladeshi
children. The e®ect on Indians, Caribbean and African is not statistically signi¯cant. OLS
results for the Pattern Construction test are similar.
The 2SLS estimates for all groups are larger than the corresponding OLS estimates,
implying either that delayed entry (and shorter exposure) is more common among students
who would otherwise have high test scores, or that early entry (and longer exposure) is more
common among students who would otherwise have low test scores. Overall, the coe±cient
28This amounts to 1.589 children or 16.15% of the age 3 sample.
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whites, one month more school exposure increases MCS5 test results by 4.2% and 15.3% of
a standard deviation, respectively. The e®ect is larger for nearly all minority groups, and
in particular for the Pattern Construction test. Pakistani and Bangladeshi children seem to
bene¯t most from a longer exposure to reception class, with an increase in test scores of 9.4
and 14.2% for the Vocabulary test, and 15.9% and 30.4% for the Pattern construction test.
For Black Africans and Caribbean, insigni¯cant and even negative estimate on the exposure
variable in the OLS results turn now positive and signi¯cant, with large point estimates:
Estimates suggest that one additional month of reception class leads to a 60.6% and 44.2%
improvement in the Pattern Construction test score for Caribbean and African, respectively.
The 2SLS coe±cients for the Naming Vocabulary test increase in particular for Asian
children, while they are lowest for whites; this is consistent with those children gaining most
in terms of the English language through reception class exposure.
One way to interpret these results is that children from ethnic minority background
gain more from exposure to reception class than children with a white background. This
is in contrast to some of the US literature, where exposure to school leads to an increase
in test gaps between whites, and Blacks and Hispanics (see for instance Fryer and Levitt
2004, Todd and Wolpin 2006, Hanushek and Rivkin (2006)). It is however in line with
recent work by Dustmann, Machin and Schoenberg (2008), which shows that children with
an ethnic minority background gain relative to whites at every stage of their formal school
curriculum.29 But, as we point out above, the parameter we estimate is the combined e®ect
of a longer exposure to reception class, and an earlier school entry age. Earlier research
has found that an early school entry age leads to lower test scores. If this age at entry
e®ect is lower for ethnic minority groups (in the sense that an early age at school entry
is less detrimental for test score results than for whites), then this may partly explain the
coe±cient estimates we ¯nd above. In the next section we investigate this.
School Entry Age and Exposure to Reception Class
To investigate the e®ect of school at age entry on test score results, we now turn to the
FSP tests. As we discuss above, these are taken at the end of reception class. Other than for
the MCS5 tests, all children for the FSP tests have had the same exposure to reception class.
However, there are exceptions: in LEA's that allow children to enter at various times during
the year, exposure to reception class may be lower than 9 months. The idea of allowing
di®erent points of entry to school is based on the observation that 4 years olds can be too
29Leuven, Lindahl, Oosterbeek and Webbink (2006) ¯nd that expanding the early enrolment possibilities
for 4 years olds in the Netherlands does have a positive e®ect on early achievement tests only for disadvantaged
children. In particular they ¯nd that one month more of schooling would improve language (math) scores
of minority children of a 6.6% (3.1%) of a standard deviation. They do not ¯nd any e®ect of schooling for
non disadvantaged Dutch children.
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school some months later (usually in the January of the following year), allows schools to
have age wise more homogeneous classes. We therefore restrict our analysis to those LEA's
where the entry age is September (which is more than 70% of all LEA's).
The literature on age at school entry e®ects ¯nds that the causal e®ect of entering school
later is positive (see e.g. Bedard and Dhuey (2006), Datar (2006), Puhani and Weber
(2008), Fredriksson and Oeckert (2005)). Elder and Lubotsky (2008)interpret this ¯nding
as being suggestive for the e®ect of exposure to pre-school environment: if children enter
school later, they have accumulated more skills, and are therefore performing better. This
interpretation suggests that children from weaker backgrounds should have lower age at
entry e®ects than children from stronger backgrounds - a result that is found in Elder and
Lubotsky's analysis. Our results have shown that pre-school environment may be particularly
weak for children from ethnic minority backgrounds. Therefore, if age-related di®erences in
early school performance are indeed mainly due to pre-school learning, then going to school
at an earlier age may have a less detrimental (and possibly even positive) e®ect on test
results of ethnic minority children.
We test this hypothesis in this section. In Table 8 we present estimates of the age at
entry e®ects on the total FSP score for whites (¯rst row), and the di®erent ethnic minority
groups in our sample. The ¯rst column presents OLS results. Column 2 presents IV results,
conditioning on gender, birth weight and LEA dummies only. Column 3 adds a large set of
family background characteristics.
The results show that a later age at school entry has a positive e®ect on outcome measures
for whites: to enter school one month later increases test scores by 7.3% of a standard
deviation. These results are similar to those by Dearden et all (2007) for tests results taken
at age 7 (key stage 1) of children born in 1990-1992. They report an age at entry e®ect for
children subject to September entry of 7.2% at age 7. Consistent with Elder and Lubotsky's
(2008) hypothesis that the age at entry e®ect is related to preschool learning, the reported
e®ect reduces over time.30 This is much in line with the previous literature on age at school
entry e®ects (Bedard and Dhuey (2006), Datar (2006), Puhani and Weber (2008), Fredriksson
and Oeckert (2005)).
However, the e®ects are smaller for all ethnic groups, with the exception of black Africans.
The e®ects are particularly small for minority groups from the Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and
Caribbean communities - those groups that performed poorly in the MCS age 3 and age 5
tests. For both the Bangladeshi and the Caribbean groups, the point estimate of being one
month older at school entry is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero.
30Dearden et all. (2007) report an age at entry e®ect at the Key stage 2 examinations (age 11) of 1,7%
and not statistically signi¯cant in the Key Stage 3 (age 14) examination.
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Again, entering school one month later has a positive impact on nearly all test measures for
white children; however, the e®ect is close to zero (with a negative point estimate in some
cases) for Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Caribbean children, suggesting that early school entry
is not detrimental for these children. The crosses indicate that the estimated coe±cients
are signi¯cantly smaller from those for white children. The size of the e®ects is particularly
pronounced for test results on personal, social and emotional development, and communica-
tion, language and literacy. This is consistent with the widely accredited hypothesis that the
ability to become fully pro¯cient in a second language is in°uenced by the developmental
period in which exposure to the language begins. Much of this research ¯nds a negative
correlation between the age at which learning begins and the ability to become a native-like
speaker (for reviews of this research, see Birdsong (1999) and Singleton and Ryan (2004)).31
Arguably the ability to communicate and express themselves helps children to better relate
to others and integrate in the class.32 Thus, these results point at a higher age at school
entry - although advantageous for majority children - being of no advantage for children
from some of the minority groups.
Our estimates also suggest that the larger e®ect of exposure to reception class on MCS5
test results, as we reported in the last section, is partly explained by a non-positive e®ect of
age at school entry for Bangladeshi, Caribbean and Pakistani children.
Variation by early family background
The results we report above are in line with the view that age at school entry e®ects
capture (partly) the accumulation of skills prior to reception class, as suggested by Elder
and Lubotsky (2008). Those ethnic groups who have been most disadvantaged in early test
results - and received the lowest exposure to parental learning activities are at the same time
those groups that seem to be harmed less (or possibly even gain) from being younger at school
entry. To test this hypothesis we classify children on the basis of their family socioeconomic
conditions at age 3. We regress the school readiness test on language used at home, income
(4 income brackets), and parental education. The predicted Bracken test score is then used
as an index of children's family background at age 3. The children are classi¯ed into one
of the four quartiles of this early family background index (with quartile 4 representing the
highest). In table 11, we report IV results, again for speci¯cation 1. The point estimates
of the age at entry e®ect are increasing in the quartile. In many cases, especially for the
social and language related tests, estimates for the higher quartiles are statistically larger
31Conger (2009) ¯nds that age at entry has a negative e®ect not only on language pro¯ciency but also on
the speed of language acquisition, con¯rming the hypothesis that for children having English as a second
language the e®ect of early school enrolment can be very important for a full integration.
32For a review of the evidence on the relation between childhood development and literacy see Lonigan
and Whitehurst (1998).
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is driving the late entry e®ect. Disadvantaged families in terms of language, income, human
capital, do provide a poor substitute for kindergarten classes.
Robustness Checks
If month of birth is manipulated by parents in order to in°uence children's entry age, our
instrument could loose validity. In tables A-5 and A-6 we report results for the schooling
exposure and the age at entry e®ect including quarter of birth as an additional control vari-
able. In addition to speci¯cation 2 which includes already a wide set of variables capturing
the family background, we also report results for a speci¯cation including use of English at
home and months of early education (speci¯cation 3). Results are not signi¯cantly in°u-
enced by the inclusion of quarter of birth, nor from additional family background variables.
In tables A-7 and A-8 we examine results excluding children who moved in the 5 years prior
to reception class start. This is to exclude any possible family's sorting into LEAs based on
school entrance cut-o®s. Again results are not signi¯cantly in°uenced by this exclusion.33
4.5 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper we investigate the test score gap between ethnic minority and majority children.
We ¯nd large gaps in test scores at age 3. The raw test scores are lower for all ethnic minority
children, as compared to white children. This gap narrows when we condition on background
characteristics, but it is still sizeable conditional on a large set of variables. At age 3, the
test score gap is importantly related to the language spoken in the home. This points at
parental language abilities being important not only for parents' labour market outcomes,
but being critically associated with early achievements of their children. At age 5, the test
score gap is still substantial and- again - cannot be eliminated through conditioning on a
large set of parental background characteristics. However, although tests are not directly
comparable, the gap seems to be slightly reduced, as compared to age 3.
One reason for this may be exposure to reception class, which all children in our sample
had at age 5. Using age adjusted tests that have been conducted at di®erent stages of
exposure to reception class, and instrumenting exposure using cut-o® school policies, we ¯nd
that exposure to reception class has indeed a larger e®ect on children from those groups who
were most disadvantaged at age 3.
We then investigate whether this exposure e®ect may be due to lower test de¯ciencies for
children from minority groups who enter school early. Using another set of tests that were
conducted after the ¯rst year of reception class, we ¯nd that this is the case: while - as found
33MCS data show that more than half of the parents who changed address in the 5 years prior to the
reception class start, moved to a bigger better house closer to relatives when the cohort child was born.
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a younger age, children from those ethnic minority groups that were most disadvantaged in
early achievement tests at age 3 do not - or may even gain. These results are compatible with
the interpretation of early school entry e®ect given by Elder and Lubotsky (2008), who argue
that age-related di®erences in early school performance are driven by pre-school learning,
and are smaller for children who are exposed to a family background that is less favourable
to the accumulation of human capital important for learning success. This may be the case
for some ethnic minority groups who -as we point out - receive less parental learning input
at an earlier age, and are less exposed to the English language. In fact, we ¯nd that the
gain from entering school at a slightly later age is smaller for children where English is not
spoken at home.
Our results are important and novel in a number of dimensions. First, we believe the
study of early achievement of ethnic minority children is extremely important for a long term
and intergenerational integration of minorities. While in the U.S., the early stage develop-
ment of children has been understood as perhaps the most critical factor in explaining the
social and economic integration of minorities (see e.g. the discussion in Carneiro, Heckman
and Masterov 2005), very little attention has been paid to this in other countries. We provide
analysis for a European country - Britain - where by now one in four children in the school
system are of ethnic minority background (DfES (2007)). Our ¯ndings for Britain di®er
slightly from those for Hispanic and Black minorities in the US, in two dimensions: First,
as in US studies (Fryer and Levitt (2004), Todd and Wolpin (2006), Hanushek and Rivkin
(2006), Krueger and Whitmore, (2002)), we ¯nd a large achievement gap between whites
and minority children at an early age (age 3). However, while for instance Fryer and Levitt
(2004) ¯nd that this gap diminishes conditional on a large set of background characteristics,
this is not the case for Britain. Secondly, and more importantly, we ¯nd that exposure to
early schooling does not lead to an increase in this gap. We rather ¯nd that the gap tends
to decrease, and that the combined e®ect of entry age and school exposure leads to higher
gains for those ethnic minority groups that were most disadvantaged at an earlier age.
Our study also adds to the recent literature on school entrance age e®ects. We ¯nd that -
while white children gain in early test scores when entering school slightly older - this seems
not to be the case for ethnic minority children from groups that were most disadvantaged at
a young age. Our ¯ndings support the view put forward by Elder and Lubotsky (2008), that
early school entry e®ects are related to pre-school learning. Our ¯ndings therefore emphasise
that early, rather than late, school entry may be bene¯cial for children from minority family
backgrounds, with less exposure to skill-enhancing activities. We identify language as a main
determinant of early test score de¯ciencies.
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DOI: 10.2870/12804Table 1: Summary statistics by ethnic group.
white Indian Pakistani Bangla b Car. b Afr. others
Observations 7303 391 718 278 179 283 1000
Percentage 71.94 3.85 7.07 2.74 1.76 2.79 9.85
Age 3
English used only partly 0.012 0.711 0.777 0.705 0.039 0.519 0.347
(0.109) (0.454) (0.416) (0.457) (0.194) (0.501) (0.476)
English never used 0.002 0.212 0.181 0.270 0.017 0.233 0.128
(0.050) (0.409) (0.385) (0.445) (0.129) (0.424) (0.334)
single parent 0.165 0.064 0.095 0.083 0.553 0.389 0.289
(0.371) (0.245) (0.293) (0.276) (0.499) (0.488) (0.454)
mother working before birth 0.709 0.563 0.164 0.130 0.652 0.439 0.536
(0.454) (0.497) (0.370) (0.337) (0.478) (0.497) (0.499)
mother working 0.534 0.528 0.119 0.125 0.528 0.389 0.364
(0.499) (0.500) (0.324) (0.331) (0.501) (0.488) (0.482)
number of children 2.154 2.182 2.845 2.949 2.343 2.875 2.280
(1.008) (0.970) (1.281) (1.390) (1.226) (1.546) (1.183)
childcare: only parental care 0.437 0.464 0.710 0.754 0.302 0.476 0.476
(0.496) (0.499) (0.454) (0.432) (0.460) (0.500) (0.500)
childcare: informal relatives 0.249 0.247 0.184 0.153 0.225 0.154 0.162
(0.432) (0.432) (0.387) (0.361) (0.419) (0.361) (0.369)
childcare: informal non relatives 0.107 0.043 0.009 0.004 0.118 0.114 0.114
(0.310) (0.203) (0.094) (0.064) (0.324) (0.319) (0.318)
child care: formal 0.207 0.247 0.097 0.089 0.355 0.256 0.248
(0.405) (0.432) (0.296) (0.285) (0.480) (0.437) (0.432)
partner working 0.917 0.904 0.787 0.729 0.797 0.738 0.805
(0.276) (0.294) (0.410) (0.445) (0.404) (0.441) (0.397)
age mother left f-t edu 17.43 18.45 16.43 16.02 17.34 18.10 17.68
(2.47) (2.79) (3.87) (3.35) (2.41) (4.07) (4.02)
age partner left f-t edu 17.37 18.85 17.85 17.22 17.41 19.87 18.65
(2.75) (3.74) (3.66) (3.73) (3.13) (4.99) (4.07)
income supp/ job seeker 0.167 0.095 0.230 0.259 0.380 0.424 0.335
(0.373) (0.293) (0.421) (0.439) (0.487) (0.495) (0.472)
oecd poverty indicator 0.262 0.280 0.722 0.760 0.503 0.582 0.464
(0.440) (0.450) (0.448) (0.428) (0.502) (0.494) (0.499)
ethnic concentration 93.74 27.76 34.92 22.14 11.53 11.79 7.98
(11.23) (23.04) (22.64) (19.26) (7.88) (9.99) (6.17)
percentage in the pop 92.1 1.8 1.3 0.5 1 0.8 2.6
arrival < 10yrs 0.019 0.294 0.274 0.281 0.073 0.435 0.283
(0.136) (0.456) (0.447) (0.450) (0.260) (0.497) (0.451)
age mother at birth 28.91 28.68 26.33 26.08 30.03 30.71 28.70
(5.895) (5.304) (5.300) (4.885) (6.589) (5.889) (5.890)
NO internet access 0.302 0.412 0.731 0.809 0.393 0.440 0.432
(0.459) (0.493) (0.444) (0.394) (0.490) (0.497) (0.496)
Female 0.492 0.481 0.514 0.504 0.469 0.470 0.496
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.501) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
Birth weight 3.353 3.066 3.050 3.014 3.087 3.463 3.395
(0.651) (1.393) (0.677) (0.747) (0.682) (3.760) (3.934)
Age5
mother working 0.617 0.565 0.212 0.240 0.557 0.411 0.467
(0.485) (0.496) (0.409) (0.428) (0.498) (0.493) (0.499)
income supp/ job seeker 0.128 0.080 0.209 0.215 0.335 0.359 0.258
(0.334) (0.272) (0.407) (0.411) (0.474) (0.480) (0.437)
months of early educ 16.30 15.69 12.79 12.59 17.84 16.28 15.40
(9.346) (9.403) (6.375) (5.695) (10.306) (10.330) (9.100)
Source: MCS wave 2 and wave 3.
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DOI: 10.2870/12804Table 2: Learning Oriented Activities gap at age 3
and age 5
Learning Oriented Activities
age 3 age 5
Indian -0.041 0.091 0.098 0.129
(0.082) (0.084) (0.057)* (0.079)
Pakistani -0.437 -0.178 -0.166 -0.070
(0.060)*** (0.077)** (0.062)*** (0.073)
Bangladeshi -0.761 -0.434 -0.313 -0.202
(0.235)*** (0.229)* (0.076)*** (0.101)**
Black Caribb. -0.323 -0.187 -0.017 -0.016
(0.112)*** (0.092)** (0.070) (0.073)
Black African -0.456 -0.186 -0.120 -0.063
(0.092)*** (0.104)* (0.054)** (0.065)
others -0.133 -0.017 -0.000 -0.012
(0.044)*** (0.046) (0.034) (0.043)
Engl. partly used -0.137 -0.102
(0.054)** (0.065)
Engl never used -0.209 -0.209
(0.101)** (0.150)
income supp. -0.142 0.024
(0.037)*** (0.047)
m medium edu 0.061 0.045
(0.021)*** (0.026)*
m high edu 0.191 0.002
(0.030)*** (0.033)
arrived < 10 years -0.216 0.169
(0.059)*** (0.060)***
single parent -0.176 0.106
(0.033)*** (0.115)




Obs 9305 9305 9585 9585
R2 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.01
Notes: Signi¯cance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. The omitted category is
white British, thus the table is showing home input measures gaps at age
3 and age 5. The home input measure is the ¯rst principal component of
indicators for the following activities performed everyday: - age 3: reading
to the child, teach a song, abc, counting, paint; - age 5: reading to the child,
teaching of the following activities: play an instrument, math, read, write.
The controls included are: English use at home, mother education level,
poverty index, an indicator for arrival time to England less than 10 years
ago, number of siblings, marital status of the mother, child's gender.
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DOI: 10.2870/12804Table 3: Raw test gaps at age 3 and age 5
Test gaps (age 3) Test gaps (age 5)
Vocabulary Bracken Vocabulary Pictures Pattern fsptotal
Indian -0.761 -0.289 -0.529 0.032 -0.106 -0.090
(0.100)*** (0.113)** (0.074)*** (0.067) (0.059)* (0.078)
Pakistani -1.363 -0.962 -1.303 -0.363 -0.528 -0.650
(0.068)*** (0.070)*** (0.056)*** (0.059)*** (0.051)*** (0.085)***
Bangladeshi -1.594 -1.242 -1.334 -0.297 -0.495 -0.838
(0.109)*** (0.077)*** (0.066)*** (0.103)*** (0.078)*** (0.149)***
Black Caribbean -0.575 -0.58 -0.575 0.140 -0.272 -0.136
(0.088)*** (0.122)*** (0.076)*** (0.118) (0.077)*** (0.152)
Black African -0.916 -0.666 -0.927 -0.123 -0.518 -0.296
(0.095)*** (0.095)*** (0.069)*** (0.053)** (0.102)*** (0.129)**
others -0.356 -0.126 -0.271 0.040 -0.103 -0.155
(0.048)*** (0.047)*** (0.037)*** (0.038) (0.039)*** (0.044)***
All minoritiesy -1.035 -0.713 -0.950 -0.170 -0.384 -0.440
(0.069)*** (0.068)*** (0.061)*** (0.045)*** (0.042)*** (0.061)***
Obs. 9305 8781 9585 9576 9556 6592
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%.
y does not include the group "Others". All tests have been normalized to have mean 0 and standard
deviation 1. The omitted cathegory is White British. The table is thus showing score gaps at age3:
Naming Vocabulary and Bracken school readiness, and at age 5: Naming Vocabulary, Picture Similarities,
Pattern Construction, and Foundation Stage Pro¯le total score.
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DOI: 10.2870/12804Table 5: Analysis of Test gaps (age 3)
NAMING VOCABULARY TEST School readiness test (BRACKEN)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Indian -0.763 -0.273 -0.280 -0.289 -0.218 -0.234
[0.106]*** [0.106]** [0.092]*** [0.113]** [0.124]* [0.094]**
Pakistani -1.359 -0.859 -0.590 -0.962 -0.901 -0.507
[0.067]*** [0.078]*** [0.066]*** [0.070]*** [0.100]*** [0.073]***
Bangladeshi -1.574 -1.056 -0.738 -1.242 -1.156 -0.659
[0.116]*** [0.123]*** [0.090]*** [0.077]*** [0.107]*** [0.083]***
Black Caribb. -0.541 -0.549 -0.342 -0.58 -0.575 -0.352
[0.096]*** [0.088]*** [0.059]*** [0.122]*** [0.121]*** [0.092]***
Black African -0.836 -0.528 -0.360 -0.666 -0.591 -0.412
[0.102]*** [0.077]*** [0.080]*** [0.095]*** [0.096]*** [0.081]***
others -0.327 -0.173 -0.140 -0.126 -0.105 -0.086
[0.050]*** [0.044]*** [0.042]*** [0.047]*** [0.052]** [0.045]*
Engl. partly used -0.481 -0.412 -0.003 -0.051
[0.055]*** [0.053]*** [0.070] [0.056]
Engl. never used -0.852 -0.623 -0.399 -0.208
[0.119]*** [0.092]*** [0.143]*** [0.098]**
income supp/job seeker -0.148 -0.151
[0.031]*** [0.033]***
LOA: teach ABC 0.047 0.144
[0.026]* [0.026]***
LOA: teach song 0.051 0.041
[0.021]** [0.022]*
LOA: read to the child 0.183 0.195
[0.022]*** [0.022]***
LOA: paint 0.029 0.025
[0.019] [0.020]
Obs 9305 9305 9305 8781 8781 8781
R2 0.11 0.12 0.26 0.05 0.05 0.29
Note: Signi¯cance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Both tests have been normalized to have mean 0 and
standard deviation 1. Sampling weights are used to take account of sample strati¯cation. LOA: learning
oriented activities, coe±cient reported only for activities performed everyday. Speci¯cation 3 includes
controls for the use of English at home, mother and father education, income support and/or job seeking
bene¯ts indicator, learning oriented activities (LOA), child care arrangements, child characteristics (gender,
birth weight, birth order), breast feeding behaviour, mother age at birth, family structure (single parent
indicator, nr of siblings), neighbourhood indicators for income poverty and littering behaviour.
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DOI: 10.2870/12804Table 7: E®ect of exposure to reception class on MCS tests. Interaction by group.
OLS 2SLS
speci¯cation 1 speci¯cation 2 speci¯cation 1 speci¯cation 2
vocabulary P Constr vocabulary P Constr vocabulary P Constr vocabulary P Constr
(white)*EXP 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.042 0.153 0.039 0.151
[0.005] [0.007] [0.005]* [0.007] [0.017]** [0.023]*** [0.017]** [0.023]***
(indian)*EXP 0.004 0.035 0.001 0.032 0.055 0.238 0.056 0.236
[0.026] [0.023] [0.024] [0.022] [0.084] [0.097]** [0.080] [0.095]**
(paki)*EXP 0.036 0.031 0.043 0.034 0.094 0.159 0.101 0.164
[0.020]* [0.017]* [0.019]** [0.016]** [0.041]** [0.062]** [0.040]** [0.057]***
(bangla)*EXP 0.04 0.047 0.035 0.041 0.142 0.304 0.104 0.288
[0.022]* [0.026]* [0.021] [0.027] [0.096] [0.114]*** [0.088] [0.106]***
(bcaribb)*EXP -0.026 -0.017 -0.019 -0.011 0.23 0.606 0.217 0.596
[0.045] [0.048] [0.038] [0.045] [0.192] [0.259]** [0.176] [0.244]**
(bafrican)*EXP -0.003 0.034 -0.003 0.032 0.114 0.442 0.212 0.513
[0.017] [0.022] [0.015] [0.021] [0.118] [0.211]** [0.141] [0.220]**
(others)*EXP -0.009 0.002 -0.004 0.006 -0.04 0.104 -0.028 0.113
[0.012] [0.013] [0.011] [0.013] [0.041] [0.040]** [0.038] [0.040]***
Obs. 9317 9289 9317 9289 9317 9289 9317 9289
R2 0.18 0.08 0.25 0.13
Note: Signi¯cance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. EXP: months of reception class Speci¯cation 1: gender, birth weight
and LEAs dummies; Speci¯cation 2: gender, birthweight, mother education, poverty indicator, single parent family, nr of
children, and LEAs dummies




(whites)*AGEE 0.061 0.073 0.074
[0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]***
(indian)*AGEE 0.061 0.061 0.058
[0.022]*** [0.024]** [0.024]**
(pakistani)*AGEE 0.047 0.06 0.059
[0.012]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]***
(banglad)*AGEE 0.042 0.013yy 0.023y
[0.026] [0.028] [0.030]
(bcaribb)*AGEE 0.003 0.013 -0.004
[0.045] [0.055] [0.056]
(bafrican)*AGEE 0.035 0.087 0.077
[0.035] [0.047]* [0.047]
(other)*AGEE 0.068 0.091 0.086
[0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]***
Obs. 6590 6590 6590
Notes: Signi¯cance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Only
children with entry in September. AGEE: age at entry.
Speci¯cation 1: gender, birth weight and LEAs dummies,
Speci¯cation 2: gender, birth weight, mother education,
poverty indicator, single parent family, nr of children, and
LEAs dummies.
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DOI: 10.2870/12804Table 9: First stage fsptotal speci¯cation 2
(W)*eAGEE (I)*eAGEE (P)*eAGEE (B)*eAGEE (bC)*eAGEE (bA)*epAGEE (O)*eAGEE
coe®. 0.9687 0.9231 1.014 0.9419 0.8765 0.8675 0.9396
[0.014]*** [0.033]*** [0.022]*** [0.031]*** [0.061]*** [0.044]*** [0.019]***
F-stat 1115.33 160.46 600.5 321.16 111.5 86.76 471.74
part-R 0.9394 0.8501 0.8949 0.793 0.8151 0.779 0.8387
Note: eAGEE: expected age at entry.
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DOI: 10.2870/128044.6 APPENDIX A - Children assessment measures
(1) BAS Naming Vocabulary (age 3 and age 5)
The Naming Vocabulary is a verbal scale for children aged 2 years 6 months to 7 years
11 months. It assesses the spoken vocabulary of young children. The test items consist of a
booklet of coloured pictures of objects which the child is shown one at a time and asked to
name. The scale measures expressive language ability, and successful performance depends
on the child's previous development of a vocabulary of nouns. The items require the child
to recall words from long-term memory rather than to recognise or understand the meaning
of words or sentences.
(2) Bracken School Readiness Assessment (age 3)
The Bracken Basic Concept Scale - Revised (BBCS-R) is used to assess the basic concept
development in children in the age range of 2 years 6 months to 7 years 11 months. The
six subtests administered evaluate 88 concepts related to colours, letters (upper and lower
cases), numbers/counting, sizes, comparisons and shapes. The readiness concepts assessed in
these sub-tests are argued to be directly related to early childhood education and to predict
readiness for more formal education.
(3) BAS Picture similarities (age 5)
In the picture similarities assessments children are shown a row of four pictures on a
page. They are asked to place a free-standing card with a ¯fth picture underneath the
picture with which the card shares a similar element or concept. The picture similarities
assessment measures a child's problem solving ability.
(4) BAS Pattern Construction (age 5)
The BAS Pattern Construction test in meant to measure spatial ability and is considered
highly related to overall cognitive ability. Generally, for each item a child must copy a two-
dimensional pattern, usually of two colours, by arranging three-dimensional blocks whose
sides are of di®erent colours and patterns.
(5) The Foundation Stage Pro¯le (age5)
The Foundation Stage Pro¯le (FSP) assessment records the child's achievement as re-
ported by their teacher at the end of the ¯rst year of reception class for children in state
schools in England. The FSP captures the six areas of learning - personal, social and
emotional development; communication, language and literacy; mathematical development;
knowledge and understanding of the world; physical development; creative development - as
a set of 13 assessment scales listed in the table below.
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MCS assessments
expressive language ability Naming Vocabulary:
comprehension of relevant educational concepts Bracken school readiness
nonverbal reasoning skills: problem solving Picture Similarities
nonverbal reasoning skills: spatial abilities Pattern Construction
Foundation Stage Pro¯le
Personal, social and emotional development (PSE) Disposition and attitudes (DA)
Social development (SD)
Emotional development (ED)
Communication, language and literacy (CLL) Language for communicating and thinking (LCT)
Linking sounds and letters (LSL)
Reading (R)
Writing (W)
Mathematical development (MD) Numbers as labels and for counting (NLC)
Calculating (C)
Shape, space and measures (SSM)
Knowledge and understanding of the world (KUW) Knowledge and understanding of the world (KUW)
Creative development (CD) Creative development (CD)
Physical development (PD) Physical development (PD)
Table A-1: Parental learning oriented activities.
white Indian Pakistani Bangla b Caribb. b African others
Age 3
teach abc > 6 x week 0.270 0.425 0.294 0.245 0.294 0.240 0.337
(0.444) (0.495) (0.456) (0.431) (0.457) (0.428) (0.473)
teach count > 6 x week 0.566 0.559 0.456 0.344 0.471 0.374 0.494
(0.496) (0.497) (0.498) (0.476) (0.501) (0.485) (0.500)
teach song > 6 x week 0.612 0.594 0.501 0.322 0.497 0.415 0.537
(0.487) (0.492) (0.500) (0.468) (0.502) (0.494) (0.499)
paint at home > 6 x week 0.497 0.535 0.504 0.341 0.418 0.378 0.500
(0.500) (0.499) (0.500) (0.475) (0.495) (0.486) (0.500)
mother reads > 6 x week 0.619 0.403 0.342 0.253 0.354 0.293 0.482
(0.486) (0.491) (0.475) (0.435) (0.480) (0.456) (0.500)
average LOAS age 3 0.437 0.409 0.327 0.218 0.328 0.257 0.400
(0.259) (0.264) (0.261) (0.249) (0.252) (0.268) (0.272)
Age 5
help math > 6 x week 0.308 0.352 0.321 0.257 0.371 0.326 0.330
(0.462) (0.478) (0.467) (0.438) (0.485) (0.470) (0.471)
help writing > 6 x week 0.248 0.368 0.329 0.287 0.360 0.346 0.304
(0.432) (0.483) (0.470) (0.453) (0.482) (0.477) (0.460)
help reading > 6 x week 0.574 0.545 0.514 0.411 0.500 0.495 0.571
(0.495) (0.499) (0.500) (0.493) (0.502) (0.501) (0.495)
mother reads > 6 x week 0.519 0.440 0.376 0.324 0.420 0.428 0.481
(0.500) (0.497) (0.485) (0.469) (0.495) (0.496) (0.500)
average LOAS age 5 0.223 0.232 0.199 0.168 0.224 0.198 0.226
(0.169) (0.188) (0.180) (0.180) (0.184) (0.182) (0.174)
Notes: MCS wave 2 and wave 3.
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Black Caribb. -0.277 -0.313
(0.059)*** (0.089)***




Engl. partly used -0.400 -0.042
(0.053)*** (0.055)
Engl. never used -0.598 -0.179
(0.088)*** (0.098)*
income supp/job seeker -0.149 -0.139
(0.031)*** (0.033)***
LOA: teach ABC everyday 0.047 0.144
(0.026)* (0.026)***
LOA: teach count everyday -0.004 0.017
(0.023) (0.023)
LOA: teach song everyday 0.051 0.040
(0.021)** (0.022)*
LOA: read to the child mother 0.183 0.195
(0.022)*** (0.022)***
LOA: paint everyday 0.029 0.025
(0.019) (0.020)
LOA: read to the child father 0.111 0.140
(0.028)*** (0.025)***
breastfed up to 6 months 0.030 0.039
(0.028) (0.026)
breastfed more then 6 months 0.070 0.125
(0.028)** (0.023)***
arrived less than 10 yrs ago -0.420 -0.231
(0.051)*** (0.059)***
medium education mother 0.058 0.101
(0.022)** (0.020)***
high education mother 0.176 0.251
(0.037)*** (0.031)***
medium education father 0.099 0.108
(0.024)*** (0.030)***
high education father 0.121 0.241
(0.036)*** (0.034)***
age mother at birth 20-29 0.141 0.224
(0.038)*** (0.043)***
age mother at birth 30-39 0.217 0.338
(0.040)*** (0.042)***
age mother at birth more than 40 0.337 0.409
(0.080)*** (0.087)***
single parent -0.057 0.029
(0.042) (0.042)
nr of children -0.068 -0.092
(0.011)*** (0.012)***
child care: relatives care 0.032 0.073
(0.026) (0.026)***
child care: informal non relatives 0.003 0.068
(0.032) (0.036)*




¯rst born 0.149 0.137
(0.028)*** (0.028)***
birth weight 0.039 0.034
(0.018)** (0.012)***
no internet -0.124 -0.147
(0.024)*** (0.024)***
house clean 0.180 0.265
(0.042)*** (0.051)***
oecd neighboorh. poor indicator -0.104 -0.148
(0.026)*** (0.029)***
neighborh litter indicator -0.194 -0.158
(0.061)*** (0.058)***
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Vocabulary P. Similarities P. Construction
Indian -0.109 -0.129 -0.070
(0.066) (0.086) (0.073)
Pakistani -0.470 -0.272 -0.282
(0.074)*** (0.103)*** (0.072)***
Bangladeshi -0.451 -0.102 -0.257
(0.089)*** (0.134) (0.100)**
Black Caribb. -0.295 0.026 -0.189
(0.087)*** (0.093) (0.080)**
Black African -0.406 -0.257 -0.413
(0.078)*** (0.075)*** (0.105)***
others -0.140 0.009 -0.021
(0.037)*** (0.041) (0.043)
Engl. partly used -0.457 -0.061 -0.071
(0.049)*** (0.059) (0.050)
Engl. never used -0.920 -0.278 -0.156
(0.136)*** (0.140)** (0.102)
income supp/job seeker -0.180 -0.162 -0.174
(0.041)*** (0.042)*** (0.059)***
LOA: help w/ writing 0.009 -0.006 -0.015
(0.025) (0.028) (0.031)
LOA: help w/ math -0.037 -0.028 -0.020
(0.023) (0.027) (0.026)
LOA: help w/ reading 0.020 0.003 0.039
(0.022) (0.023) (0.025)
LOA: read to child mother 0.047 0.007 0.013
(0.022)** (0.023) (0.020)
LOA: paint everyday -0.019 -0.027 0.029
(0.031) (0.038) (0.035)
LOA: read to the child father 0.061 -0.003 0.025
(0.032)* (0.032) (0.029)
breastfed up to 6 months 0.043 0.098 0.070
(0.025)* (0.030)*** (0.029)**
breastfed more then 6 months 0.099 0.144 0.109
(0.025)*** (0.028)*** (0.028)***
arrived less than 10 yrs ago -0.347 -0.009 -0.026
(0.049)*** (0.047) (0.048)
medium education mother 0.111 0.068 0.086
(0.022)*** (0.026)*** (0.024)***
high education mother 0.326 0.187 0.217
(0.032)*** (0.036)*** (0.037)***
medium education father 0.084 0.107 0.074
(0.024)*** (0.029)*** (0.027)***
high education father 0.188 0.118 0.141
(0.029)*** (0.032)*** (0.037)***
age mother at birth 20-29 0.168 0.100 0.082
(0.037)*** (0.043)** (0.046)*
age mother at birth 30-39 0.256 0.156 0.098
(0.037)*** (0.048)*** (0.047)**
age mother at birth more than 40 0.270 0.052 0.102
(0.074)*** (0.081) (0.086)
single parent -0.022 -0.123 -0.055
(0.088) (0.103) (0.127)
nr of children -0.071 -0.041 -0.054
(0.010)*** (0.011)*** (0.012)***
female 0.055 0.109 0.182
(0.020)*** (0.023)*** (0.022)***
¯rst born 0.158 -0.005 -0.041
(0.022)*** (0.026) (0.026)
birth weight 0.061 0.056 0.159
(0.016)*** (0.017)*** (0.018)***
no internet -0.194 -0.137 -0.131
(0.022)*** (0.026)*** (0.030)***
months early education 0.001 -0.003 -0.003
(0.001) (0.002)* (0.002)**
oecd neighbor poor indicator -0.074 -0.056 -0.093
(0.024)*** (0.027)** (0.028)***
neighborh litter indicator -0.116 0.002 -0.071
(0.066)* (0.085) (0.100)
neighborh. ethnic concentration -0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.001)* (0.001)* (0.002)
LEA dummies Y Y Y
Obs. 9585 9576 9556
R2 0.29 0.10 0.14
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DOI: 10.2870/12804Table A-5: E®ect of exposure to reception class on MCS tests controlling for
quarter of birth.
OLS 2SLS
speci¯cation 2 speci¯cation 3 speci¯cation 2 speci¯cation 3
vocabulary P Constr vocabulary P Constr vocabulary P Constr vocabulary P Constr
(white)*EXP 0.008 0.002 0.009 0.009 0.025 0.122 0.029 0.124
[0.005] [0.006] [0.005]* [0.007] [0.019] [0.025]*** [0.019] [0.026]***
(indian)*EXP -0.001 0.027 0.001 0.032 0.008 0.209 0.014 0.212
[0.023] [0.020] [0.024] [0.022] [0.075] [0.092]** [0.074] [0.092]**
(paki)*EXP 0.042 0.03 0.043 0.034 0.072 0.133 0.088 0.139
[0.019]** [0.017]* [0.019]** [0.016]** [0.043]* [0.052]** [0.045]* [0.054]**
(bangla)*EXP 0.032 0.034 0.035 0.041 0.075 0.262 0.071 0.261
[0.020] [0.027] [0.021] [0.027] [0.082] [0.101]** [0.083] [0.103]**
(bcaribb)*EXP -0.02 -0.016 -0.019 -0.011 0.163 0.56 0.179 0.567
[0.037] [0.043] [0.038] [0.045] [0.165] [0.237]** [0.162] [0.237]**
(bafrican)*EXP -0.001 0.027 -0.003 0.032 0.313 0.476 0.316 0.477
[0.015] [0.021] [0.015] [0.021] [0.171]* [0.211]** [0.169]* [0.209]**
(others)*EXP -0.006 -0.001 -0.004 0.006 -0.037 0.085 -0.033 0.087
[0.011] [0.013] [0.011] [0.013] [0.038] [0.042]** [0.038] [0.042]**
Obs 9317 9289 9317 9289 9317 9289 9317 9289
R2 0.25 0.13 0.18 0.08
notes: Standard errors in brackets. Only children with entry in September. EXP: months of reception class Speci¯cation
2: gender, birth weight, mother education, poverty indicator, single parent family, nr of children, quarter of birth and LEAs
dummies Speci¯cation 3: gender, birth weight, mother education, poverty indicator, single parent family, nr of children,
months of early education, language spoken at home, LEAs dummies and quarter of birth dummies
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(whites)*AGEE 0.049 0.068 0.068
[0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]***
(indian)*AGEE 0.05 0.053 0.054
[0.022]** [0.025]** [0.025]**
(pakistani)*AGEE 0.036 0.053 0.053
[0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]***
(banglad)*AGEE 0.031 0.017 0.018
[0.027] [0.030] [0.030]
(bcaribb)*AGEE -0.014 -0.014 -0.017
[0.046] [0.057] [0.056]
(bafrican)*AGEE 0.022 0.071 0.067
[0.035] [0.047] [0.047]
(other)*AGEE 0.057 0.08 0.08
[0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]***
Obs. 6590 6590 6590
notes: Standard errors in brackets. Only children with
entry in September. AGEE: age at entry. Speci¯cation
2: gender, birth weight, mother education, poverty indi-
cator, single parent family, nr of children, quarter of birth
and LEAs dummies Speci¯cation 3: gender, birth weight,
mother education, poverty indicator, single parent family,
nr of children, months of early education, language spoken
at home, LEAs dummies and quarter of birth dummies.
Table A-7: E®ect of exposure to reception class on MCS tests discarding children
who moved in last 5 years.
OLS 2SLS
speci¯cation 1 speci¯cation 2 speci¯cation 1 speci¯cation 2
vocabulary P Constr vocabulary P Constr vocabulary P Constr vocabulary P Constr
(white)*EXP 0.013 0.012 0.015 0.013 0.059 0.154 0.057 0.153
[0.006]** [0.007] [0.006]** [0.007]* [0.018]*** [0.024]*** [0.017]*** [0.024]***
(indian)*EXP 0.011 0.036 0.005 0.033 0.05 0.164 0.051 0.162
[0.029] [0.024] [0.026] [0.023] [0.096] [0.092]* [0.091] [0.090]*
(paki)*EXP 0.031 0.024 0.04 0.029 0.104 0.166 0.11 0.171
[0.023] [0.022] [0.020]** [0.020] [0.045]** [0.056]*** [0.044]** [0.054]***
(bangla)*EXP 0.049 0.06 0.042 0.055 0.156 0.273 0.104 0.249
[0.025]* [0.028]** [0.026] [0.030]* [0.095] [0.098]*** [0.086] [0.090]***
(bcaribb)*EXP -0.041 -0.04 -0.035 -0.035 0.265 0.603 0.239 0.584
[0.048] [0.048] [0.040] [0.045] [0.178] [0.283]** [0.163] [0.269]**
(bafrican)*EXP 0.001 0.037 0.001 0.037 0.149 0.413 0.203 0.451
[0.018] [0.028] [0.018] [0.028] [0.128] [0.259] [0.137] [0.259]*
(others)*EXP -0.003 0.013 0.003 0.017 -0.03 0.096 -0.013 0.108
[0.014] [0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.043] [0.041]** [0.039] [0.041]***
Obs. 7850 7825 7850 7825 7850 7825 7850 7825
R2 0.19 0.1 0.25 0.13
notes: Standard errors in brackets. Only children with entry in September. EXP: months of reception class Speci¯cation
1: gender, birth weight and LEAs dummies; Speci¯cation 2: gender, birth weight, mother education, poverty indicator,
single parent family, nr of children, and LEAs dummies.
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FSP Total score discarding children
who moved in the last 5 years
OLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2)
(whites)*AGEE 0.06 0.073 0.074
[0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.004]***
(indian)*AGEE 0.069 0.068 0.068
[0.024]*** [0.026]*** [0.026]**
(pakistani)*AGEE 0.052 0.06 0.059
[0.011]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]***
(banglad)*AGEE 0.025 -0.027 -0.005
[0.031] [0.037] [0.037]
(bcaribb)*AGEE 0.004 0.01 -0.006
[0.047] [0.059] [0.059]
(bafrican)*AGEE 0.022 0.117 0.115
[0.044] [0.056]** [0.053]**
(other)*AGEE 0.074 0.099 0.09
[0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]***
Obs. 5531 5531 5531
notes: Standard errors in brackets. Only children with
entry in September. AGEE: age at entry. Speci¯cation 1:
gender, birth weight and LEAs dummies, Speci¯cation 2:
gender, birth weight, mother education, poverty indicator,
single parent family, nr of children, and LEAs dummies
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Most LEAs establish a single entry point: all children, regardless of age, start school in the
September of the academic year in which they turn 5 (Policy A).
The other predominant policy foresees two possible entry points Policy B: Children born 1
September to 29 February start school in the September of the academic year in which they
turn 5; children born 1 March to 31 August start school in the January of the academic year
in which they turn 5.
Policy C: Children born 1 September to 31 December start school in the September of the
academic year in which they turn 5; children born 1 January to 31 August start school in
the January of the academic year in which they turn 5.
Policy D: Children born 1 September to 30 April start school in the September of the
academic year in which they turn 5; children born 1 May to 31 August start school in the
January of the academic year in which they turn 5.
A very tiny minority of LEAs foresees three points of entry: The rising 5 policy: Children
start school at the beginning of the term in which they turn 5, so children born 1September
to 31 December start school in September, children born 1 January to 30 April start school
in January and children born 1 May to 31 August start school in April (Policy E)
There is then a minor part of LEAs which leave school freedom to choose their own admission
policy, or where the admission policy is not clear. (Policy F)
From table 1B , it is clear the majority of children are in LEAs which apply the single entry
point in September: policy A
Table B-1: Admission policies
Admission Policy
A B C D E F
nr. children 7,144 1,470 565 65 172 273
percentage 73.70 15.16 5.83 0.67 1.77 2.82
Table B-2: Compliance rate to admission policy by ethnic group
COMPLIANCE RATE TO ADMISSION POLICY in percentage
whites Indian Pakistani Bangla b.Caribb b.African other
Compliance 0.88 0.93 0.91 0.80 0.79 0.76 0.88
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white Indian Pakistani Bangla b Caribb. b African others
age in months at test 62.37 62.76 62.68 62.94 62.58 62.78 62.58
(2.894) (2.761) (2.888) (2.913) (3.077) (3.010) (2.943)
age at school entry 55.06 54.95 54.96 54.83 55.29 55.25 54.91
(3.454) (3.356) (3.650) (3.634) (3.260) (3.366) (3.601)
months of recep class 7.251 7.721 7.435 7.870 7.194 7.442 7.585
(2.500) (2.382) (2.765) (2.612) (2.290) (2.605) (2.707)
Source: MCS wave 3.
Table B-4: Month of birth
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